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ABSTRACT 
Within competitive sport, the coach-performer relationship is of central 
importance to the performance enhancement process. Such relationships may 
develop over many years, with effective communication and mutual 
understanding core components. 
Despite the obvious importance of the coach-performer relationship, very little is 
known about coach-performer compatibility, especially from a cognitive 
perspective. Attribution theory has been shown to be useful in explaining 
behaviour, cognitions and affect, both in achievement and social settings. A key 
feature of this approach has been the emergence of what has been termed 'actor-
observer differences'; this has been little examined within sport psychology. 
Where attribution theory has been applied in sport, it has tended to focus 
exclusively on the performer. 
The aim of this research, therefore, is to explore coaches' and their performers' 
attributions, and specifically to examine the presence or otherwise of coach-
performer attribution differences. 
In the first study coaches' attributions and emotions following significant 
successful and less successful events involving their performers were recorded. 
Analyses revealed a large number of attribution-emotion associations, especially 
for 'less satisfied' and 'more surprised' coaches. For example, 'effort' and 
'personality' attributions are each highly associated with five emotions, with 
'personality' attributions having strong associations with affect across satisfaction 
groups. These findings are contrasted with previous studies exploring performers' 
attribution-affect relationships. 
A subsequent longitudinal study required coaches and their performers to keep a 
log of significant training and competition events, including their goals, degree of 
attainment and subsequent attributions. Coach and performer log entries were 
then contrasted. In addition, each member of the eight coach-performer dyads 
was interviewed on a four-weekly basis to explore further the significant sports 
events logged. Transcripts of these interviews were coded usmg the Leeds 
Attributional Coding System. Log and interview data were then contrasted. 
In relation to log data, group analyses revealed that the locus of causality 
dimension in particular might be critical when considering coach-performer 
compatibility. Findings suggest both successful and important events result in less 
compatibility on this dimension. Regarding individual dyads, results were more 
equivocal. Coaches and performers seem to agree more consistently on stability 
and controllability dimensions, suggesting greater agreement on the likelihood of 
outcomes reoccurring and the extent to which they have some control over them. 
From the interview data it appears that whilst some coach-performer differences 
exist, they are less prevalent than III prevIOus actor-observer research. 
Furthermore, individual dyads appear to function despite the presence of 
differences in some dimension scores. 
The results are discussed in relation to Rejeski's (1979) model of coach-
performer conflict and the methods adopted in these studies. It is concluded that 
the coach-performer relationship and attributional compatibility in particular are 
aspects of sport psychology requiring further investigation. 
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Introduction 1 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
Sport psychology has grown out of a recognition of the need to study the 
psychological determinants of sports participation and performance, and the 
application of psychological techniques available to render the sports performer 
better equipped to cope with the demands of sport. Within this multi-dimensional 
field, research has tended to focus on the performer and his or her interaction with 
the sports task (e.g., examining the effects of anxiety on performance). Despite 
the call by Larming in the first volume of the Journal of Sport Psychology for 
attention to be paid to the coach-performer relationship, relatively little attention 
to this has been paid in the research literature. 
"One of the critical psychological considerations is the interaction 
of the personality of the coach ... and the athlete. Athletic 
performance can be enhanced or hindered by giving attention to 
the personality compatibility between the athletes and coaches" 
(Larming, 1979, p.267). 
Whilst this personality compatibility may manifest itself in a number of important 
ways, of particular interest here are the causal explanations given by coaches and 
performers for sports outcomes and the influence the process of making them has 
on significant aspects of the coaching process, e.g., decision-making, goal-setting, 
coach and performer motivation. 
Coaching has been defined by a number of researchers and practitioners (e.g., 
Fairs, 1987; Cross & Lyle, 1999), but most agree that coaching is a multi-
dimensional process which is both dynamic and interpersonal and centred on 
improving performance toward somy end competition. Opportunities for coaching 
as a career are growing and there are now approximately 10500 coaches 
registered with the SportscoachUK (formally the National Coaching Foundation) 
and, undoubtedly, many more that are not. Coach education has become an 
integral part of sports development over the last 15-20 years. 
Despite this growth, it is only relatively recently that the coaching process itself 
has come under academic scrutiny (e.g., Cross & Lyle, 1999). A variety of 
theories and methods have been developed or adapted to examine group dynamics 
within sport. Within this broad area the coach-performer relationship has received 
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some, if limited, attention. Whilst there has been this "general lack of attention to 
coaching behaviour in sports performance research" (Cross & Lyle, 1999, p.viii), 
a review of sport psychology by Hardy and Jones (1992) identified a number of 
important relationships within sport in need of further study, one of which was 
that between the coach and performer. Outlining the approaches taken in the 
research literature, Hardy and Jones identify a number that are relevant here. 
For example, Chelladurai's (1984) multi-dimensional model ofleadership in sport 
has received a great deal of attention in sport psychology. Within this model the 
personal characteristics of the leader (considered here to be the coach), the 
performers' and coach's needs and desires, and the situational demands are 
considered. Congruence between the behaviour displayed by the leader (coach), 
the leader behaviour preferred by the performers, and the leader behaviour 
required by the circumstances in which they are exhibited are seen in this model 
as central to determining performance and satisfaction. Also relevant here, the 
personal characteristics of the leader and performers, in addition to situational 
characteristics, are seen as influencing leadership behaviour. Chelladurai and 
Saleh (1980) developed the Leadership Scale for Sports (LSS) to measure 
coaches' leadership behaviour and research using this device has generally 
supported the model. Although not the focus of this research, findings using this 
measure are seen as relevant to understanding the coach-performer dyad. Results 
obtained in studies using this approach have suggested that performers tend to 
prefer coaching that emphasises training and instruction and positive feedback, 
although the experience level of performers may mediate this finding; 
experienced performers tend to prefer more social support than inexperienced 
performers. Furthermore, males tend to prefer more social support than females 
(Chelladurai & Carron, 1983), although potential differences between same and 
cross-gender coach-performer relationships require further study (Hardy & Jones, 
1992). However, this model may represent an oversimplification of the 
interactions between situation, coach and performer attributes, underplaying the 
role of perception and the influences on it. For example, it can be argued that the 
coach's actual behaviour is influenced by perceptions of the circumstances he or 
she is in and the perceived needs of the performers; these perceptions are 
themselves potentially distorted by a variety of cognitive, emotional and 
Introduction 3 
motivational factors. Furthermore, no relative weighting is gIven to the 
antecedents of prescribed, preferred and actual behaviour: under what 
circumstances might each of the three antecedents of behaviour carry most 
influence? Another important question is to what degree are performers' 
preferences conveyed and Ullderstood by the coach? 
Based on research in organisational psychology, Chelladurai and Haggerty (1978) 
proposed a number of important variables in need of consideration when 
examining dyadic decision-making processes in sport. Seven situational variables 
were identified as influential: time pressure, quality requirements, coach's relative 
information, problem complexity, acceptance requirements, coach's power and 
group integration. These variables were considered in relation to three decision-
making styles: autocratic, participative and delegative. These can be seen to be 
relevant in the attribution process and may mediate the information processing 
Ulldertaken. Findings using this approach have included participants' apparent 
preference for and the effectiveness of the autocratic style when under external 
stress (Rosenbaum & Rosenbaum, 1971), greater preference expressed by males 
over females for more autocratic decision-making (Chelladurai & Saleh, 1978), 
and experienced performers' preference for more autocratic decision-making than 
less experienced performers (Chelladurai & Carron, 1983). Also of interest here is 
the finding by Challadurai, Haggerty, and Baxter (1989) that situational factors 
accounted for approximately three times more variance in performers' preferred 
decision-making style than did individual difference variables. This is seen to be 
consistent with findings in attribution research (e.g., Jones & Nisbett, 1972) that 
actors (those engaged in an act or behaviour) attribute their actions more to 
situational factors than internal factors, in contrast to observers for whom the 
opposite pattern is true (the so-called actor-observer effect). However, Hardy and 
Jones (1992) call for future research to focus on the specific situation-by-
performer interaction across situations that occur rather than the global performer 
preferences and coaches' leadership behaviour evidenced in these studies. 
The preoccupation with the sports performer is perhaps not surprising. As will be 
detailed later in the evaluation of the actor-observer effect, observers of behaviour 
tend to focus attention on the immediacy of the act and the actor and not the 
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surrounding spatial or temporal environment: perhaps sports scientists, too, have 
tended to focus to too greater degree on the sports performer and not the factors 
influential in the sport environment. 
An approach to interpersonal compatibility which has received some attention in 
the sports psychology literature, and seen as pertinent here, is Schutz's (1966) 
model of Fundamental Interpersonal Relations Orientation (FIRO). Schutz 
developed a measuring device, the so-called Fundamental Interpersonal Relations 
Orientation - Behaviour (FIRO-B) questionnaire. Initially for use in industrial 
settings, it allows the researcher to measure individuals' interpersonal styles in 
terms of their need for three areas of behaviour: inclusion, control and affection, 
both from the perspective of behaviour expressed toward others and that wanted 
from others. The general principle is that interacting dyads are most compatible 
when each individual's need to give and receive behaviour in these three domains 
is complementary to that of the dyadic partner (that is, each satisfies the other's 
behavioural preferences). For Schutz, group or dyadic performance is partially 
dependent upon this compatibility!. 
Amongst the limited research in sport psychology using this approach some 
interesting findings have been reported. For example, Pease, Locke and 
Burlingame (1971) found that player-coach incompatibility, as measured with the 
FIRO-B, was a factor in the player's decision to leave the squad, although it 
should be noted that this study was set within a school athletics programme and 
may have included a number of confounding variables from outside sport. 
Carron and Bennett (1977) studied effective interpersonal interactions between 
coaches and performers in a number of sports. They found that inclusion 
compatibility was most significant in distinguishing extreme compatible and 
incompatible dyads, with the latter being characterised by detached, withdrawn 
and isolated behaviour on the part of both the coach and the performer. Carron 
and Garvie (1978) found that levels of withdrawn from and communication with 
I It should be noted that some studies found that incompatibility lead to greater performance 
effectiveness; the degree offace-to-face (Hill, 1975) contact and the nature of the task (Landers & 
Luschen, 1974) were seen as important mediating factors. 
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the coach (indicating inclusion behaviour) were significantly related to 
subjectively measured performance. 
However, in a subsequent study, Home and Carron (1985) found that none of the 
FIRO-B variables discriminated compatible and incompatible dyads but, rather, 
discrepancy between preferred and perceived reward behaviour (measured using 
the LSS) was the most accurate indictor of compatibility. 
This approach may be of particular relevance when two attributors work 
interactively together; it has, however, less application for self-attributions. 
Schutz' need areas may act to bias or confound the type of information selected 
and used in the attribution process. 
From the above it can be seen that a number of approaches have been adopted 
when examining the coach-performer relationship. 
Since the 1950s an approach which has received considerable attention in various 
areas of general psychology (e.g., educational, clinical, interpersonal) is 
attribution theory, itself a collection of related theoretical and empirical 
contributions by numerous authors (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Attributions are the 
causes individuals ascribe to their own or others' actions or the outcomes of 
people's behaviour. A number of theories are reported in the next chapter, but 
common to these approaches is the belief that people search for causes for 
observed or experienced events in their lives in order to predict and, hence, 
maintain some degree of control over them; that is, there is a basic need to answer 
the question why? (Hewstone, 1989). A distinction should be made here between 
attribution theory and attributional theories. The former is concerned with how 
perceivers use information to arrive at a causal explanation; the focus is on the 
antecedents of causal ascriptions and research is primarily concerned with testing 
theoretically-derived hypotheses (Hewstone, 1989). The latter attempts to predict, 
using the tenets of attribution theory, how people will respond to events in a 
particular domain (e.g., achievement settings, social situations), that is the 
consequences of attributions (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). 
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These approaches in social-cognitive psychology have been used to study aspects 
of human behaviour in a variety of contexts as disparate as helping behaviour, 
depression, family dysfunction, corporate market research and motivation in 
sport. The diversity of its use points to its robustness; however, within sport 
psychology it has been employed in a rather limited fashion focussing primarily 
on performers' attributions and subsequent affect (Biddle, Hanrahan, & Sellars, 
2001). Given its widespread use in interpersonal settings (Weiner, 1992), it is 
surprising that it has not been utilised to study interpersonal relations in sport, 
especially given the highly outcome-oriented nature of competitive sport and the 
often public quest for explanations for successes and failures. It could be argued 
that this is, in part, due to the lack of sensitivity of the measuring devices 
available and the difficulty of measuring attributions in their natural settings, 
issues addressed in the current research. 
"Sports coaching is a normative activity. As such, it is underpinned by values, 
philosophies and ideologies" (Cross & Lyle, 1999, p.viii). From this position it 
can be seen that the process of coaching, including the interaction with the 
performer (and others), is ripe for attribution research: for example, how do these 
values and philosophies affect the attribution process? Since attribution (and 
attributional) theory suggests causal ascription affects future behaviour, decisions 
and motivation (Biddle, 1993), and can be the basis for interpersonal conflict 
(Rejeski, 1979), it seems a highly appropriate medium through which to explore 
the coach-performer relationship. 
Previous attribution studies in sport psychology have tended to be quantitative, 
looking for patterns of attributions or differences between situations, 
experimental conditions, or groups of individuals. Developments within other 
sub-disciplines of psychology have created new measuring tools, allowing 
qualitative and quantitative methods to be combined where appropriate. A 
preparedness to utilise an eclectic approach to research has been called for by a 
number of applied sports scientists and researchers (e.g., Hardy & Jones, 1992). It 
is the intention of this research project to combine qualitative and quantitative 
approaches to further reveal sports coaches' and performers' causal beliefs and 
evaluate their potential impact on compatibility and conflict. 
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In the next chapter an overview will be given of the major attribution theories, 
foJlowed by an examination of key research findings pertinent to the current 
study. 
Chapter 2. Review of Literature 
Introduction 
Review of Literature 8 
This review of literature will consider first the major models in attribution theory 
that have underpinned most of the research in the area; in doing so, this will 
provide a historical overview of the field. It will also form the basis from which 
to demonstrate how attribution research has moved from a narrow application of 
attribution theory in intra-personal settings to more diverse applications at a 
variety of social levels. 
This will be followed by an examination of the most commonly used methods of 
attribution measurement. Where pertinent, specific application to sports settings 
will be reviewed. In order to place attributions in context, and to consider the 
major facets of Rejeski's (1979) model of attributional conflict which underpins 
the current research, antecedent conditions affecting causal ascription and the 
consequences of making attributions will then be considered. Therefore: 
• the initial part of the review will reflect the largely intra-personal focus of 
attribution research in sport; 
• in order to evaluate the potential for attributional conflict, inter-personal 
considerations will then be reviewed, including the methods available to assess 
attributions in interpersonal settings and the significance of verbal 
communication on attribution processes; 
• the review will conclude by considering recent advances in the assessment of 
attributions in discourse and making the case for such an approach to the study 
of coach-performer compatibility and potential conflict. 
What are attributions and why are they important? 
Attributions are statements made by people about the causes ascribed to their own 
or others' actions or behaviour. This expression of causal belief is also labelled 
causal explanation (Munton, Silvester, Stratton, & Hanks, 1999). People search 
for causes for observed or experienced events in their lives in order to predict and 
hence maintain some degree of control over future events (Hewstone, 1989). 
Heider (1944, 1958) is credited with bringing to the attention of social scientists 
the significance of attributions as an area worthy of explicit study; his model of 
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nai've psychology is outlined below. However, before the early theoretical models 
are presented, some points of clarification are required. The distinction has been 
made between four levels of explanation in social psychology (Doise, 1986): 
levels I and IT refer to intra-personal and inter-personal explanation and have 
been the primary focus of most attribution research. Levels ID (inter-group) and 
IV (societal) have received much less attention in the research literature. In 
relation to attribution research, Hewstone (1989) considers all four levels to be 
social in the sense that attributions are based on social information as a result of 
social interaction, attributions are the causes of people's actions, and attributions 
are social in that groups or societies may share explanations due to socialisation 
and common experience. 
There is some debate in the literature concerning the distinction between causes 
and reasons (Munton et aI., 1999). Whilst this may seem an issue of semantics, it 
is worth clarifYing the position here. A cause may be considered to be "that which 
brings about a change", whereas a reason is "that for which change is brought 
about" (Buss, 1978, p.1311), although others have argued that a reason is merely 
a specialised type of cause (Kruglanski, 1975). Fiske and Taylor (1991) suggest 
the need to distinguish the more commonly asked what brought about an outcome 
(cause) and why did it occur (reason). 
This distinction aside, the study of attributions has been conducted in a range of 
social, health, clinical and achievement settings (Biddle et aI., 2001) and has 
received attention in the sport psychology literature since the 1970s, although this 
has declined through the 1990s. 
Historical overview of the major attribution theories 
The early attribution theories are presented here, although many of the associated 
propositions have since been modified or received qualification. However, as 
stated by Hewstone (1989, p.29), they "ushered in the halcyon days of attribution 
theory ... (and) have all been paid the tribute of unrelenting criticism". 
In his original work, Heider (1944) considers the significance ofunitjormation as 
central to the attribution process. For Heider, the causes (or origins) and their 
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subsequent effects, the actor and the act, make up a causal unit and by studying 
the relationship between cause and effect, inferences about the event can be 
made. For Heider (1944), attributions to the person were more likely than 
situational attributions since the act and the actor become inextricably linked and, 
therefore, persons are seen as the ''prototype of origins" (Heider, 1944, p.359). 
For Heider, this often led to an underestimation of situational factors, especially 
when an act was considered intentional; this phenomenon he referred to as the 
fundamental attributional error. 
Heider's subsequent work, 'The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations' (1958), 
focussed on naive (or common sense) psychology, where common sense was 
seen to guide behaviour. Here, the intention of actors to commit an act was seen 
as significant in inferring dispositional causes. For Heider, actions are more likely 
to be seen as intended if they are goal-directed (he termed equifinality), if the 
person is seen as the agent of the action, rather than environmental conditions 
(local causality), and where the person exerts effort to achieve the outcome 
(exertion). 
Associated with this approach are some fundamental assumptions. Firstly, one 
must understand how people perceive and describe their social world in order to 
explain behaviour. Secondly, humans have a basic desire to control and make 
predictable their environment through explanations of their own and others' 
behaviour. Thirdly, the process of perceiving social actions is similar to that of 
perceiving objects; therefore, to understand behaviour, people tend to look for 
dispositional qualities of the actor (Biddle et ai., 2001). Fiske and Taylor (1991) 
suggest that Heider's common-sense psychology can best be understood studying 
"the natural language that people employ to describe their experience" (p.24). 
However, this has often been ignored in attribution research. 
Heider's works were the catalyst for many subsequent theories and models of 
causal attribution, some of which follow here. 
Jones and Davis' (1965) theory of correspondent inferences focuses on other 
person attributions rather than self-attributions and is, therefore, of significance 
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here. For Jones and Davis, attributors attempt to infer that behaviour and the 
intention that caused it correspond to some stable trait of the actor (Hewstone, 
1989). Therefore, in this model the attribution of intention must precede a 
dispositional inference. To do this the perceiver must consider that the actor knew 
the potential consequences of the act and had the choice to act differently. Since 
some dispositions are clearly not intended, e.g., shyness, this approach is only 
relevant for actions which have some degree of choice and not involuntary 
occurrences (Hewstone, 1989). However, as Hewstone (1989, p.16) notes, 
"perceived freedom of choice" is perhaps of most relevance for inferring 
intention. Jones and Davis suggest that the perceiver contrasts the consequences 
of chosen and non-chosen actions, using the non-common effects principle. That 
is, a correspondent inference is made when the consequences of an act are 
relatively unique or distinctive and by considering the social desirability of the 
act: the less socially desirable an act, the stronger the correspondent inference. 
This assessment of others' dispositional qualities is subject to at least two biases. 
If the actions of another affect a perceiver's interests, that is they have hedonic 
relevance, then the likelihood of making a correspondent inference and, hence, a 
dispositional ascription, increases (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). It would seem likely 
that in a coach-performer relationship hedonic relevance would be relatively high. 
The coach's training progranune for the athlete is highly likely to be perceived as 
fundamental to the athlete's preparation for competition and the athlete's 
performances are highly influential on the coach's reputation. 
In addition to hedonic relevance, the perceiver may perceive that the actor 
intended to bring about the outcomes experienced. This association between the 
actor's intention and the subsequent behaviour/outcome is referred to as 
personalism. When operating, the perceiver is more likely to infer disposition and 
experience associated heightened affect (positive or negative depending on the 
behaviour or outcome). 
Other potential limitations to this approach include research findings which 
indicate that perceivers often attend to occurrences, and not non-occurrences 
which Jones and Davis posit as a significant part of their theory (Nisbett & Ross, 
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1980). Furthermore, expectancy-confirming information may be of greater value 
to the perceiver than this theory would suggest (Crittenden, 1983). One further 
limitation stated by Hewstone (1989) is the erroneous assumption sometimes 
made that dispositional and causal attribution processes are necessarily similar. 
Some researchers (e.g., Hamilton, 1988) have found that dispositional attributions 
are made more spontaneously and involve less cognitive effort than causal 
attributions (i.e., explanations). 
Kelley's (1967, 1972) focus within attribution research centres on the type of 
information that is processed in order to reach a causal attribution. He suggested 
two possible processes, one for when multiple sources of information are 
available from which to infer covariation of causes and effects, the other for 
when the attributor has only a single observation from which to infer causality 
from the configuration of factors that are plausible causes. Kelley (1967) 
developed his theory of covariation using an approach analogous to the statistical 
method of analysis of variance (ANOV A), which examines changes in a 
dependent variable (the outcome or event) following manipulation of the 
independent variable (the conditions or cause). For Kelley, attributors process 
information regarding the extent to which circumstances co-vary with the 
observed behaviour or events. 
Various types of information help lay attributors arrive at a causal decision. The 
degree to which one person's behaviour is similar to that of others in similar 
circumstances provides consensus information. Consistency information relates to 
the degree to which a person's behaviour is constant over time when under the 
same circumstances. Finally, distinctiveness information refers to the extent to 
which a person's behaviour differs between conditions or situations. Whilst 
support for this model was forthcoming (e.g., McArthur, 1972), Hewstone (1989) 
reminds us that there are various limitations to be borne in mind. For example, 
correlation cannot be used to infer causation, merely association. Perhaps of 
greater significance is the question of the degree to which perceivers actually 
seek out these three covariation information sources and, when they do, how 
skilled are they in using them? Some researchers (e.g., Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984) 
have suggested that perceivers often lack these skills. Finally, even when the 
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principles of the ANOV A appear to be adhered to, the actual infonnation 
processing mechanisms may be very different. 
Kelley developed a second model, the configuration theory, for when such 
covariation infonnation is not present. Where data are incomplete, or the 
perceiver lacks the motivation to assess them, attributions can be made using 
causal schemata. Built up from past experiences of cause-effect relationships, 
these schemata guide the attribution process. Kelley outlines two schemata, the 
multiple sufficient cause (MSC) schema, where anyone of a number of possible 
causes can by itself bring about the specified effect and is, therefore, most likely 
in commonly occurring events, and the more complex multiple necessary cause 
(MNC) schema, where a number of causes must all be present together to bring 
about the effect and, thus, most appropriate for atypical events (Weiner, 1992). 
The advantage of these and other schemata proposed by Kelley is that they allow 
perceivers to make attributions in the absence of complete infonnation by 
providing a fonn of causal shorthand (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). Despite the appeal 
of such a model, Fiedler (1982), amongst others, has criticised this approach for 
lacking empirical support. Furthennore, it could be argued that causal schemata 
may be a rather complex model for a common-sense attribution process 
(Hewstone, 1989). 
People with substantial domain experience may adopt more complex principles 
(Fiske & Taylor, 1991). The principles of the ANOV A model provide 
generalisations; however, sometimes attributions are based not on typical cases 
but on more extreme examples of behaviour (Kelley & Michela, 1980). 
Therefore, in addition to the covariation rule, other infonnation-processing rules 
may operate, such as similarity, temporal contiguity and the salience effect (Fiske 
& Taylor, 1991). 
Furthennore, people do not necessarily employ content-free attributional 
principles. The influence of communication on causal explanation has received 
some attention (e.g., Antaki, 1985) and is considered further below (see pages 60-
64). However, the broader role of interaction in the attributing process has 
received attention only recently. Clearly, when faced with disappointment or 
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unexpected outcomes, many people turn to others for explanations and help. In 
the sport context, the extent to which coach and athlete may look to each other for 
a causal explanation has not been investigated. The social processes surrounding 
the making of attributions has led some (e.g., Stratton, Munton, Hanks, Hard, & 
Davidson, 1986; Sousa & Leyens, 1987) to call for methods to enable causal 
explanations to be elicited from natural discourse. 
Integration of the three preceding models has proved difficult; indeed the 
products of such attempts (e.g., an integrated framework produced by Jones & 
McGillis, 1976) have received little research focus. However, some 
commonalities are evident: 
• All three models consider how the perceiver mediates between an event 
(stimulus) and causal inference (response). 
• All models consider the perceiver as a layperson, attempting to explain the 
surrounding world. 
• All models seek to explain what and how information is used to reach an 
explanation in response to the core question why? (Hewstone, 1989). 
• Each approach tends to focus on specific circumstances and attempts to model 
the types of information used by the perceiver and the processes through 
which this information passes, attempting to develop the rules of causal 
ascription. 
Although each has received critical comment, subsequent research foci have 
drawn heavily on these early works. However, these classic theories have tended 
not to be adopted in their original form in sports attribution research. 
Of particular interest to those studying attributions in sport has been the work in 
achievement settings of Weiner (Weiner, 1979; Weiner, 1986; Weiner, 1992). 
Weiner was instrumental in creating a taxonomy of causes. He suggests that 
causes can be classified along a number of causal dimensions; arguably the first 
was Heider's personal-environmental distinction which was subsequently 
progressed by Rotter (1966) in his development of the internal-external 
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personality classification. Weiner proposes these dimensions are significant in 
determining subsequent psychological and behavioural consequences. 
Weiner identified three causal dimensions: locus of causality (is the cause internal 
or external to the actor?), stability (does the cause vary over time or is it 
constant?), and controllability (can the actor exert volitional influence over the 
cause?). This classification enables any cause to be located within a 2x2x2 matrix 
of causal dimensions (see Table I). For example, 'temporary effort' can be 
located as internal, unstable and controllable. This was a particularly important 
development as it aIIowed any cause to be classified according to these 
dimensions and enabled researchers to move away from designs in which subjects 
had to select from a limited number of previously identified, albeit salient, causes. 
This aIIowed the criticism that only a limited number of causes were presented to 
respondents to be addressed. For example, Roberts and Pascuzzi (1979) found 
that ability, effort, task difficulty and luck (the causes most commonly employed 
by those narrowly adopting the causal elements in Weiner's model) were used to 
explain only 45% of sporting outcomes. 
Table 1: Possible causes of achievement outcomes (Fiske and Taylor, 1991, 
p.51). 
Internal 
Stable Unstable 
Controllable Typical effort Temporary effort 
exerted exerted 
Uncontrol- Aptitude 
lable 
Mood 
External 
Stable Unstable 
Some forms 
of teacher 
bias 
Task 
difficulty 
Unusual 
help from 
others 
Luck 
These dimensions have endured in research across a range of contexts and the 
three-dimensional matrix has received factor-analytic support (Meyer, 1980). It 
wiII be seen later that additional dimensions have been added in some models and 
research designs, such as intentionality (Weiner, 1979), globality (Abramson, 
Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978), and excusability (de Jong, Kooman, & 
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Mellengergh, 1988), although Weiner (1986) has argued that these dimensions 
have failed to receive sufficient theoretical and empirical support. 
Despite this criticism, there appears a need to look beyond the rather narrow 
dimensional focus adopted so far in sport psychology, which has tended to utilise 
Weiner's three-dimension approach. 
Attributions in sport research 
Sport attribution research relied initially on assessment inventories developed in 
other areas of psychology. Early studies adopted a checklist approach, where 
attributions were analysed individually (e.g., Biddle & Hill, 1988) or coded by 
dimension, allowing only limited interpretation of the findings. In the case of 
dimension coding there is also the danger of committing the fundamental 
attribution research error, whereby the researcher gives attributions dimensional 
qualities which are not consistent with the attributor's meaning. 
The development of the Causal Dimension Scale (CDS; Russell, 1982) allowed 
respondents to rate their own attributions along a range of causal dimensions. 
This development spawned a variety of sport attribution research, although the 
dimension scales and the items within them are not without their critics. For 
example, Biddle (1988) has questioned whether intentionality and responsibility 
are conceptually related to controllability and whether evidence exists for 
separating these constructs. Furthermore, the CDS includes statements for 
intentionality and controllability which are potentially confounding (Biddle et aI., 
2001). 
The successor to the CDS, the CSDII (McAuley, Duncan, & Russell, 1992), was 
developed in part through studies in the physical domain; therefore its use in sport 
can be made with some confidence. Since some researchers (e.g., Vlachopoulos, 
Biddle, & Fox, 1996) have reported children's difficulty in using the CDSII, a 
modified CDSII for use in the physical domain with children (CDSII-C; 
Vlachopoulos et aI., 1996) has been developed, although this needs further 
psychometric testing (Biddle et al., 2001). 
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Sport attribution research will be considered in the following sections and 
relevant findings reviewed as appropriate. To do this, it is useful to consider the 
processes associated with causal analysis and ascription along a path of 
antecedents, causal attribution and consequences, in relation to social, cognitive 
and affective parameters. The following sections consider the antecedents and 
consequences of attribution-making. 
Attributions: antecedents and consequences 
Attribution antecedents 
Given attributors' need to understand and control their social world, a major 
question in attribution research is, Why do people make the attributions they do? 
The early theories presented so far (those of Heider, Jones and Davis, Kelley) 
suggest attributors as logical, causal analysts. However, a number of researchers 
have made qualifications to these earlier attribution models. These suggest that 
information may be selectively coded, stored, recalled and used, and that this 
information processing is subject to various potential distortions (e.g., 
motivational and perceptual biases). Therefore, whilst the processing of 
information available at the time may follow aspects of the rules presented so far, 
this process is likely to be influenced by pre-existing beliefs already held by the 
attributor (Kelley & Michela, 1980). Furthermore, individuals may have 
particular predispositions to certain attributional styles because of their 
perceptional position, the hedonic relevance of the act, gender, level of 
maturation, previous experience and cultural heritage. Such differences may help 
to explain why two people disagree about the causes of an outcome and, hence, 
contribute to the potential for conflict. In the following sections, a number of 
biases and other factors influential to the attribution process and pertinent to 
coach-performer attribution research are reviewed. 
One of the most commonly cited biases shown to exist in the attribution-making 
process is the fundamental attributional error (FAE). Ross (1977) defines the 
FAE as, "the tendency for attributers to underestimate the impact of situational 
factors and to overestimate the role of dispositional factors in controlling 
behaviour" (p.183). This bias has been shown in numerous studies (e.g., Nisbett 
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& Ross, 1980; Ross & Anderson, 1982), although it is not without its critics (see 
Funder, 1987). 
This error has been explained in various ways. For example, it has been argued 
that the F AE is due to a perceptual bias; the actor's behaviour is more salient to 
an observer than the surrounding enviromnent (Heider's, 1944, unit formation). 
Alternatively, other researchers (e.g., Peterson, 1980) have shown that memory 
over the passage of time tends to favour dispositional recall for self-attributions, 
although this tendency may be mediated by the focus of post-event information 
processing (Funder, 1982). Some researchers have found societal differences in 
the tendency to focus on dispositional versus situational causal factors. For 
example, Western societies tend to emphasise individual agency to a greater 
degree than Eastern cultures (e.g., Ybarra & Stephan, 1999). Furthermore, 
transient factors such as mood (Forgas, 1998) have been shown to influence the 
likelihood of committing the F AE. 
Self-serving bias 
"The tendency to take credit for success and deny responsibility for failure is 
known as the self-serving attributional bias" (Fiske & Taylor, 1991, p.78). This 
tendency has been shown to operate in a variety of settings, including sport 
(Biddle et aI., 2001), and appears to intensifY over time from event (Burger, 
1986). The tendency to self-enhance by taking credit for success appears stronger 
than the tendency to self-protect by denying responsibility for failure (Millar & 
Ross, 1975). Responses to negative events would seem to be more susceptible to 
mediation by states, such as self-esteem (Campbell, 1986), whereby high self-
esteem individuals attribute negative events more to external and unstable factors, 
with low self-esteem individuals tending to attribute internally. 
Support for both cognitive (e.g., Millar & Ross, 1975) and motivational (e.g., 
Reiss & Taylor, 1984) explanations for these effects has been found in the 
literature and Fiske and Taylor (1991) suggest that it is likely that cognitive and 
motivational factors co-contribute to these effects. However, it should be noted 
that the reported differences on the locus of causality dimension might reflect 
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degrees of internality rather than real internal-external group differences (Biddle 
et al., 2001). 
Santamaria and Furst (1994) explored the explanations given by elite student 
long-distance runners for their self-selected most and least successful races using 
the revised CDS-IT. Results revealed significant differences between the most 
successful and least successful races on both the locus of causality and 
controllability (personal control, but not external control) dimensions, but no 
significant difference on the stability dimension. Specifically, for successful 
outcomes, explanations were more internal and controllable. There is, therefore, 
some support for the operation of a self-serving bias. The authors argue that the 
lack of significant difference findings for the stability and control-external 
dimensions might be due to the time-scale over which athletes had to recall 
outcomes, in some cases over 10 years, which it was argued would more severely 
affect these dimensions. 
Egocentric bias 
The phenomenon of taking more responsibility (as opposed to taking credit for 
success and denial of it for failure as in the self-serving bias) for a joint venture 
than would be ascribed by others is known as the egocentric bias. This bias may 
occur for a variety of reasons. It may be due to a motivation to take more credit 
than is due, i.e., a motivational bias, or alternatively, because a person can recall 
more readily the contribution made to a joint endeavour, an example of a 
cognitive or, more precisely, a memory bias. Researchers have put forward a 
number of possible explanations for such disparities in responsibility-taking: 
selective encoding and storage; differential retrieval; informational disparities; 
and motivational influences (Ross & Sicoly, 1979). 
To illustrate the phenomenon, Ross and Sicoly's (1979) series of experiments 
looked at responsibility claimed for joint activity by married couples. They found 
that subjects provided more examples of their own input than of their spouse's 
and the greater the tendency to recall self-relevant behaviours, the greater was the 
overestimation of responsibility. This suggests that biases in attributions of 
responsibility are mediated by biases in availability. 
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Considering a more natural setting (explaining the turning point in a previously 
played basketball game), Ross and Sicoly (1979) found that greater availability 
for outcomes and responsibility for outcomes was given to team-mates than to 
opponents, suggesting a group-level effect, a so-called group egocentrism; this 
effect was regardless of the outcome. It was suggested that as this team played 
together and would continue to do so, this may have encouraged players to 
attribute to factors over which they could maintain some control. Subsequent 
experiments where subjects' attention was manipulated led these authors to 
reconsider the findings from the basketball experiment, as players were asked to 
respond to 'Our team won/lost our last game because .. .', focussing attention on 
their, and not the opposing, team. In examining these results collectively, it 
appears that encoding and storage, information disparities and motivational 
influences are not necessary determinants of the egocentric bias and that these 
biases may well be multi-determined (Ross & Sicoly, 1979). The two biases 
(availability and attributions of responsibility) appear significantly correlated, 
although causation cannot be inferred. 
These biases may have implications for the coach-performer relationship. 
Differential taking or denying responsibility and/or credit for a performer's 
outcomes could result in either positive consequences, e.g., the coach supporting 
the performer by accepting some responsibility following a poor performance, or 
the potential for conflict, e.g., disproportionately recalling one's own 
contributions following successes. 
Adding to the cognitive versus motivational bias debate, Cates-Zientek and 
Breakwell (1991) consider attributions at various stages of the attribution-making 
process: pre-, during, and post-game. Previous studies have tended to focus on 
retrospective attributions: those made after the result or outcome is known. 
Kelley (1967) has previously argued that attributors use causal schemata when 
developing attributions. Furthermore, Brawley (1984) has suggested that 
egocentric biases affect the information used in making causal ascriptions, citing 
cases of men's doubles tennis teams and coach-performer pairs who more easily 
remember their own input to team effort than their partners'. Others have found 
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the egocentric bias operating, internal attributions being made regardless of the 
outcome or perceived success (e.g., McAuley, 1985; Robinson & Howe, 1987). 
Cates-Zientek and Breakwell propose that different information regarding the 
score, i.e., total uncertainty pre-game, partial uncertainty during the game and 
total certainty post-game, is available at each stage in the game. Furthermore, if 
the factors believed pre-game to be likely to influence the result are still 
considered so post-game, these expectations may influence the post-game 
attributions. Thus, if a particular quality is associated with an outcome (e.g., hard 
work with sporting success), such a belief may result in specific attributions of 
hard work for successful outcomes. The issue of this investigation was, therefore, 
whether these beliefs (or stereotypes) would be retained as outcome information 
became available. 
Despite the limitation of only considering the contributions of ability, effort, luck 
and ease and difficulty of the game, data supported the notions of a self-serving 
bias and of the existence a schema operating. Winners' and losers' attributions 
changed over time: effort was considered less important at half-time and task-
ease considered less important as the game progressed. Winners and losers 
differed only in external attributions, with losers' attributions to luck and task-
ease/difficulty growing over time, the opposite being true for winners. These 
authors conclude that these findings support the self-serving bias in that the 
emphasis on external factors varies between the two groups over time. Ability 
and effort were also more credited for personal success across the three time 
measurements; again, only the external factor, ease of task, varied between 
winners and losers. Collectively, these results support a motivational bias rather 
than an informational one. They also indicate that causal schemata may exist in 
the form of pre-outcome expectations which, in this study, is suggested as 
probably a function of playing experience. 
Of great significance to the present study is consideration of the need of coaches 
to understand the expectations and explanations given by their athletes for the 
future and past performances, in addition to their own. Cates-Zientek and 
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Breakwell call for athletes to undergo attribution training as part of the 
preparation for competition. This topic will be returned to later (see page 53). 
Biases in interpersonal settings 
Of particular interest in the present study is the impact of cognitive and 
motivational biases which may operate in close relationships. Brawley (1984) 
questioned whether such biases were present in an interpersonal relationship 
where mutual understanding and joint endeavour are paramount, such as the 
coach-performer relationship, i.e., Does each give credit where it is due? One in a 
series of Brawley's studies aimed to determine if the availability bias occurred in 
the recall of both coaches and performers in on-going relationships in track 
athletics or swimming and whether the egocentric bias in allocations of 
responsibility occurred in these relationships. Employing a questionnaire design 
using bi-polar scales, results revealed that there are egocentric biases in both the 
recall of events and the making of responsibility attributions by coaches and 
performers. Both coaches and performers recalled more of their own personal 
inputs to their joint interactions and made more responsibility attributions than to 
their dyadic partner. Results of this study may be explained best by "differences 
in each person's knowledge" of his or her separate input to joint interactions 
(Brawley, 1984, p.275). This study does show that egocentric biases may occur 
not only in competitive outcome settings but in a variety of sport settings. As 
Brawley suggests, this raises interesting questions for the study of actor-observer 
differences in long-standing interpersonal relationships. For example, memory 
bias may impact on coach-performer compatibility. When considering these 
effects in relation to close others, the term ethnocentric or group-serving bias is 
used (Hewstone, 1989). 
Group settings 
Taylor, Doria and Tyler (1983) were interested to see if the self-serving biases 
reported elsewhere were apparent in group task situations, where making self-
serving attributions might be at the expense of group-serving interests, an issue 
clearly pertinent in team sports and coach-performer situations. Using a research 
design which allowed members of an established, naturally-formed group to 
attribute responsibility to any of the following: the self (internal); other members 
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of one's own group (external within group); forces that lay outside of the self and 
group (external), Taylor and Doria (1981) had found the existence of both self-
and group-serving biases where the operation of one did not conflict with the 
other. Specifically, group members shared responsibility for successes and took 
disproportionately more personal responsibility for failures. 
Taylor et al. (1983) explored the attributions made by ice-hockey team members 
for successes and failures over the duration of a season. Despite continual and 
cumulative failure (in terms of win-losses), they found team cohesion remained 
high throughout the season. Players consistently attributed more responsibility for 
failure to in-subgroups (the sub-groups in which the subject was a member, e.g., 
offense) and that they consistently assumed more personal blame whilst avoiding 
blaming others. It was suggested that such biases in a long-term group that 
worked together daily fostered positive interpersonal relationships. Furthermore, 
if all players adopted a similar group-serving bias, all players were in this way 
self-protecting (Taylor et aI., 1983). 
Bird, Foster, and Maruyama (1980) were interested in the consistency between 
seif- and team-attributions for teams which varied in team cohesion. They used a 
4-element and 2-dimension model (Weiner, 1974) of attributions, percentage win-
loss as the measure of success and individual choice of success/failure questions 
as the measure of perceived success, to assess attributions both mid- and post-
season. Mid-season results revealed no relatiop. between either attribution 
dimension and cohesion. Post-season, stability, but not locus of causality, was 
related to cohesion, such that players perceiving their team to be cohesive showed 
more similar team- and self-attributions than did players perceiving lower 
cohesion. Further analyses revealed low team cohesion players made greater task 
attributions for their teams than for themselves and greater luck attributions for 
themselves than for the team. For players viewing their teams as high on 
cohesion, there was little difference in team- and self-attributions either for task 
or luck. No significant differences were found for either ability or effort 
attributions. 
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When considering team and individual attributions in relation to both perceived 
outcome and cohesion, results showed that high cohesion-success players made 
more internal attributions for their own successes than did low cohesion-success 
players. High cohesion-failure players made fewer internal attributions than did 
low cohesion-failure subjects. These results indicate self-attributions of high 
cohesion players remain high and do not become less egocentric. Overall, these 
findings point to the probability of cohesion affecting individual as well as team-
oriented motivation. 
In a study examining self-serving attributions in a competitive sport setting, 
Kimiecik and Duda (1985) identify four key considerations when assessing 
attributions made by young sport participants: SUbjective and objective meanings 
of success and failure; the importance of considering perceptions of competence 
when assessing sport attributions; the need to go beyond the four causal elements 
previously identified in the literature; and the influence of the method of 
assessing causal attributions on the major findings in attribution research. 
Kimiecik and Duda's (1985) study considers the relationship between objective 
outcome, subjective outcome and the attribution process in children (boys, aged 
9-12 years). Additionally, perceptions of competence were considered, since this 
additional factor was significant in interpreting the findings of earlier work (e.g., 
Spink & Roberts, 1980). Views of players' own competence and that of an 
opponent mediated attributions for objective outcomes and were necessary to 
distinguish between self-serving and information-processing attributions. 
Furthermore, the restriction of causal elements to the four categories suggested by 
Weiner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest, and Rosembaum (1971) has hindered previous 
research (see findings of Roberts & Pascuzzi, 1979). The process of recording of 
attributions may also be significant. For example, Elig and Frieze (1979) found 
that different methods of recording attributions (open-ended, structured and 
ipsative) yielded quite different responses. 
Kimiecik and Duda compared open-ended and forced-choice methods. Results 
showed 75.9% of open-ended attributions could be classified as one of We in er's 
four elements. Winners and losers did not significantly differ in terms of the 
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internal-external dimension. Ability was the most cited cause (43.2%) of a sports 
outcome. Interestingly, a relationship was found between game outcome and 
forced attribution which was not found in the open-ended format. The authors 
suggest that the method may alter the balance of the causes offered: in the forced 
format, clear self-enhancing and self-protecting biases were found for winners 
and losers respectively. However, when considering the perceived competency 
data, which showed that winners perceived their demonstrated competence higher 
than did losers, whereas losers rated the perceived demonstrated competency of 
opponents higher than did the winners, the authors suggest these biases can be re-
interpreted as due to information processing. 
Clearly there is a need for more research into self- and other-serving biases in 
naturalistic settings. The primary, although not exclusive, focus reported so far is 
on the locus of causality dimension. From previous studies it is clear that this 
dimension, more than others, seems to play the lead role in distinguishing groups 
of self and social perceivers. 
Of interest in the present research, therefore, is the extent to which the preceding 
biases may occur in the attributions made by coaches and performers and the 
potential effects of these on coach-performer attributional compatibility. 
Individual differences 
In addition to situational and interpersonal factors that might affect the 
attribution-making process, researchers such as Rotter (1966) are interested in 
identifYing individual differences in the propensity to make certain types of 
attributions. Rotter distinguished between the extremes of a continuum referred to 
as locus of control. At one extreme lay internals, people who believe in their 
ability to control the occurrence of life events; at the other extreme, externals 
consider factors beyond their control (e.g., luck, the behaviour of others) to be the 
causes of significant outcomes. Whilst Rotter recognised this propensity may not 
operate equally across all situations, he did regard it as a general, relatively stable 
individual characteristic. Rotter developed a locus of control scale which has 
been used in a number of domains (e.g., examining beliefs in political, 
achievement, health and learning domains; Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Despite 
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criticisms regarding validity (e.g., Weiner, 1986, who subsequently separated the 
aspects of locus of causality from control to form two distinct dimensions) and 
appropriateness for cross-cultural use (Strickland, 1988), locus of control has 
been used extensively in attribution research designs. 
Attributional style 
A question central to attribution research is whether individuals have a tendency 
to make certain types of attributions; in other words, Do people possess an 
attributional style? Attributional style is "a tendency to make particular kinds of 
causal inferences, rather than others, across different situations and across time" 
(Metalsky & Abramson, 1981, p.38). If such styles exist they could be considered 
significant in identitying potential interpersonal conflict in coach-performer 
relationships. 
This question has been focal in attempts to develop an attributional model of 
depression. For example, it has been hypothesised by Abramson et al. (1978) that 
a particular attributional style mediates between negative events and subsequent 
depression. This may have application within a sports context where, for 
example, it would be helpful for coaches to know whether their sports performers 
have a tendency to attribute perceived failure as due to factors lying within or 
without their control. 
Despite a number of researchers' attempts to find an attributional style trait, 
results have been equivocal. For example, Peterson and colleagues, in an attempt 
to measure attributional style, developed the Attributional Style Questionnaire 
(ASQ; Peterson, Semmel, vonBaeyer, Abramson, Metalsky, & Seligman, 1982; 
Seligman, Abramson, Semmel, & von Baeyer, 1979). However, its use by 
Cutrona and co-workers failed to predict convincingly attributions for negative 
outcomes and, using confirmatory factor analysis, found only modest cross-
situational consistency of attributional style (Cutrona, Russell' & Jones, 1985). 
These results lead Cutrona and colleagues to make a speCUlative suggestion that 
even domains might be conceptually too wide within which to consider 
consistency in attributions and suggest more narrow attributional equivalence 
classes (e.g., performances in major events as opposed to performance per se). 
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One of the reasons for the inconsistent findings might be the means used to 
collect attributional style data: the ASQ asks for the one major cause of each 
outcome, which tend to be hypothetical scenarios across a range of settings. 
Despite the benefits of such an approach, more meaningful, real life events might 
prompt causal analysis which differs from that produced in hypothetical settings, 
with explanations entailing a number of causal elements; the challenge then is to 
develop measures which can be used in such settings. Validity aside, if 
attributional style exists, the processes by which it exerts its influence need 
further exploration. 
Attributional style in sport 
In order to measure attributional style specifically within the domain of sport, 
Tenenbaum and colleagues developed the Wingate Sport Achievement 
Responsibility Scale (WSARS; Tenenbaum, Furst, & Weingarten, 1984). This 
measure does allow for attributions of causality to be assessed separately for team 
and individual sports. However, it only assesses the degree of responsibility taken 
for an outcome in sport measured on the locus of causality dimension and, 
therefore, has limited use. 
Probably the most comprehensive sport-specific measurement of attributional 
style is the Sport Attribution Style Scale (SASS; Hanrahan, Grove, & Hattie, 
1989). The development of this questionnaire was in response to previous 
studies' failure to measure attributional style along all of the dimensions 
considered in the literature to be important. Its development also reflects the 
concern that researchers may not be able to locate accurately attributions 
according to their dimensional qualities (Hanrahan et aI., 1989). The 
questionnaire rates causal responses to positive and negative events on five 
dimension scales: locus of causality, stability, controllability, globality and 
intentionality. General support for the scale's, and a subsequent short version's, 
factor structure, reliability and construct validity is provided by Hanrahan and 
colleagues (e.g., Hanrahan & Grove, 1990a; Hanrahan & Grove, 1990b). 
However, this inventory, short and long versions alike, suffers from asking for the 
one main cause for a series of hypothetical scenarios, an approach which has been 
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challenged in recent attribution psychology literature (e.g., Munton et aI., 1999). 
Can it be inferred with any certainty that an attributional style found using such a 
measure reflects a similar style for real life events and the potentially complex 
causal explanation offered to account for them? Some researchers have argued 
that hypothetical events may be better for identifying attributional style (e.g., 
Metalsky & Abramson, 1981) and Hanrahan and Grove (1990a) have 
demonstrated its internal consistency with real sportspeople. However, this 
researcher concurs with Hanrahan et al. (1989) who suggest that this issue needs 
further investigation. 
Prapavessis and Carron (1988) identify a previous lack of support in the sport 
domain for the learned-helplessness model of depression proposed by Abramson 
et al. (1978), despite sport's obvious potential as an achievement setting. 
Prapavessis and Carron propose that maladaptive achievement patterns associated 
with learned helplessness would be found amongst sports performers and that, for 
those displaying this pattern, the characteristic attributional style would be 
evident. Following the completion of an Attributional Questionnaire (based on an 
attributional style questionnaire developed by Peterson et aI., 1982) and their own 
Maladaptive Achievement Pattern Questionnaire, nationally or internationally 
ranked tennis players were classified as demonstrating maladaptive or adaptive 
achievement patterns. The results revealed that maladaptive achievement patterns 
associated with learned helplessness were present. When attribution dimension 
styles in failure situations were analysed, it was found that the helpless group 
gave ratings that were internal, persistent and recurrent; that is, those displaying 
the maladaptive achievement pattern also displayed an attributional style 
associated with learned helplessness. No differences were found based on gender 
or skill level, suggesting highly competitive male and female players, skilled and 
lesser skilled players alike do not differ in their attributional tendencies. 
One suggested implication for coaches and sports psychologists is the potential 
value of attribution training in developing a more adaptive achievement pattern 
(see page 53). 
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In addition to individual differences, within North American populations boys 
have been shown to display a tendency to attribute successful outcomes to 
personal ability and failures to luck or lack of effort more than girls (Dweck & 
Goetz, 1978). Whilst Nicholls (1980) reports this general trend in New Zealand 
with few ethnicity effects, primarily for classroom tasks, his studies exploring sex 
differences in attributions revealed that certain variables may mediate the 
normally found sex differences in achievement orientation. Nicholls reports that, 
at certain ages, girls appear less logical in making causal attributions than do 
boys. However, this was explained by looking at the conceptions of success and 
achievement used in these studies, which had been primarily masculine. This 
general sex difference is explained by a number of processes, including teacher 
feedback patterns, and in particular negative feedback, which Dweck, Davidson, 
Nelson, and Enna (1978) found differed markedly for males and females. There 
may be implications here for coach feedback to boys and girls and its impact on 
performer attribution-making. 
Attributional complexity 
Considered by some (e.g., Hewstone, 1989) an individual difference, the 
complexity of an attributor's causal ascription may also impact on interpersonal 
compatibility. A manifestation of this difference is how far back in time 
attributors look for explanations for events in their lives. In relation to coach-
performer compatibility, one dyadic member's relatively simple explanation for a 
performance may be potentially in conflict with the other's complex explanation. 
For example, the training implications of these differing explanations may be 
quite disparate. The issue of attributional complexity is, therefore, considered 
germane to the current research. 
Some theorists suggest that people are lazy thinkers or "cognitive misers" 
(Fletcher, Danilovics, Fernandez, Peterson, & Reeder, 1986, p.875), whose 
attributional thinking is governed by simple heuristics and influenced by a variety 
of biases (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). Alternatively, in real life situations, where 
outcomes can have significant life consequences, people often produce complex 
explanations (Fletcher, 1983). Temporal factors may also influence the causal 
schemata operating (Fletcher, 1983; Kelley, 1983). Furthermore, which factors 
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detennine the depth of attributional search? Some have argued that situational 
antecedents are the significant influence (e.g., Tetlock, 1983), whilst others claim 
it to be a personality trait (Fletcher et aI., 1986). Early attribution theorists 
suggest people are most likely to combine internal and external attributions when 
explaining extreme events (Cunningham & Kelley, 1975), when needing 
attributional accuracy (Kassin & Hochreich, 1977) or when explaining complex 
interpersonal events (Bradbury & Fincham, 1990). 
Fletcher et al. (1986), in taking the position that attributional complexity is a 
domain-specific trait, developed the Attributional Complexity Scale (ACS), 
suggesting attributional complexity to be dependent upon the degree of 
knowledge of the domain and level of interest in it. If so, one would expect active 
sports people of some experience to be capable of relatively complex causal 
explanations, if motivated to do so. Fletcher and colleagues (1986) have 
suggested that attributionally simple individuals may use the internal-external 
dimension in a more hydraulic fashion than those who are attributionally 
complex, who tend to adopt a more interactionist explanation. The latter, it is 
suggested are, therefore, less prone to the fundamental attributional error. 
The notion of attributional complexity has received little attention in the sport 
attribution literature and indeed no published research findings in sport 
psychology journals concerning it exist to date. However, the use of the ACS 
within sport and exercise settings has been called for by Biddle and Hanrahan 
(1998). The number of causes elicited to explain events and the causal chains 
they create will be addressed in the current research. 
Other antecedent factors 
Susskind, Thakkar, Hamilton, Maurer, and Shennan (1999) were interested in 
whether the processes associated with fonning impressions of individuals differed 
from impression fonning for groups, since infonnation processing studies have 
suggested such a difference (e.g., Hamilton & Shennan, 1996). This is relevant in 
sporting contexts in relation to coaches' impressions of teams and the individuals 
within them and potential differences in infonnation processing between team 
and individual sport coaches. 
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The individual may be considered a coherent psychological unit with a stable 
personality and, thus, stable behaviours over time and situations (Hirt, Erikson, & 
McDonald, 1993). Susskind et aI. (1999) suggest that knowledge of specific 
events and behaviours are then integrated into the expectancies about the 
individual's behaviour and efforts are made to resolve any inconsistencies by 
searching for causes which least damage the initial impression and expectations. 
This assumption of unity afforded individuals is believed not to hold for group 
targets and, furthermore, as such it is believed that the impression formation 
process is affected (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). 
Susskind et aI. (1999) undertook two experiments to test these assumptions, the 
second of which looked specifically at differences in attributional reasoning. 
Based on the premise that perceivers expect less consistency in a group target, 
Susskind et aI. propose that they are likely to be less sensitive to group 
inconsistencies and, therefore, devote less effort to generating causal attributions. 
Responding to written scenarios for individual or group targets which provided 
either target-consistent or target-inconsistent information, 133 undergraduates 
were asked to continue a descriptive sentence with a short phrase which offered a 
plausible extension to the initial description. These continuations were 
subsequently coded and analysed. 
Despite a general finding that non-causal extensions were more common than 
attributions when the target was an individual, consistent behaviours yielded 
more non-causal statements than causal statements, with the opposite pattern 
when the behaviour was inconsistent. However, this interaction between 
congruency and continuation type was not apparent for the group target 
responses. Group participants generally wrote non-causal extensions more often 
than causal attributions. It was apparent that, for individual targets, incongruency 
triggered causal explanation, which was not the case for group targets. However, 
when attributions were generated, no differences between individual and group 
targets, in terms of locus of causality, were found. Reversals, where the meaning 
of the stimulus description itself is altered, were rare but more likely when 
participants had a negative expectancy, rather than a positive one, and more likely 
when behaviour was inconsistent with expectancy rather than consistent. This 
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pattern was further exaggerated when under a condition of a negatively valenced 
expectancy. 
Although the emphasis in the current research is on individual sport dyads, these 
findings may have implications for future studies considering attributions made 
by coaches working in team or squad situations. It appears coaches' inclination to 
explain, and the nature of these explanations, may be affected by the constitution 
ofthe target (i.e., individual or group). 
A variety of cognitive and motivational factors have been shown to affect the 
selection of outcome attributions. However, most related research has tended to 
consider the perceived outcome as either success or failure. In experiments by 
Milech and Nesdale (1984) perceived outcome was assessed on as-point 
percentage gradation (10, 30, 50, 70, 90%). Milech and Nesdale assessed the 
perceived outcome-affect and outcome-attribution relationships in order to 
examine the affect-attribution relationship. In the first of two experiments the 
perceived outcome on a concept identification problem was manipulated so that 
participants achieved at one of the five success levels. Subjects assessed the 
degree to which each of a limited number of causal factors (those suggested by 
Heider, 1958, to be important: luck, ability, effort, task difficulty) had affected 
the result and whether the outcome was due to personal or situational factors, 
assessed on a bi-polar, 5-point scale. They also indicated how happy they were 
with the outcome. 
Findings revealed that affect was linearly related to perceived outcome level. 
However, across the five levels of perceived success, only attributions made for 
successful outcomes (70 and 90% success) were discriminatory, with the most 
important discriminator being ability, followed by task difficulty and person-v-
situational differences. In the 10-50% range attributions did not discriminate 
success levels. 
A subsequent study examining the 10-50% success range generally supported the 
findings for the same success range from the previous study, with differences 
only for the mean ratings for degree of person-v-situation, with attributions in the 
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second study significantly influenced by outcome. It was suggested by Milech 
and Nesdale that perhaps answers to more global questions (e.g., person v 
situation) are more unstable than those of specific questions. 
These two studies, suggest Milech and Nesdale, show that whilst the relationship 
between outcome and positive and negative affect appears linear, the relationship 
between performance and attribution is non-linear and that discrimination appears 
greater between higher levels of relative success than for relative failure. The 
results also suggest a direct relationship between attribution and affect for 
positive outcomes but not negative ones. This study did, however, only consider 
one emotion, happiness. 
A further antecedent which may influence the attribution process is the context 
within which attributions are sought. McGiIl (1989) suggests that the selection of 
a causal explanation from a number of potential options may be dependent upon 
the context, as well as the perspective of the attributor. McGiIl offers three 
experiments that look to explain three common features of attribution research by 
examining the role of the causal background: actor-observer differences, the role 
of consensus and distinctiveness information in reaching a causal conclusion and 
the tendency to commit the fundamental attributional error. For McGiIl, the to-be-
examined event is the difference between the target event, i.e., what has 
happened, and some contrasting background. It is this deviance that triggers the 
attributional search process (Weiner, 1985), that is, expectation is critical. 
Therefore, one must identifY the key features of the context in which events 
occur. A significant question is, What governs the selection of causal 
backgrounds against which the target episode is compared? Of interest in an 
interpersonal setting such as the coach-performer relationship is the question of 
whether co-actors with their differing experiences select similar or different 
causal backgrounds for use in causal analysis. 
Such factors as recency, frequency, intensity, area and duration and higher-order 
attributes such as meaningfulness, familiarity and ego-involvement (McGiIl, 
1989) can be used to account for the divergent perspectives of actor and observer 
who, as a result of their distinct roles, may select a different set of causal 
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backgrounds. McGiIl (1989) suggests that where the causal background is 
unambiguous, e.g., where a questioner directs the selection of the causal 
background, the actor-observer difference may not be evidenced. McGill reports 
support for this notion in the findings of her study (1989, Experiment 1). The 
preference for person and stimulus attributions varied according to the focus of 
the causal question; where the causal question was ambiguous the actor-observer 
effect was evident. 
Kelley's (1967) ANOV A model, where attributors use consensus, distinctiveness 
and consistency information to select attributions from a range of options, is 
challenged by McGill (1989). Specifically, McGill asks what happens when the 
attributor selects one type of infonnation to the exclusion of the others. For 
example, the coach might focus on differences in responses to training between 
athletes in his group rather than differences across time or situations. McGiIl 
argues that lay attributors are unlikely to rely on covariation information when 
the causal question is not ambiguous. Therefore, where the context suggests the 
use of a particular type of information, this may be used rather than covariation 
information. Once again, results of McGill's second study (1989, Experiment 2) 
support this claim. Consensus and distinctiveness information were used to select 
the causal background when no other cues were provided, but when such cues 
were available, subjects did not rely on such information. 
Finally, McGiIl examined the phenomenon of taking credit and laying blame 
(Weiner, 1971). Previously thought to reflect a self-serving bias, McGill argued 
that those expecting to succeed might differentially select particular causal 
backgrounds quite different to those selected by subjects expecting to fail. McGill 
offered more speculative support for this hypothesis, concluding that 
"attributions for success and failure may reflect more about how 
subjects interpret ambiguous causal questions than about how they 
view factors responsible for positive and negative performance." (p.197). 
Clearly central to the current research is consideration of the methods used to 
collect attributions. Tenenbaurn and Furst (1986) note that attribution research in 
the sport domain may not equivocally support findings in other settings. Drawing 
on the work of Roberts and colleagues (e.g., Roberts & Duda, 1984), they stress 
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that perceived ability, expected success and subjective perception of goal 
attainment need to be considered in addition, and perhaps in place of, objective 
win/loss. Tenenbaum and Furst suggest inconsistencies in previous research 
findings may reflect the nature of attribution collection, e.g., the varied use of 
forced- and free-response formats, real and hypothetical scenarios and the over-
emphasis on analyses of the first attribution offered. 
Tenenbaum and Furst, therefore, conducted a study to consider consistency when 
multiple attributions, up to three in their study, are analysed. Team and individual 
sport participants were divided by gender, outcome, relative outcome, group and 
individual setting, perceived ability and outcome expectations. Results from this 
study showed a clear difference between males and females on the first 
attribution on locus of causality, stability and controllability dimensions which 
persisted across all conditions except for the locus of causality dimension for the 
third cause. With regard to winners and losers, the egocentric bias tended to 
disappear when more than one attribution was offered, especially for locus of 
causality and control dimensions. This pattern was repeated for the relative 
peiformance analyses. Individual sportspeople tended to give more internal 
attributions than team sport performers but control and stability across sport type 
showed some inconsistencies; differences apparent for the first attribution 
disappeared for the subsequent attributions. High ability performers gave all three 
attributions as internal, stable and controllable, but each successive cause was 
more stable. The Iow and moderate perceived ability performers tended to offer 
less stable causes. These results indicate the benefits to researchers of considering 
more than the first attribution. 
In addition to the considerations above, one of the most commonly researched 
and reported phenomena in attribution research is the influence of one's position 
as actor or observer in the attribution process. Of central importance in this study, 
it is considered in detail below. 
Actor-observer differences 
The actor-observer (A-D) difference bias is the tendency to explain others' 
behaviour in terms of dispositional factors and one's own in terms of situational 
Review of Literature 36 
or unstable factors. The reasons for this consistently found difference may be 
perceptual: what is perceptually salient for the actor is situational features 
whereas, for the observer, the fundamental attributional error may operate to 
extenuate the salient focus on the actor's dispositions. Ross (1977). in interpreting 
the divergent perspectives model, suggests that the observer is more likely to 
observe behaviour in the actor that differs from his or her own, that is uncommon 
or deviant and, thus, is more prone than is the actor to attribute these behaviours 
to dispositional factors. 
Alternatively, the information available to actors and observers may be different: 
actors have available information regarding personal feelings and intentions, 
usually not available to the observer. Additionally, the actor will probably have 
personal history information not held by the observer. There is empirical support 
for both of these explanations (see Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Actors also see their 
behaviour as less stable and predictable. 
In considering the actor-observer effect, Monson and Snyder (1977) critique the 
notion of the dispositional-situational dichotomy. They suggest that this is not 
truly a dichotomy. Most situational attributions depend in part on certain 
dispositions complementing the situation and vice-versa. They argue that the 
apparent distinction may be one of language rather than cognition. An inherent 
problem with this assumption is that it assumes we believe we take actions in 
response to our changing environment but that, observing others, they behave due 
to dispositional constraints. Monson and Snyder report bodies of research 
findings both in support and refuting the hypothesis. 
These authors go on to discuss the potential differences in the attributional 
processes of involved actors and uninvolved observers. However, utilising such a 
strict distinction is to ignore the potential for the involved observer, i.e., someone 
who has worked with and helped shape the behaviour of the performer, and 
indeed may continue to be a significant influence during the action, e.g., the 
team-mate, coach, or other support worker. Such a distinction is compounded if 
one is to assume categorical differences inherent in these two positions, in terms 
of degree of knowledge of inner states, personal history and the foci of attention 
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(Monson & Snyder, 1977). Whilst there is clearly a perceptual difference between 
the touchline coach and the performer engaged in the activity, many years of 
active involvement in the sport, as performer and coach, and the use of new 
technology, e.g., multi-perspective video, may allow diverse attentional and 
perceptual foci. Additionally, in a long-standing relationship, knowledge of the 
performer's personal history may be shared. To what extent the active observer 
is less able to assess covariation (Kelley, 1972) may, therefore, be called into 
question. However, it should be noted that other factors, such as emotion during 
the event and hedonic relevance ofthe outcome, might need to be considered. 
Also in existence are motivational biases that may influence the likelihood of the 
A-O difference. For example, Monson and Snyder (1977) consider actors as 
likely to use a variety of situational and dispositional cues in order to maintain 
their sense of behavioural freedom and self-determination. However, it is 
suggested that actors may alter their perceptions of causality to enhance self-
esteem, attributing desirable outcomes to dispositional factors and less desired 
outcomes to situational constraints. It follows that the propensity for both these 
actions is greater for the actor than for the observer. Monson and Snyder report 
numerous studies to support these propositions, although Kelley and Michella 
(1980) suggest that support for the influence of these motivational biases is 
limited to competitive experimental games designs. 
In part to address criticisms by Rejeski and Brawley (1983) concerning the 
narrow focus on athletes' self-attributions, Luginbuhl and Bell (1989) considered 
the attributions made by track and field athletes for events occurring to other 
athletes, either from their own event or another. Of specific interest was the locus 
of causality dimension. Note was made of studies (e.g., Taylor & Fiske, 1975) 
showing that altering the focus of attention can change the tendency previously 
reported in the literature (e.g., Jones & Nisbett, 1972; Watson, 1982) for the 
actor-observer effect. They also considered the effect of empathy instructions on 
attribution-making; that is, observers given empathy instructions tend to make 
attributions similar to actors (Gould & Sigall, 1977). They hypothesised that 
observers who have previously performed the task that is under observation are 
more likely to make actor-like attributions than observers who have not. 
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In order to test these assumptions in a sport setting, male university athletes were 
offered four vignettes in which an athlete (either from their event or another) 
performed poorly in three, one of which was his own event, and well in one. 
Athletes noted in a free-response format up to three factors that influenced the 
outcome, in order of importance. Locus of causality ascription was made based 
on the way the attribution was termed by the attributor, as this was seen as the 
essence of testing the hypothesis under investigation. Where athletes made 
attributions for outcomes in their own event, the attributor was classified as ego-
involved. 
Results revealed that there was a tendency for non ego-involved athletes to make 
more dispositional attributions than ego-involved athletes across all three 
specialisms and this was significant in two of the three, jumping and throwing. 
Additionally, athletes in all three specialisms tended to make more dispositional 
than situational attributions when in the non ego-involved role than in the ego-
involved role. This supports the suggestion that prior experience in a role affects 
attributions for others' outcomes in the same role, especially unexpected negative 
ones. There is a tendency for the attributor to make more dispositional 
attributions when never having been in the actors' role. When attributing for 
another's outcome in their own speciality, they attributed more as though they 
were actors, argued here as due to ego-involvement and ability to empathise. 
Differences between events were explained in terms of the peculiar determinants 
of performance in those events, e.g., environmental factors being influential in the 
javelin. This may have implications for coach-performer relationships, where 
coaches' prior experience may alter the actor-observer attributional pattern found 
in other settings. Chen, Yates, and McGinnies (1988) also found that personal 
involvement with the actor's plight similarly reverses the A-O effect. 
Ross and Sicoly (1979) considered of central importance the degree to which "the 
observer departs from a passive role and interacts with the actor" (p.335). The 
suggestion is that, whilst passive observers focus on the actions of others, more 
engaged observers may be cognitively focus sed on their own contribution to the 
interactive processes in the joint activity. This seems particularly pertinent in 
relation to studying the attributions made by coaches. 
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Brawley (1984) draws on Ross and Sicoly's (1979) suggestion of four possible 
mechanisms by which this availability bias may occur. The need for social 
approval and a focus on personal competency could lead to personal information 
being preferentially stored. Furthermore, past experiences, values and 
expectations may result in personal information being retained more effectively 
than that pertaining to others. This focus on the self may result in personal 
information about performance being retrieved, even when information about 
team-mates or opponents has been coded and stored. These three potential biases, 
in addition to performers having more information about their own role over 
those of others, and their own team over opponents, and therefore more personal 
awareness, may result in this egocentric tendency. Ross and Sicoly's (1979) study 
of members of a basketball team found support for these notions. 
Brawley (1984) considered the attributions made by members of 12 men's 
doubles tennis teams and 32 coach-athlete dyads in order to explore biases in a) 
the available information used to make attributions and, b) the attributions of 
responsibility for events. A number of studies have shown support for the 
operation of the self-serving bias in sport (e.g., basketball: Bird & Brane, 1978; 
hockey: Brawley, 1980). However, here Brawley suggests the need to consider 
both functional and cognitive interpretations of this tendency, suggesting that, in 
addition to the potential need to protect one's own self-esteem, there may be an 
egocentric bias in the availability of information in memory, resulting in greater 
responsibility for the outcome being accorded to the attributor. In other words, 
the egocentric bias may, in part at least, be unintentional. 
Brawley (1984) asked whether sport dyads are any different from other types of 
dyads. Results of the tennis doubles teams study revealed egocentric biases in 
availability and in the responsibility ascriptions of winning and losing tennis 
dyads; players recalled their own contributions over those of their partner. Players 
also offered more own team attributions of responsibility for the team outcome 
than other team attributions, regardless of the outcome. Brawley suggests that the 
results of this experiment may best be explained in terms of selectivity and 
motivation: that is, selective encoding and retrieval of relevant event information 
and a possible motivation to search for causes of their outcomes in order to 
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improve personal control over future events. Thus, support for Ross and Sicoly's 
findings were found. 
It should be noted that the experimenter asked for the recall of "one important 
turning point" and "a single event or play that sticks out in your mind" (p.268). 
One should not infer that players' recall of the game per se is necessarily 
similarly biased. Clearly, self and other biases may operate for performance 
outcomes. However, research concerned with close working relationships may 
benefit from considering outcomes that may be of an interpersonal, as well as a 
performance, nature. 
Hewstone (1989) identifies a number of methodological and theoretical problems 
in association with the testing of Jones and Nisbett's (1972) actor-observer 
hypothesis. Of particular interest here is the distinction made by Watson (1982) 
between the common-rater procedural paradigm, where the researcher compares 
the self-attributions of subjects with their perceptions of others, and the common-
target paradigm, where self-attributions of subjects are compared to those of 
outside observers. Watson distinguishes these approaches as self-other and actor-
observer and Hewstone supports Watson's view that true actor-observer 
interaction is not usually present in social interaction settings. 
A more fundamental criticism is that if researchers are truly to understand the 
formation and nature of attributions in interpersonal setting, the motivational 
forces of social desirability and interpersonal attitude, in addition to cognitive and 
perceptual factors, must be taken into account. Regan, Strauss, and Fazio (1974) 
have suggested that attributors tend to arrive at attributions which are relatively 
consistent with prior knowledge of the target's dispositions: prosocial behaviour 
tends to be attributed to internal causes where the person is liked by the attributor; 
where the person is disliked by the attributor, attributions for prosocial behaviour 
are made to external factors. 
In relation to the current thesis, an important question is that of whether one can 
consider the coach as an observer. Miller and Norman (1975) have considered the 
attributions of the active observer, that is, someone simultaneously interacting 
Review of Literature 41 
with the actor. These authors suggest that the active observer is even more likely 
than the passive observer to attribute an actor's behaviour to dispositional factors, 
citing the need to predict and control the situation. However, as Fiske and Taylor 
(1991) note, this is not likely to occur if the outcome is neutral and is also less 
likely to occur if the active observer empathises with the actor, quite likely in a 
close coach-performer relationship in a sport such as track and field athletics. 
The majority of research conducted to explore the A-O phenomenon has been 
conducted in laboratory setting. Blass and Kaplowitz (1990) question the 
ecological validity of such an approach, both on the grounds of the short time-
scale of these studies and the artificial setting in which they are conducted. These 
authors conducted a longitudinal study covering 3.5 weeks and 4 assessment 
times per week. They offered 200 descriptive adjectives from which the 
respondents used 5 each to describe the self and another across the four days. It 
was contended that homogeneity of descriptors would suggest a trait-like 
disposition and heterogeneity reflect the diversity of situations. It was expected 
that A-O differences would be reflected in greater trait variability in descriptions 
of the selfthan for the other. 
Results revealed individual differences in the propensity for the A-O difference. 
Further examination suggested that self-esteem was a mediating variable, with 
those low in self-esteem conforming more to the effect. These authors suggest 
that the occurrence of the A-O difference may be an artefact of the methods used 
to measure it. They conclude that the A-O difference appears not to be present in 
on-going relationships studied longitudinally in natural settings and that the term 
"pervasive tendency" (Blass & Kaplowitz 1990, p.263) in relation to the A-O 
effect, may be too strong. 
Osberg and Shrauger (1986) note that research has tended to explore the A-O 
effect by studying retrospective attributional analyses and question whether this 
tendency can be extended to people's predictive judgements about factors that 
will influence future behaviour. These authors report conflicting results of two 
previous studies that had considered temporal distance from the event. Moore, 
Sherrod, Liu, and Underwood (1979) found that attributions became more 
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dispositional over time, namely a three-week delay period; and, Miller and Porter 
(1980), who considered observer subjects, and who found that attributions to 
situational factors increased over time in one study and showed no-effect in 
another. Whilst the former focussed on memorial factors, the latter concentrated 
on potential motivational processes. 
Osberg and Shrauger's (1986) study explored the spontaneous judgements about 
the factors affecting future behaviour and examined whether actor-observer and 
self-serving biases extend to explanations for future events. It was suggested that 
the motivation to perceive control will be greater for future events than for those 
already passed, hence, greater dispositional attributions should be made for future 
events. 
Subjects were assigned to one of four groups: actor-past, actor-future, observer-
past or observer-future. Subjects imagined their own or another's behaviour in 
three situations: a social setting, an academic situation and a job situation. They 
employed three 10-point scales to assess degree of performance in each setting 
and two scales to assess the degree to which subjects ascribed behaviour to 
situational (qualities of the situation) and dispositional (personal qualities) 
factors. The results showed future judgements to be more dispositional than past 
performances. However, the authors note that this main effect was qualified by a 
significant Role x Type of situation x Time perspective interaction, such that 
future events were more dispositional except for the actor-social and observer-
academic data. Osberg and Shrauger conclude that one must take account of the 
nature of the behaviour and the time perspective in order to evaluate the actor-
observer difference. 
The authors also found correlational support for the self-serving bias in actors, 
although a non-significant finding for observers. This bias was present for future, 
as well as past, events. In line with previous findings, Osberg and Shrauger 
conclude that uncertainty about future events can lead to dispositional attributing 
in order to maintain some level of perceived control. 
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Despite the tendency for research to find little support for subject sex differences, 
there is support (e.g., Unger, 1979) for stimulus sex differences. Jones and 
McGillis (1976) make the point that behavioural expectancies will have a 
significant effect on attributions, in that perceivers develop a modal behavioral 
expectancy (Jones & McGillis, 1976) based on category membership, such as sex 
grouping, and assess behaviour against this blueprint. 
As a result of a series of experiments looking at the role played by subject sex, 
actor sex and sex-linked behaviour in attribution making, Hansen and O'Leary 
(1983) demonstrate that attributors of both sexes rely more heavily on personal 
factors when explaining women's behaviour and more heavily on situational 
factors when explaining the same behaviour of men across a range of behavioural 
action. Behavioural expectancies based on sexual grouping were also shown to be 
operating, such that actors behaving in an act of low prior probability based on 
sex-related behavioural expectancy were associated with an attributional shift 
from enviromnental to personal causes. 
An issue, therefore, for coach-performer research is the extent to which the sex of 
the target is a mediating factor in the attribution-making process. Furthermore, is 
there a coach-performer sex interaction (same/other sex)? 
Burger and Rodman (1983) considered the effect of time-lag between outcomes, 
in this case a cross-word puzzle, and elicited explanations for them. Using an 
immediate attribution and three-day delay attribution repeated measures design, 
the results revealed that more credit was given to the dyadic partner than was 
taken themselves immediately after the outcome. However, when subjects gave 
their attributions three days later, the egocentric bias was evident: dyad members 
collectively gave more credit to themselves than to their partner more often than 
they gave more credit to their partners than to themselves. The argument is made 
by Burger and Rodman (1983) that the salience of the partner's contribution 
dissipates more rapidly than does the salience of one's own actions. 
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Summary of antecedent influences 
The present study aims to consider the extent to which coaches and performers 
offer explanations for mutually-relevant outcomes which are compatible or 
potentially in conflict. A number of biases have been shown to operate which 
may contribute to this potential. However, it also appears likely that the context in 
which attributions are made and the methods used to elicit these attributions may 
influence the propensity for these bias effects. Furthermore, it seems likely that 
these biases may interact or even reverse previously found attribution patterns. 
Consequences 
The implications of attribution theory have led to a range of applications in 
various domains, e.g., education, clinical and counselling therapy, interpersonal 
relations counselling and environmental psychology (Kelley & Michela, 1980). 
Within sport psychology, early interest in attributions made for winning and 
losing and the effects on performers' emotions and cognitions were initially 
concerned with self-attributions. Researchers subsequently considered 
attributions made for others, e.g., team-mates, opposition. The following sections 
will consider the cognitive, emotional and behavioural consequences for the 
attributor of making attributions and the potential benefits that can be gained 
from making certain attributions. Such a consideration may be particularly 
significant when considering close interpersonal settings where the cognitions, 
emotions and behaviours of one individual may act as antecedents for others' 
attribution-making. 
Affect 
Research by Weiner and colleagues (e.g., Weiner, Russell, & Lerman, 1978) in 
success/failure situations has shown that two types of affective reactions exist: 
outcome dependent reactions, where the emotional response is determined by the 
outcome, and attribution dependent affect, where it is not the outcome per se that 
causes the affective response but the attribution made for it. Weiner et al. (1978) 
considered the emotional consequences of attributions to luck (e.g., surprise), 
ability (e.g., changes in confidence), effort (e.g., guilt) and actions of others (e.g., 
thankfulness). Weiner (1979) also showed that not only do attributions affect 
emotional responses, but so, too, do the attributional dimensions they 
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characterise, naming locus of causality, stability and controllability as particularly 
important. 
Extending the significance of attribution dimensions, Weiner (1985, 1986) 
developed a specific model of the attribution-emotion relationship that is shown 
in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Weiner's (1986) model of attributions and emotions (adapted from 
Fiske & Taylor, 1991, p.50). 
Objective task outcome 
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+ 
General emotional 
reaction to success 
(pleasure) or failure 
(displeasure) 
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From this model it can be seen that an outcome, such as a perceived sporting 
success or failure, produces an initial attribution-independent emotion and, that 
under certain conditions, such as unexpectedness, failure, or where the event is 
particularly important, this is followed by a cognitive search for causation. The 
causes identified can be classified according to their dimensional qualities which 
influence psychological and affective responses, such as expectancy for future 
outcomes and attribution-dependant emotions. These resultant effects may then 
influence subsequent behaviours in the domain, such as continuing to participate 
or not. 
There have been criticisms of We in er's model. For example, there has been only 
limited support for the contribution made by the controllability dimension (de 
Jong et aI., 1988). Furthermore, the contribution made by causal attributions to 
expectation change and performance may be less influential than in Weiner's 
model (Covington & Omelich, 1979). Finally, initial emotional responses to a 
perceived outcome may be more influenced by attributions than originally 
thought (McFarland & Ross, 1982). Although alternative models have been 
presented in the literature (e.g., Vallerand, 1987), Weiner's attribution-emotion 
model remains a useful framework within which to predict affective responses to 
specific events, stipulating, as it does, associations between particular causal 
dimensions and emotions. 
Following subsequent support for these propositions (e.g., McMillan & Sprat!, 
1983; Forsyth & McMillan, 1981), Russell and McAuley (1986) hypothesise a 
number of models to explain the attribution-emotion relationship; these are 
shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Alternative models of the relation between attribution processes and 
affective reactions (Russell & McAuley, 1986). 
a) Attribution-affect script model 
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In an attempt to test which of the above models best explains the attribution-
emotion relationship following success and failure, Russell and McAuley (1986) 
conducted two studies, the first experimental, the second involving a naturally 
occurring achievement outcome. 
In Russell and McAuley's first study, using situation descriptors and affect rating 
scales, factor analyses revealed three affect factors for successes (competence, 
gratitude and positive affect) and four for failures (anger, guilt, surprise, negative 
affect). For successes, ability and effort attributions were found to elicit feelings 
of competence, whereas luck elicited lower feelings of competence. Gratitude 
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was maximised by attributions to actions of others or luck and minimised by 
attributions to ability or stable effort. Greater positive affect was produced by 
ability and effort attributions, with positive affect reduced by luck attributions. 
For failures, attributions to the actions of others led to feelings of anger which 
were reduced by attributions to ability or stable effort. Guilt was increased by a 
lack of effort attribution and minimised by attributions to others. Failure due to 
luck or task difficulty resulted in surprise which was minimised by attributions to 
lack of effort. Only stable effort was associated with negative affect. From these 
results it can be seen that some specific attributions increase certain affective 
reactions, whereas the presence of others suppresses the likelihood of certain 
emotions. 
In relation to causal dimensions, the greatest predictor of affect, here competency 
feelings, following success was found to be a combination of the three 
dimensions; internal, stable and controllable causes maximised feelings of 
competency. This combination accounted for 52.9% of the affect variance. 
Positive affect was predicted (28.5% variance) by internal and controllable 
causes. Weaker predictions were found for other affective reactions and for those 
following failures. The locus of causality dimension was consistently found to be 
the strongest predictor of affect. 
Examining the joint and independent effects of causal attributions and causal 
dimensions on affect, it was found that the largest effects involve variance jointly 
accounted for by individual attributions and casual dimensions. However, it 
appears that attributions exert an independent influence on success and failure 
affect (up to an additional 12.9% of the variance above that of causal dimensions) 
and causal dimensions exert an independent influence on some, but not all, of the 
success and failure affects. These findings appear to discount the attribution-
affect script and causal dimension mediation models. 
Attempting to replicate these findings using the outcome of a midterm 
examination, it was suggested by Russell and McAuley (1986) that, in real life 
settings, attribution processes may play a less influential role in determining 
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emotional reactions. Following similar data collection and analysis procedures to 
those in Study I, only task difficulty attributions were found to predict affective 
reactions following failure, such that anger was maximised and guilt minimised 
by attributions to task difficulty. No other attributions predicted affects and, thus, 
findings from Study 1 were not supported. 
The causal dimension-affective reactions relationships were found to be weaker 
in the real-life setting than in the first study. Although the analysis of the data for 
testing the three models did not produce consistent findings to Study I, causal 
attributions and causal dimensions were found to make independent contributions 
to affect. However, it should be noted that, in this second study, attributions were 
gathered a week after the examination and only the first attribution given for the 
examination performance was entered into the analyses. Furthermore, in the 
second study very few of the students used the attributions provided by the 
researchers. This highlights the problem of offering prescribed attributions from 
which participants must select. 
In summarising these findings the authors note that it is still unclear by what 
processes and in what sequence attributions, attributional dimensions and 
affective reactions are related. 
In an attempt to explore the consequences of attributions in sport, Biddle and Hill 
(1992a) draw on the attribution models of Weiner (1986) and Vallerand (1987). 
Their study examines the predictors of emotions from objective outcome and 
subjective performance appraisal, the importance of winning and playing well, 
and the SUbjective appraisal of performance (performance satisfaction) in regional 
squash league players. 
Subjective appraisal of performance clearly predicted positive self-esteem and 
relaxation emotion for winners. For losers, relaxation was best predicted from 
unstable attributions and ratings of importance. For winners, variance in positive 
self-esteem was primarily accounted for by performance satisfaction which also 
accounted for variance in feelings of relaxation, such that high satisfaction 
resulted in lower feelings of relaxation. No gender differences were found. 
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However, in line with Kerr's (1997) comments in relation to reversal theory, it is 
important to appreciate the subjective experience associated with affect labels. 
For example, low relaxation could be experienced as a positive or negative factor. 
Thus, for winners, subjective performance appraisal, and not attributions, was the 
only predictor of emotion. Unstable attributions made for losing may help the 
player relax because such attributions offer no expectation for future failure. 
Additionally, the importance of the outcome and performance added significantly 
to the prediction of relaxation, such that low ratings of importance of winning and 
high ratings of importance of playing well aided feelings of ralaxation. With 
regard to performance satisfaction, only positive self-esteem was predicted by the 
unstable attribution factor (mood) for satisfied players, suggesting that players 
relied upon on-the-day factors for feelings of self-esteem (Biddle & Hill, 1992a). 
For dissatisfied players, positive self-esteem could be maintained by attributing 
performance to features of the opponent. Opponent attributions also predicted 
feelings of surprised incompetence. These findings are consistent with Weiner's 
(1985, 1986) contention that unexpected or negative outcomes trigger greater 
attributional search and Vallerand's (1987) intuitive-reflective model of affect 
formation. 
Other studies have found some support for relationships between certain causal 
dimensions, such as those in the CDS (Russell, 1982), and emotions. For 
example, McAuley, Russell, & Gross (1983) found that, while success emotions 
were related to controllable attributions, failure emotions were not significantly 
related to any attribution dimensions. The association between attribution 
dimensions and emotions has been found to be strongest when the outcome does 
not conform to expectation (McAuley & Duncan, 1989). 
Biddle and Hill (1992b) employed a laboratory-based one-vs-one simulated 
fencing contest to test the influence of outcome importance on attribution-
emotion associations. Results revealed that, whilst winners' positive self-esteem 
was best predicted by performance satisfaction, also positively related to positive 
self-esteem were mood, ability, motivation and form attributions and inversely 
related to luck. The importance of winning also added to predictability. 
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Attributions to bad luck best predicted feelings of depression-frustration, 
although personality and opponent's personality were also related to this affect. 
Drawing on Weiner's (1986) and Vallerand's (1987) models of the relationship 
between attributions in emotion, Biddle and Hill suggest that, when winning, 
there is a greater intuitive appraisal and less reliance on attributional search. For 
losers, only positive self-esteem was predicted from attributions (to being in the 
wrong mood). 
A number of methodological weaknesses are identified by the authors, such as 
lack of task realism and the novice status of participants. Although outcome 
importance was assessed, the emotional and psychological investment in the task 
is questionable. Furthermore, the 12 attributions and 28 adjectives (to reflect 
mood) were provided by the experimenters, a practice that has been criticised 
elsewhere (Munton et ai., 1999). 
Where sport psychology has examined attribution-affect relationships, the 
emphasis has been on sports performers. It would be valuable to explore also this 
association for others involved in sport, such as officials, spectators and, as in the 
present research, coaches. 
Predictingfuture behaviours 
When people engage in causal analysis, it is argued that they utilise implicit 
causal theories to help interpret the behaviours of others. Ybarra and Stephan 
(1999) further suggest that a sense of control over the social environment can be 
enhanced by the use of attributions employed in the past as the basis for 
predicting future behaviours. The effect of making attributions about the 
behaviours of others on one's expectations of them in the future has received little 
attention. Of particular significance here is the role of locus of causality. 
Attributing behaviour to personal dispositions will result in different expectations 
for the future than following situational attributions. Furthermore, negative 
behaviour, or behaviour contrary to social norms and conventions, is more likely 
to lead to dispositional attributions (Rothbart & Park, 1986). It has been shown 
that, when learning of someone's positive behaviours, people are more sensitive 
to situational determinants and are, hence, more likely to infer situational causes 
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(Vonk & Van Knippenberg, 1994, Study 1). Evidence exists that once trait 
impressions are formed, they are resistant to change, even in the face of 
contradictory evidence that is often marginalised as situation-dependant 
(Hewstone, 1989). 
The proposal that people primed to think of dispositional causes should be more 
likely to expect the target person to behave negatively than those primed to think 
of situational causes was supported in studies by Ybarra and Stephan (1999). 
These authors suggest that this attribution-prediction bias illustrates that people 
possess implicit causal theories about the causes of negative and positive 
behaviour (i.e., that the former is more likely to be due to dispositional factors 
and the latter to situational causes). 
The mechanisms by which such a bias may operate clearly need further research. 
However, Ybarra and Stephan's (1999, Study 4) study showed that negative 
behaviours were remembered to a greater degree when cued by dispositional trait 
cues and that positive behaviours were better remembered when cued by 
situational cues. That is, the context affects recall. The authors conclude that 
behaviours with causes fitting perceivers' implicit causal theories tend to be 
better remembered than those that do not. 
What effect might prior expectations have on attributions? For example, if an 
outcome is considered to be fair, in the sense of being deserved, will causal 
attributions differ from similar outcomes felt unfair? It has been proposed 
elsewhere (e.g., Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978) that witnessing unfairness 
causes distress and efforts to restore equity, e.g., helping action. Witnessing 
injustice may trigger intense efforts to understand the causes of the unfairness in 
the hope of reducing this distress. Bies (1987) refers to the quest for 
understanding why an injustice occurred as that of the intuitive juror. It is 
suggested that causal ascription is a central part ofthis process. 
Lerner (1980) suggests that there are individual differences in the strategy that 
people employ when responding to injustice and that one significant 
psychological characteristic which may affect this response is the belief in a just 
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world (Lupfer, Doan, & Houston, 1998). People having such a belief (that people 
get what they deserve) experience most distress in cases of perceived injustice 
and, hence, are most likely to search for causes. 
Lupfer and colleagues examined whether all attributions are equally therapeutic. 
These authors found that attributional analysis reduced the distress experienced 
by strong believers in a just world for both fair and unfair outcomes. This 
suggests that those with a strong belief in a just world might have less tolerance 
to unexplained events andlor a greater motivation to explain them. Potentially 
reflecting an attributional style, these results suggest those with a strong belief in 
a just world suffer more distress than weak believers when not able to analyse 
outcomes (fair or unfair), but receive greater relief from their distress when 
clearly fair or unfair outcomes can be causally analysed (Lupfer et aI., 1998). 
Furthermore, they found little evidence of any specific attribution dimension or 
individual attribution having a greater therapeutic benefit than others, suggesting 
attribution research should focus on the functions of causal analysis rather than 
the attributions derived from it (Lupfer et aI., 1998). 
Attribution training 
Psychologists have attempted to hamess the psychological and affective benefits 
of making certain attributions. This has lead to research into the use of attribution 
therapy and the potential of attribution training. The present studies are an 
attempt to identify the underlying causal beliefs of coaches and performers 
working in dyads. Where attributional divergence is apparent, attribution training 
may prove a valuable means of enhancing or protecting the functionality of these 
relationships, especially where such divergence is perceived as dysfunctional 
(Forsterling, 1985). 
For example, in one of only a few studies that have considered attribution 
interventions in sport, Orbach, Singer, and Murphey (1997) found that 
recreational basketball players previously attributing failure on a basketball 
dribbling task to uncontrollable and stable causes (considered in Weiner's 1986, 
1992 model to be dysfunctional) could, as a result of attribution training, alter 
their attributions to be more controllable and unstable. The participants receiving 
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training that focussed on making controllable and unstable attributions made 
more functional attributions, e.g., effort, than the other two intervention groups. 
Furthermore, this group was the only group to improve performance times 
significantly on the dribbling task over the four trials and perform significantly 
better in the fourth trail than the group trained to focus on uncontrollable and 
stable factors, e.g., innate ability. 
Sinnott and Biddle (1998) also found a variety of benefits to attribution training: 
the 11-12 year old children who underwent attribution training not only altered 
their attributions but also showed improvement in perceived task success and 
enhanced levels of intrinsic motivation. 
However, as Orbach, Singer and Price (1999) note, the Orbach et al. (1997) study 
(and also the Sinnott & Biddle study) used only a short-term intervention 
consisting of one attribution training session and changes in attributions and 
performance were measured only once, shortly after the intervention. Therefore, 
the durability of these positive changes cannot be inferred. 
As a result of this shortfall, Orbach et al. (1999) conducted an attribution training 
study exploring the durability of this effect and testing how a number of 
dependent variables (i.e., attributions, performance expectation, affect) were 
influenced by attribution training. They also considered the extent to which any 
effect might transfer to other tennis tasks. Results suggest not only that 
attributions can be changed, but that these and the accompanying changes in 
affect and expectation last after the intervention period has ended (in this study 
the test-retest time lapse was three weeks). Furthermore, the effects transferred to 
a secondary tennis task. The authors suggest that knowledge of these results may 
be important for coaches who may be able to alter dysfunctional attributions 
across time and tasks and, hence, influence accompanying affect and behaviour. 
The design of these two studies allowed the primary cause only to be considered; 
more complex, multi-cause explanations were not assessed. Whilst this may be 
appropriate in a laboratory-controlled study where task importance is likely to be 
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relatively low, in real-life settings opportunities to offer multiple causes may be 
required to assess natural attributional processes more accurately. 
Interpersonal attributions and attributional divergence 
The focus in early attribution research was primarily at the intra-personal level 
(Hewstone, 1989). More recent work in clinical and therapeutic settings has 
considered the role of attributions in interpersonal and group situations. In 
particular, the call for conversational approaches to attribution research has been 
heeded (e.g., Antaki & Naji, 1987; Hammer & Ruscher, 1997). As will be 
demonstrated below, attribution-making and communication are inextricably 
linked and, therefore, the study of conversation is an important source of 
attribution information (Burleson, 1986). 
The following sections will consider a framework and a potential method for 
examining on-going, close interpersonal relationships. 
Rejeski's model of attributional divergence 
In order to examine the relationship between coach and performer, Rejeski 
suggests using a model of attributional compatibility developed from models of 
attribution divergence in dyadic situations. Rejeski's (1979) so-called model of 
attributional conflict in sport is, therefore, considered here. This model provides 
a framework within which potential interpersonal conflict can be explored. A 
brief review of this model is therefore provided (see also Figure 3). Implicit in 
Rejeski's model is the view that the coach-performer relationship is complex and 
offers the potential for conflict. Competitive sport is built upon the occurrence of 
frequent achievement outcomes and often, especially in the case of elite sport, 
very public causal ascriptions. 
As previously stated, differences in attributions made by actors and observers 
have been studied in a variety of settings, mostly based on the initial studies of 
Jones and Nesbitt (1972). The major theoretical premise for supporting a model 
for attributional conflict is that actors tend to attribute externally, i.e., outcomes 
as a result of situational influences, whereas observers tend to attribute to factors 
Review of Literature 56 
associated with the actor, i.e., behaviour!. A consideration not made clear within 
the literature is the possible gradation of the potentially multi-faceted role of 
observer. For example, the coach in some sports, in addition to passive 
observation, may play an active part in team perfonnance through such actions as 
team substitutions, changes to tactics and the giving of technical instructions 
during perfonnance. It may be, therefore, appropriate to consider the extent to 
which the coach is passive or active in the perfonnance. 
Progressing from Monson and Snyder's (1977) infonnational interpretation of 
this phenomenon and drawing on the earlier work of Bern (1972i, Rejeski 
considered the potential for attributional conflict the result of three potentially 
coexisting processes. The first is that of the insider-outsider difference: the notion 
here being that self-perceivers have access to perceptual infonnation not available 
to observers, e.g., perceived exertion which, for the coach, can only be inferred 
from observable cues. The second is the notion that actors have access to personal 
history, e.g., regarding previous perfonnances, not available to the observer. This 
intimate-stranger difference may not be as exaggerated for the established coach-
perfonner relationship where the coach may have a high level of infonnation 
relating to the perfonner's previous perfonnances. Thirdly, the self-other 
difference relates to the attributor's need to maintain self-esteem, i.e., a 
motivational bias. The suggestion here is that a self-attributor may attribute a 
negative outcome to factors outside hislher control in order to protect self-esteem 
and deflect potential blame3• It is noted from the preceding sections, however, 
that more recent research has considered group-serving biases that may operate in 
the reverse direction to self-serving biases. 
Collectively, these processes can be seen to have a potential impact on the 
distinctiveness, consensus and consistency infonnation considered by Kelley 
(1967) to be central to the process of attributing and may, therefore, lead to 
I It is noted here that Watson (1982) preferred the terms self and other, which may be more 
appropriate in the coach-perforroer situation. 
2 According to Monson and Snyder's interpretation, based on perceptual differences, the athlete's 
attribntions are more veridical, whilst Rejeski introduced the potentially confounding additional 
motivational biases highlighted by Bem 
3 The basis for this hedonic bias has been the subject of much research in psychology (e.g., 
Brawley, 1984, suggests it may be a function of memory). 
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potential attributional conflict. Where cognitive and/or motivational differences 
exist between coach and performer, these are likely to be brought into greater 
focus, and therefore be more influential, when the outcome is negative, surprising 
or especially relevant to the perceiver. The argument is deductive rather than 
explicit, in that attributional activity is believed to be increased by 
negative/important/surprising outcomes, and therefore where the above processes 
are evident (as they may be in the actor-observer, coach-performer situation), the 
effects of these will be exaggerated by such attribution-generating outcomes. For 
example, a coach and performer each motivated to protect their own self-esteem 
following a surprisingly poor performance by the athlete in an important 
competition may engage in greater attributional activity (than previously) and 
subsequently attribute to more polarised causes (for example, the athlete to poor 
planning by the coach and the coach to an inappropriate training attitude by the 
athlete). In contrast, a moderate performance in a less significant event may result 
in less attributional activity by both dyad members and hence any attributions 
made are likely to be less strongly felt and less polarised (as the motivation to 
protect their respective self-esteems is less). 
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Examining the key features of this model, Rejeski highlights consensus and 
distinctiveness information as the two aspects most likely to contribute to 
attributional conflict. As Rejeski notes, consensus information is widely available 
to coaches and performers. However, Rejeski's view that performers are 
necessarily in a superior position to utilise distinctiveness information is, perhaps, 
dependent on the sport being studied and the closeness of the coach-performer 
relationship in question. 
Rejeski notes that conflict will not occur in every situation. Of interest, then, is 
under what circumstances does attributional conflict occur and in what form is 
conflict apparent? Previous research suggests that greater attributional processing 
occurs following a negative outcome or non-achievement of a goal, when the 
outcome is important to the attributor, when the outcome is unexpected (Weiner, 
1985) or when the attributor is affected by the consequences of the actor's 
behaviour. Conflict in the coach-performer dyad is more likely to occur, 
according to Rejeski, when important events have negative outcomes and where 
the coach feels personally affected by the consequences. 
Considering the antecedent variables, the following questions can be considered: 
to what degree do coach and athlete agree on non-achievement in a given 
situation? With the potential range of individual and, in the case of team sports, 
team goals, it may not be obvious to the researcher the degree to which an 
outcome is important to the attributor. Furthermore, one needs to consider the 
significance of the outcome both in a short-term sense and within, for example, a 
long-term training and competition strategy: the relevant weighting given by 
coach and performer may differ. Rejeski discusses hedonic relevance in relation 
to team situations, suggesting that negative behaviours on the part of the 
performer are likely to be harshly judged because of the potential damage to the 
team; but what of the coach-performer relationship in individual sports? 
Rejeski notes that in addition to these attribution-making trends, individual 
differences are also significant. For example, achievement orientation may 
influence the tendency to make certain patterns of self-attributions. Rejeski notes 
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the earlier work of Weiner et al. (1971), who suggest that low-achievers assume 
personal responsibility for failures, whereas high-achievers tend to take personal 
credit for success. Furthennore, differences in achievement motivation may result 
in differing behavioural styles (Rejeski, 1979). Rejeski also refers to Snyder's 
(1974) work which suggests that some individuals are more likely to be 
situationally-guided, with others prone to being inward-looking. Rejeski suggests 
that high self-monitors, i.e., those who tend to look at environmental cues, 
including interpersonal behaviour, are likely to be more coachable. 
Rejeski discusses a range of potential effects of attributional conflict, from 
evaluative effects, where conflict leads to the fonnation of negative impressions 
which in turn bias future attributions, and motivational effects, such as denial of 
responsibility, to behavioural reaction, where athletes may wish to contribute to 
decision-making in order to help control a situation and be denied by the coach. 
Rejeski also discusses what he calls aftereffects. As an example, he considers the 
potential to develop self-fulfilling prophecies; that is, negative evaluations of 
perfonners by coaches leading to the development of the very behaviours in 
performers which are unwanted. 
Rejeski stresses the importance of the feedback system, from consequences to 
antecedents, and which makes the potential for attributional conflict a dynamic 
process4• 
A natural discourse approach to studying spontaneous attributions 
From the preceding review, it can be seen that the original theories of Heider, 
Jones and Davis, and Kelley suggest that people are naive scientists, processing 
information in a systematic way in an attempt to achieve some degree of 
understanding, prediction and control. Subsequently, various theorists have 
contended that these attributional processes are either more simple or more 
complex than originally proposed (Ross & Fletcher, 1985). It appears that the 
4 Rejeski notes that from an empirical perspective consideration of this model as a dynamic 
process is problematic. It is clear that researchers must consider any cause-outcome unit within its 
wider causal context. 
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context in which attributions are sought, the types of events which are explained 
and the spatial and temporal position from which one attributes all potentially 
affect the process of causal ascription. However, also important is the process of 
communicating attributions, especially in interpersonal settings, where one 
person's attributions may impact on the causal beliefs of others. 
The question of whether people make spontaneous attributions, i.e., causal 
thought that is unprompted (Biddle & Hanrahan, 1998) in their everyday lives 
underpins many of the criticisms of attribution research methods. Most research 
designs require participants to respond to real or hypothetical situations either 
with their own attributional ascriptions or by selecting from those provided. In an 
attempt to determine whether people do make spontaneous attributions, Weiner 
(1986) examined 20 published attribution studies. He found clear evidence of 
spontaneous attributions being made in three categories of material: archival, 
verbalisations and indirect indexes, e.g., helping behaviour (Biddle & Hanrahan, 
1998). 
The power and significance of conversation is also clearly stated by Hilton (in 
press, MS p.1, cited in Hewstone, 1989, p.1l7). 
"Causal explanation is first and foremost a form of social 
interaction .... The verb 'to explain' is a three-part predicate: 
Someone explains something to someone. Causal explanation takes 
the form of a conversation, and is thus subject to the rules of 
conversation." 
Indeed, within the sport domain there are numerous specific situations which 
could benefit from qualitative analyses: for example, Biddle et al. (2001) suggest 
content analysing raw attributions given by officials in specific situations to help 
coaches better understand decisions. 
Hewstone (1989) highlights the significance of a conversational approach to 
interpersonal attribution research whilst, at the same time, recognising the limited 
quantity in social psychology. Lalljee (1981), drawing on concepts from 
discourse analysis, ethnomethodology and speech act theory, suggests four 
general principles that might influence the giving of a particular explanation in an 
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interpersonal setting. Firstly, assumptions concerning the knowledge of the other; 
secondly, the relationship between the interactors; thirdly, topic and activity 
implications; and fourthly, interpersonal consequences. In relation to an interview 
situation, i.e., between coach or performer and interviewer, such considerations 
seem pertinent. When considering naturally occurring dialogue in sport, e.g., 
between coach and performer, the antecedent conditions suggested by Lalljee can, 
perhaps, be more easily assessed. For example, you would expect those in a well-
established coach-performer dyad to appreciate each other's knowledge of the 
sport and to have a clearly defined working relationship. The consequences of the 
conversation, and the attributions made within it, can be far reaching, in terms of 
future training and competition plans, motivation and their interpersonal 
relationship. 
Iohnson and Biddle (1988) used a method previously adopted by Diener and 
Dweck (1978) in asking participants in a balancing act to think aloud. During 
these trials, in which feedback of success was manipulated, verbalisations were 
recorded and analysed. Participants who persisted at the task despite negative 
feedback were found to make more strategy-related comments, whereas those 
classified as low persisters were more likely to make free-response attributions 
and negative self-statements. Of the attributions made, task-difficulty and lack of 
ability were cited significantly more by low persisters than high persisters. 
However, as Biddle and Hanrahan (1998) rightly note, this approach cannot claim 
to elicit truly spontaneous attributions; sport psychology research has yet to 
assess truly spontaneous attributions. 
Another approach to measuring spontaneous attributions used by Harvey, Yarkin, 
Lightner, and Town (1980) involved showing subjects vidoetaped episodes of 
activities likely to elicit attributional search (unexpected, negatively valenced 
behaviours) and asking them to write down any thoughts or feelings experienced 
during the footage. Although it could be argued that there is still a degree of 
coercion here, causal attributions were not asked for explicitly. Harvey et al. 
reported unsolicited attributional activity especially where there was a degree of 
empathy for the behaviour, where outcomes were perceived as serious and where 
future interaction was anticipated. 
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Interest in the attributional statements made in natural conversation was the focus 
of a study by Antaki and Naji (1987). Antaki and Naji report the dearth of studies 
considering this topic. In the one relevant study found, of lower socioeconomic 
senior citizens at a picnic, causal statements made up 15% of all utterances 
(Nisbett, Harvey, & Wilson, 1979, in Nisbett & Ross, 1980). In this study the 
authors focus on those statements containing the causal connective 'because'. 
This is rather limited and may have missed attributions where the cause and 
outcome are spatially distanced within the sentence construction. However, they 
offer a system for categorising those topics which people choose to explain in 
ordinary conversation, making the distinction between actions and other related 
outcomes which might prompt explanation: emotions (Lalljee, Watson, & White, 
1983), occurrences (Zuckerman & Evans, 1984), unexpected failure or success 
(Wong & Weiner, 1981) and untoward events in general (Lalljee, Watson, & 
White, 1982). 
Using the categories derived from their pilot study for the main analysis and 
making the distinction between those statements in which the speaker or 
speaker's group is the protagonist and those where the protagonist is someone 
other than the speaker, Antaki and Naji (1987) found the following: The most 
common category was general states of affair (33.8%), followed by the set of 
events involving the speaker, i.e., speaker's actions, policy, state of affairs, beliefs 
or state of mind (28.8%), and the set of events involving other people (17.9%). 
This is contrary to expectation of what triggers attributional processing (single 
person actions, the actions of others). It is suggested that this may be because 
states of affairs serve a number of heuristic purposes, such as summarising 
previous discussions. However, it should be noted that these findings are for 
British-speaking, professional middle-class people and may differ from findings 
for other cultural or socio-economic groups. 
Summary 
It can be seen from the preceding sections that after the initial use of a narrow 
range of methods to assess attributions in sport, a number of approaches, both 
from within sport psychology but more notably from other areas of psychology, 
have been explored. After an initial examination of the 'classic' attribution 
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theories, this literature review has focussed upon the antecedent factors affecting 
attribution formation and the consequences of making attributions, at the 
cognitive, affect and motivational levels. This discussion led into a consideration 
of interpersonal attributions pertinent to the study of coach-performer relations 
and subsequently of Rejeski's model of attributional divergence. The literature 
review was completed by considering natural discourse approaches to the study of 
attributions. 
Many of the approaches reviewed here hold some potential for future sport 
attribution research. Many questions pertinent to attribution research in sport 
remain unanswered. The present research aims to begin addressing some of these. 
Specific proposal and research questions 
Rejeski draws on the actor-observer literature to provide a model for examining 
potential attributional conflict between coach and performer in sport. In order to 
explore the attributions made by coaches and performers for real life outcomes to 
shared events, there is a clear need to assess causal ascriptions in their natural 
context and through the medium of verbal speech. However, as suggested by 
Biddle and Hanrahan (1998), there is a clear gap in the research literature; few 
studies in sport psychology have used interview approaches to explore 
attributions, this despite their use in many other sub-disciplines in psychology. 
The purpose of this research, therefore, is to explore the attributions made by 
coaches and performers for significant shared events. In discussing these findings, 
reference will be made to both antecedent determinants and the affective, 
cognitive and behavioural consequences of causal ascription. Both questionnaire 
and interview methods will be used to determine whether the attributions made by 
coaches and performers immediately and some time after events do indeed offer 
the potential for conflict, as suggested by Rejeski's model. Specific hypotheses 
will be included in each study chapter. 
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Chapter 3. 
Study I: The Attribution-emotion Relationship in Coaches 
Introduction 
Attributions are believed to influence a number of cognitive, behavioural and 
affective processes (Weiner, 1992). Performance-level sport often produces high 
emotions, especially in its immediate aftermath. This is the level at which the 
coach-performer relationship is likely to be relatively intense and of greater 
significance than at recreational (participation) level. Various models from a 
variety of theoretical perspectives have been developed to explain emotions in 
sport (Kerr, 1997). Within sport attribution research, investigators considering the 
attribution-emotion relationship have produced a number of models, e.g., that of 
Weiner (1985, 1986, 1992) and Vallerand (1987). The similarities and differences 
in these models are worth some reiteration here. For Weiner (1986), outcomes 
may generate a range of emotions independent of the attributions that may follow. 
The search for explanation is strongest following negative, unexpected and/or 
important outcomes and, depending on the causal dimension qualities of the 
attributions made, attribution-dependent emotions may also follow. In this model, 
Weiner considered three dimensions: locus of causality, stability, controllability 
and their relationships with various cognitive and affective consequences are 
shown in Figure 1. A number of researchers in sport have considered the 
emotional consequences of attributions (e.g., McAuley & Duncan, 1989), 
although usually in laboratory settings. 
An alternative, although similar, framework, the intuitive-reflective appraisal 
model has been proposed by Vallerand (1987; Vallerand & Blanchard, 2000). For 
Vallerand, an initial and relatively immediate intuitive appraisal of the outcome 
takes place, producing affect similar to Weiner's attribution-independent 
emotions. A reflective appraisal may then follow, generating attributions for the 
outcome. 
Given the potential identified by Rejeski (1979) for coaches and performers to 
make different attributions for the same outcome, based on differences in a 
number of antecedent conditions and the potential biases which may operate, it 
The Attribution-emotion Relationship in Coaches 66 
could be expected that differences in emotions may well follow these shared 
outcomes. Yet, as Biddle et al. (2001) have noted, most attribution research, 
including those studies considering post-event affect, have focussed almost 
exclusively on the performer. The current study considers the attributions and 
emotions of sports coaches for outcomes achieved by their performers. 
As a field study building on previously published investigations of athletes l by 
Biddle and Hill (1988, 1992a), the design of the current study is unable to exert 
the same level of control as laboratory-based designs (Cates-Zientek & 
Breakwell, 1991). However, the outcomes focussed upon are naturally occurring 
and hence meaningful to the coach and, as such, this approach incorporates some 
advantages over more controlled studies, especially in relation to emotions. 
It was hypothesised that the attributions made by coaches would be related to a 
number of emotions and that these relationships would be stronger following less 
satisfying, unexpected and/or important outcomes (Weiner, 1985). 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were eighteen coaches (Male n=16, Female n=2; Age: 20-30 years 
n=2, 31-40 years n=7, 41-50 years n=8, 51-60 years n=l) from a variety of team 
(n=8) and individual (n=lO) sports who attended one of the National Coaching 
Foundation's (N.C.F.'s) Level 3 coach education courses for experienced 
coaches. 
Procedures 
Either before or immediately after the N.C.F. course, coaches were asked to 
participate in a study examining coaches' attitudes in sport. It was made clear that 
the study was not related to the N.C.F. course. A Sports Coach Questionnaire 
(see Appendix 1), based on an attribution-emotion measure used by Biddle and 
Hill (1992 a&b), was distributed to those willing to participate. Coaches were 
asked to complete the questionnaire immediately following a competition or, if 
I The tenn 'athlete' is used here and in subsequent chapters in the generic sense, referring to any 
sport perfonner. 
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not possible, a significant training event (i.e., a session perceived by the coach to 
be key in a training cycle) involving one of the coaches' performers. Forms were 
returned to the author the following week. Each questionnaire contained clear 
instructions and information concerning confidentiality. 
Instrument 
After descriptive details (age, sex, nature of sport), coaches rated the 'importance 
of winning' and the 'importance of performing well' (for the chosen event) on 
two separate 7-point scales, ranging from 'Very important' (I) to 'Not at all 
important' (7). In relation to their athlete's performance, they then made ratings 
on thirteen 5-point bipolar emotion scales: pleased-displeased, satisfied-
dissatisfied, happy-unhappy, contented-discontented, competent-incompetent, 
good-bad, confident-unconfident, proud-shameful, relaxed-tense, unconcemed-
concerned, elated-depressed, sense of achievement-frustrated, and calm-angry, 
based on Biddle and Hill's (1992 a&b) studies. High scores indicate the positive 
end of the continuum (i.e., the first word in the pairs above). In addition, the 
coach's degree of satisfaction with 'your performer's standard of performance' 
was measured on a 6-point bipolar scale (Satisfied=l, Dissatisfied=6). Unipolar 
5-point scales measured coaches' current ratings of surprise (which can be 
equated to degree of unexpectedness), disappointment and guilt, where 1 ='Not at 
all',5='Verymuch'. 
Nine attributions commonly used in sport (Biddle & Hill, 1988, 1992a; Roberts & 
Pascuzzi, 1979) were presented. Coaches rated each attribution on two 5-point 
scales: the first concerning the extent to which the outcome was due to each 
factor; the second the degree the performance was due to each factor. Eight 
coaches responded in relation to significant training sessions, and so 
'performance importance' and 'performance satisfaction' were considered for 
subsequent analyses (rather than 'outcome importance/satisfaction'). 
The median performance satisfaction score was used to split the attribution and 
emotion scores given by coaches into two sub-groups (highly satisfied=I-2; less 
satisfied=3-6). Data from these sub-groups were then analysed separately. Scores 
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were also split at the median according to level of surprise (low surprise=I-2; 
high surprise=3-5) and similar analyses conducted. 
Results 
Descriptive data are shown in Table 2. These reveal that both sub-groups of 
coaches, based on satisfaction scores, felt that 'performing well' was considered 
important and that they were generally not dissatisfied with the performances of 
their athletes. 
Table 2: Performance importance and performance satisfaction data. 
All coaches (n=18) 
Satisfied (n= 9) 
Dissatisfied (n= 9) 
Attributions for performance 
Performance 
importance 
M SD 
2.28 1.32 
2.22 1.30 
2.33 1.41 
1 =very important 
7=not important 
Performance 
satisfaction 
M SD 
2.61 1.38 
1.44 0.53 
3.78 0.83 
1 =very satisfied 
6=dissatisfied 
Attributions for performance made by 'highly satisfied' (HS) and 'less satisfied' 
(LS) and 'highly surprised' (HSu) and 'less surprised' (LSu) coaches are 
presented in Table 3. 
Table 3: Mean attribution scores as measured on a 5-point scale (5=high) made 
coaches who were highly satisfied or less satisfied and highly surprised 
or less surprised with performance (attributions' relative ranking is 
shown in brackets). 
Coaches' performance appraisal Coaches' degree of surprise 
Attributions HS (0=9) LS (0=9) LSu (0=11) HSu (0=7) 
Luck 1.63 (9) 1.50 (9) 1.73 (9) 1.20 (9) 
Ability 4.11 (1) 3.38 (4) 4.09 (3) 3.17 (5=) 
Effort 4.00 (2=) 4.00 (1) 4.18 (2) 3.67 (1=) 
Mood 3.56 (7) 3.75 (3) 3.73 (4) 3.50 (3=) 
Fitness 3.78 (4=) 2.75 (7) 3.36 (6) 3.17 (5=) 
Previous experience 3.67 (6) 3.00 (6) 3.27 (7) 3.50 (3=) 
Motivation 4.00 (2=) 3.88 (2) 4.36 (1) 3.17 (5=) 
Personality 3.78 (4=) 3.25 (5) 3.45 (5) 3.67 (1=) 
Form 3.22 (8) 2.43 (8) 3.20 (8) 2.33 (8) 
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For each coach group, the three most highly scored attributions are highlighted. 
From Table 3 it can be seen that 'highly satisfied' coaches attribute performance 
most to 'ability', 'effort' and 'motivation'. 'Less satisfied' coaches also attribute 
most to 'effort' and 'motivation', presumably a lack of these qualities, but also 
'mood'. For both groups of coaches, 'luck' is least identified as the performance 
cause. The largest difference between group mean scores is for 'fitness'. Despite 
similar patterns of attributions scores for both groups, scores are generally 
highest, across all but two scales, for the 'highly satisfied' coach group. 
In all except two of the attribution scales (,previous experience', 'personality'), 
scores for 'surprised' coaches are lower than for 'less surprised' coaches. 
'Motivation', 'effort' and 'ability' are attributions most highly rated by less 
surprised coaches, whereas 'effort', 'personality' and 'mood'I'previous 
experience' are causes rated highest by the more surprised coach group. 'Luck' is 
least employed by all groups. The largest difference between group mean scores 
is for 'motivation'. 
Ratings of emotional feelings 
Highly satisfied and less satisfied, and highly surprised and less surprised 
coaches' emotional ratings are provided in Table 4. The figure in brackets 
represents the score minus the mid-scale score of 3 (which represents a neutral 
state in a bi-polar scale). Those most strongly felt emotions are highlighted. 
Those marked with the * were rated on unipolar scales. 
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Table 4: Mean emotion scores as measured on 5-point bipolar scales (5=strong 
feeling as labelled in the table) and *5-point unipolar scales (5 ='very 
much'). 
Coaches' performance appraisal Coaches' degree of surprise 
HS (n=9) LS (n=9) HSu (n=7) LSu (n=l1) 
Emotions Actual (-MP) score Actual (-MP) score Actual (-MP) score Actual (-MP) score 
Pleased 4.67 (1.67) 3.33 (0.33) 4.17 (1.17) 3.92 (0.92) 
Satisfied 4.22 (1.22) 3.44 (0.44) 4.00 (1.00) 3.75 (0.75) 
Happy 4.22 (1.22) 3.11 (0.11) 3.67 (0.67) 3.67 (0.67) 
Content 3.67 (0.67) 3.00 (0.00) 3.33 (0.33) 3.33 (0.33) 
Competent 4.22 (1.22) 3.78 (0.78) 3.83 (0.83) 4.08 (1.08) 
Good 4.44 (1.44) 3.56 (0.56) 3.67 (0.67) 4.17 (1.17) 
Confident 4.56 (1.56) 4.11 (1.11) 4.33 (1.33) 4.33 (1.33) 
Proud 4.22 (1.22) 3.22 (0.22) 3.83 (0.83) 3.67 (0.67) 
Relaxed 4.44 (1.44) 3.22 (0.22) 4.33 (1.33) 3.83 (0.83) 
Unconcerned 2.89 (-0.11) 2.89 (-0.11) 3.17 (0.17) 2.75 (-0.25) 
Elated 3.89 (0.89) 3.11 (0.11) 3.67 (0.67) 3.42 (0.42) 
Sense of achievement 4.33 (1.33) 3.22 (0.22) 3.67 (0.67) 3.83 (0.83) 
Calm 4.00 (1.00) 3.89 (0.89) 3.83 (0.83) 4.00 (1.00) 
Surprised' 2.56 2.11 3.50 1.75 
Disappointed' 1.33 2.78 2.17 2.00 
Guilty' 1.11 2.11 1.50 1.67 
For all except the 'unconcerned' scale, emotion scores (on bipolar scales) for all 
coach sub-groups are above the mid-point, reflecting at least a mild expression of 
the emotions listed in the table. Satisfied coaches tend to report stronger feeling 
than less satisfied coaches on all but one bipolar scale. Mean scores on the 
unipolar scales are all lower than the mid-point, suggesting these emotions were 
not greatly experienced. Less satisfied coaches appear to experience more 
disappointment and guilt. 
The pattern between sub-groups divided by degree of surprise is less clear. Both 
highly- and less-surprised groups report positive emotions and similar mean 
scores on most emotions. 
Relationship between attributions and emotional ratings 
Zero-order correlations between attribution scores and the top 8 bipolar and all 
unipolar emotional ratings for HS and LS coach groups with correlation 
coefficients greater than or equal to 0.6 are shown in Table 5. This value was 
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selected as a medium to large correlation rather than showing significance levels 
that, due to the small sample size, are less meaningful. 
Table 5: Attribution-emotion correlations for HS and LS coaches. 
Pleased Satisfied Competent Good Confidence Relaxed Sense of Calm Guilt Surp. Disap 
Achieve. 
HS coaches (n=9) 
Luck -0.80 
Ability -0.62 -0.66 -0.62 
Motivation -0.78 
Personality -0.70 -0.69 
Form -0.60 -0.72 -0.60 
Previous expo -0.66 -0.76 
LS coaches (n=9) 
Luck 0.74 0.61 
Ability 0.61 
Effort -0.83 0.87 0.72 0.84 -0.69 
Mood -0.71 
Previous expo -0.60 
Personality 0.62 0.76 0.77 0.71 0.66 
Most notable results from Table 5 include satisfied coaches' feelings of 
'disappointment', 'surprise' and 'guilt' all being inversely related to attributions 
of 'ability' and 'form', 'disappointment' and 'guilt' being inversely related to 
'previous experience', and 'confidence' being strongly inversely related to 'luck'. 
For less satisfied coaches there are more attribution-emotion relationships than 
for highly satisfied coaches. However, there are fewer relationships between 
attributions and the feelings of 'surprise', 'disappointment' and 'guilt'. 
Attributions to 'effort' and 'personality' are each related to five emotions. 
However, with the exception of feeling 'competent' being positively associated 
with attributions to 'ability' and 'effort' and negatively related to 'mood', no 
other single emotion is associated with such a range of attributions. 'Personality' 
attributions have strong associations with affect across both high and less 
satisfied coaches. 
-0.76 
-0.86 
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Zero-order correlations between attributions scores and the top 8 bipolar and all 
unipolar emotional ratings for LSu and HSu coach groups with correlation 
coefficients greater than or equal to 0.6 are shown in Table 6. 
Table 6: Attribution-emotion correlations for LSu and HSu coaches. 
Pleased Satisfied Competent Good Confidence Relaxed Sense of Calm Guilt surp. Disap 
Achieve. 
Less Surprised coaches (n=l1) 
Ability -0.77 0.77 0.63 -0.71 0.67 
Effort -0.61 0.78 0.80 0.75 -0.62 
Fitness -0.69 
Motivation 0.63 
Personality 0.62 
Fonn 0.69 0.70 -0.64 
High Surprised coaches (n=7) 
Luck 
-0.77 
Ability -0.77 -0.70 
Effort -0.63 -0.76 
Mood -0.69 -0.71 -0.71 
Fitness -0.85 
-0.67 
Previous expo 
-0.75 
Motivation -0.65 
Personality -0.63 -0.76 -0.72 
Fonn -0.87 
Where the coach is less surprised by the performance, it appears that 'effort' and 
'ability' are attributions strongly related to a number of emotions, five each. 
Furthermore, a feeling of 'guilt' is negatively related to four attributions: 'ability', 
'effort', 'fitness' and 'form'. 
For those coaches who are most surprised by performance there is a wider spread 
of attribution/emotion relationships. Feelings of 'satisfaction' seem to be most 
related to attributions, being negatively related to five. 
Collectively, across to the two coach sub-groups, feelings of satisfaction and guilt 
seem to be most related to attributions. 
-0.82 
0.67 
-0.64 
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Discussion 
In this study coaches rated both attributions for their athletes' performances and 
the emotions they felt themselves following these outcomes. Both Weiner (1986) 
and Vallerand (1987) suggest that attributions affect emotional reactions 
following an outcome. However, there are no published studies investigating the 
links between coaches' emotions and the attributions they give for the 
performances of their athletes. It was hypothesised that the attributions made by 
coaches would be related to a number of emotions and that these relationships 
would be stronger following less satisfying, unexpected and/or important 
outcomes (Weiner, 1985). Since all events were viewed as relatively important, 
the focus is on levels of satisfaction and expectation. 
Attributions 
The present findings suggest an emphasis by both satisfied and less satisfied 
coaches on transient aspects of the performer's behaviour as the causes of 
performance, such as 'effort', 'mood' and 'motivation'; 'ability' is also highly 
rated, although this is, perhaps, more stable. These attributions are internal to the 
performer and, with the exception of effort, arguably uncontrollable by the 
performer, although the coach may feel able to influence them. Such an emphasis 
may allow coaches to perceive more potential change in, and control over, 
performances than if more stable factors were seen as causal. 'Form', which is 
internal to the performer, relatively unstable and, arguably, uncontrollable by 
coach or performer, and 'luck', external, unstable and uncontrollable, are the least 
rated causes offered by both satisfied and least satisfied coach groups. 
It should be noted, however, that due to the number of recorded events relating to 
training performances, as opposed to competition performances, this study offers 
attributions which tend to stress factors internal to the performer (although not 
necessarily dispositional); from the attributions offered, only 'luck' can be seen as 
external to the performer. Factors relating to opponents (as included in Biddle and 
Hill's, 1992, studies) were not considered in the final analyses because in many 
cases no opponents were present. 
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Highly satisfied coaches tend to make stronger attributions than do less satisfied 
coaches across the range of attributions offered; exceptions being 'effort' and 
'mood'. Assuming that high satisfaction is associated with a level of performance 
above expectation, and bearing in mind that even the low satisfaction group had a 
moderate mean satisfaction score, these findings may offer some support for 
claims by Susskind et al. (1999) that attributors may make fairly immediate 
causal ascriptions and only search for further causes if the outcome is unexpected 
or otherwise unusual. It is possible that coaches who are highly satisfied with the 
athlete's performance search more deeply for a cause or causes, implicating a 
larger number of causal elements with stronger conviction. However, further 
research is needed to substantiate this claim and, in doing so, there is a need to 
distinguish positive and negative 'unexpectedness'. 
When examining the data grouped by level of surprise, which can be seen as a 
measure of unexpectedness, those coaches least surprised by the performance 
tend to offer stronger attributions than those more surprised. Even taking account 
of the small sample size, these findings are difficult to reconcile with the 
preceding suggestions. Susskind et al. (1999) have argued that outcomes that 
confirm prior expectations are more likely to be explained by existing causal 
beliefs and, hence, less attributional search, whereas more surprising outcomes 
require greater search and, thus, it can be argued, potentially a greater number of 
strongly evoked causes offered. However, this is not suggested by the data in the 
present study. It is possible that those coaches with expectations which are 
subsequently fulfilled and, hence, experience less surprise, may have considered a 
large number of contributory factors on which to base their expectation and, when 
asked for, are then offered. Certainly, it has been suggested that expectancy-
confirming information may be of greater value to the perceiver than J ones and 
Davis' theory suggests (Crittenden, 1983). It is also possible that both highly 
satisfied and lowly satisfied coaches are surprised, in the sense that performance 
may either exceed or fall below expectation and, hence, attributional search is 
triggered in both situations. 
'Motivation', 'effort' and 'ability' are attributed most by less surprised coaches, 
whereas 'effort', 'personality' and 'mood'I'previous experience' are causes most 
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given for the more surprised coaches group. One might expect a coach in a long-
tenn ongoing relationship with a perfonner to be able to predict the perfonner's 
'motivation' and 'ability', which are both internal to the perfonner and relatively 
stable, whereas 'mood', internal, but potentially less stable and less controllable, 
and 'personality' effects, again, internal and relatively stable, but uncontrollable, 
might be harder to take account of and are, therefore, potentially more likely to be 
offered following an unexpected perfonnance. Whilst 'effort' appears as an 
attribution made by both groups, it may be that effort co-acts with other causal 
factors; for example, effort may be given when motivated, but not given when in 
an inappropriate mood. This suggests the need to study levels and complexity of 
causal ascription and the potential interaction of causal elements. 
Emotions 
The emotions most strongly felt by 'highly satisfied' coaches are feeling 
'pleased', 'confident', 'good', 'relaxed' and 'a sense of achievement'. 
Interestingly, the emotions most highly rated by 'less satisfied' coaches also 
include 'confident' and 'feeling good', as well as feeling 'calm', 'competent' and 
'satisfied', although these are all felt less strongly than by the 'highly satisfied' 
coaches. This perhaps reflects the generally satisfied nature of the entire sample 
of coach responses. 
The lowest emotion score given by all coach sub-groups, and the only emotion 
score below the mid-point, is for 'unconcerned-concerned'. However, this scale is 
difficult to interpret as even if the score indicated more extreme 'being 
concerned', this is not necessarily a negative feature; it is not surprising that a 
coach is concerned about perfonnance, although it appears here no more so for 
less satisfYing than satisfying perfonnances. 
Less surprised coaches report most feeling 'confident', 'good', 'competent', 
'calm' and 'pleased'. The most strongly evoked emotions for the more surprised 
coaches are feeling 'pleased', 'satisfied', 'confident' and 'relaxed'. However, the 
emotion scores of these two groups do not appear to be clearly distinguished by 
degree of surprise. 
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Relationships between attributions and emotions 
A larger number of attribution-emotion correlations with coefficients greater or 
equal to 0.6 are evident for 'less satisfied' coaches than for 'highly satisfied' 
coaches. This is surprising in the light of findings by Milech and Nesdale (1984), 
who found direct relationships between attributions and the emotion of 
'happiness' for positive outcomes, but not negative outcomes. From the current 
data, one possibility is that the lack of satisfaction felt by the coach may trigger 
attributional search and subsequent emotional reactions are associated with the 
causes therein derived. In line with Weiner's (1986) attribution-emotion model, 
emotions felt after a satisfYing performance may be more independent of the 
attributions given, hence, the occurrence of fewer attribution-emotion 
relationships. 
For less satisfied coaches attributions to 'effort' and 'personality' are each related 
to five emotions. However, with the exception of feeling 'competent' being 
positively associated with attributions to 'ability' and 'effort', and negatively 
related to 'mood', no other single emotion is associated with such a range of 
attributions. 
'Personality' attributions seem to have strong associations with affect across both 
highly and less satisfied coach groups. With training for sport, and especially 
those such as running events, swimming and cycling, being largely repetitive and 
both physically and mentally demanding, the coach may place great emphasis on 
strength of character type attributes. 
It seems that the attributions made by coaches are related to a range of emotions 
for both highly surprised and less surprised groups. One possible explanation is 
that for surprising performances, either better or worse than expected, 
attributional search results in emotions that are attribution-dependent, whereas, 
when outcomes match expectation, the emotions felt are related to attributions 
pre-conceived as likely to influence future outcomes (Osberg & Shrauger, 1986). 
Performer 'effort', which is external to the coach, unstable and controllable 
mainly by the performer, in particular seems to be related to a number of 
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emotions, being negatively correlated with feeling 'satisfied' and of 'guilt', and 
positively related to feelings of 'confidence', 'competence' and a 'sense of 
achievement'. Without an appreciation of how the coach is interpreting the 
emotion (e.g., is the coach considering satisfaction with the performer or the 
se/f?), these findings are difficult to interpret. For example, one might expect a 
coach attributing an expected poor performance to a lack of perfonner effort to be 
less satisfied, but an expected good perfonnance similarly attributed to (high) 
effort to be more satisfying. These findings highlight the importance of 
differentiating between positive and negative interpretations of the attributions 
offered, e.g., motivation is presumably seen as a positive contributory factor when 
coaches are satisfied with perfonnance, but where elicited for less satisfying 
perfonnances, is seen as lacking, i.e., a negative contributory factor. Such an 
awareness and understanding is central to other models of motivation, such as 
Kerr's (1997) application of reversal theory (Apter, 1982) of motivation and 
emotions to sport. 
It might be expected that emotions would be more strongly felt following 
competitive events. Furthennore, it has been suggested that actions perceived to 
have greater hedonic relevance, in this case for the coach, are more likely to result 
in a more extreme judgement of the actor, here, the perfonner (Biddle, 1993). 
Therefore, future research needs to focus on real-life competitions and the 
hedonic relevance of the athletes' perfonnances experienced by the coach. In 
interpreting these findings in relation to evidence in the existing literature, notice 
should be taken of the distinction between the passive and active observer made 
by Monson and Snyder (1977). It seems plausible to argue that the coach, at least 
in training situations and arguably in some competitive situations, is active in the 
process ofperfonnance. 
Osberg and Shrauger (1986) have suggested that researchers recording 
attributions must take account of time-from-event when considering the actor-
observer effect. For example, Moore et al. (1979) have shown that attributions 
become more dispositional over time. In the present study it is not known how 
soon after the perfonnance coaches completed the questionnaire. It is possible 
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that this may have been done up to a week after the event, in which case there 
may have been a greater tendency to make attributions to personal factors. 
Summary 
This preliminary study aimed to explore the attributions made and emotions 
experienced by sports coaches. Eighteen coaches from a range of sports 
completed an attribution and emotion questionnaire soon after a competition or 
training event involving one their performers. It was hypothesised that coaches' 
attributions would be related to a number of emotions and these relationships 
would be strongest following less satisfYing or unexpected outcomes. This 
hypothesis was broadly supported. 
The present findings suggest that highly satisfied and less surprised coaches tend 
to make stronger attributions than do less satisfied and more surprised coaches. 
They also suggest an emphasis by both satisfied and less satisfied coaches on 
transient factors internal to the performer as the causes of performance. Such an 
emphasis may allow coaches to perceive more potential change in, and control 
over, performances than ifmore stable factors were seen as causal. 
Furthermore, it appears that some attributions made by coaches are strongly 
associated with their emotional reactions. For example, performer 'effort' appears 
most related to a range of coach emotions. Coaches' attributions seem to be 
related to more emotions when the performance of the athlete is less satisfYing to 
the coach. Furthermore, level of coach surprise appears not to affect the number 
of attribution-emotion associations. Future research into coaching behaviour, and 
in particular emotion management, may find it useful to consider coaches' 
information processing in relation to responses to dissatisfaction. 
The next chapter will consider coaches' and their performers' attributions made 
soon after significant, actual sporting outcomes in an attempt to assess the 
potential for attributional conflict. 
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Chapter 4. Study 11: Coach-performer Compatibility: Logbook 
Data 
Introduction 
In an attempt to examine coaches' responses to their perfonners' outcomes and, 
in so doing, start to redress the dominant research focus within the sport dyad on 
the perfonner, Study I considered exclusively coaches' attributions for key 
events. However, ultimately coach and perfonner work together to plan, 
implement and evaluate training and competition strategy. Therefore, the coach's 
and perfonner's perceptions concerning sports event need joint consideration. 
In order to examine the relationship between coach and perfonner, Rejeski 
suggests using a model of attributional conflict. This model provides a 
framework within which potential interpersonal conflict and compatibility can be 
explored. Rejeski's model (for a detailed review, see page 55) proposes that 
potential attributional conflict is preceded by a number of antecedent conditions; 
these may include individual differences between coach and perfonner, 
situational factors (e.g., a lack of goal attainment, negative behaviour) or 
perceptual differences as a result of the coach's and perfonner's distinct access to 
outcome-related infonnation. These factors, along with motivation-related 
influences, may interact to produce the conditions for conflict which, in turn, 
have immediate and more distant consequences (Rejeski, 1979). 
It will be recalled that the major theoretical premise for supporting a model of 
attributional conflict is that actors tend to attribute externally (Le., as a result of 
factors related to the situation), whereas observers tend to attribute to factors 
related to the actor (e.g., behaviour/. In the literature reviewed, there are a 
number of potential qualifications to this premise; it is also appropriate to 
consider the extent to which the coach is passive or active in the perfonnance 
process. In addition, conflict in the coach-perfonner dyad is more likely to occur, 
according to Rejeski, when important events have negative outcomes, that are 
important and when the coach feels personally affected by the consequences. 
1 It is noted here that Watson (1982) preferred the terms self and other, which may be more 
appropriate io the coach-performer situation. 
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The concept of compatibility in relation to attributions needs further clarification. 
When researchers code attributions they utilise a number of attributional 
dimensions such as locus of causality, stability and controllability (the reliability 
and construct validity of these dimensions are reported on pages 110-111). When 
considering compatibility in an interpersonal setting researchers may look at 
differences between ratings on each dimension. However, the mere presence of a 
difference (even, perhaps especially, if repeated across time) may reflect a 
difference in attributional style which in itself may be acconunodated within an 
established working dyad. Perhaps of more significance is the consistency of 
dimensional ratings over time; that is, does the degree of difference or similarity 
vary across events or time? This is a measure of co-variation or correlation. It is 
argued here that both these measures, differences and co-variation, are necessary 
to assess compatibility. 
Furthermore, III order to overcome a weakness of many attribution 
questionnaires, that of eliciting one cause for one, often hypothetical, outcome, an 
approach is required which allows the respondent to offer as many causal 
elements as felt appropriate to explain the event. In this way, real events can be 
explained in a manner more consistent with everyday conversation. 
Purpose of Study 
The purpose of this study is to utilise Rejeski's (1979) model to examine coach-
performer explanations for the real-life sporting events they experience. The 
attributions made by coaches and their performers for the performers' natural 
sporting outcomes in both training and competition will be examined to 
determine the extent to which they are compatible or in potential conflict. An 
approach will be used that allows dyads to select events of most significance to 
them, and permits open format responses to questions of cause. 
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Hypotheses 
Based on Rejeski's model, it is hypothesised that: 
• due to actor-observer differences, coaches and perfonners will have patterns 
of attributing which differ in their causal dimension qualities 
• there will be greater attributional compatibility when training and competition 
perfonnances are perceived to be successful and greater potential for conflict 
following perfonnances perceived as poor 
• due to hedonic relevance, there will be less compatibility when the outcome is 
perceived to be important. 
Methods 
Participants 
Five athletics (track and field) coaches in the north-west of England were 
identified through personal contact with the Head British Students Athletics 
Coach. Each of these coaches was qualified through the British Athletics 
Federation (BAF) coach certification scheme to at least Club (three to Senior 
Club) Coach level. Athletes ranged in ability from competitive club to senior 
international level and in age from 18-40. All coach-perfonner dyads had been 
working together for at least 2 years. 
As can be seen from Table 7, which provides a descriptive summary of 
participants, some coaches in the study coached more than one athlete in the 
study group. 
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Table 7: Descriptive data for coaches (Cl-CS) and perfonners (PH-PSI). 
Coach Gender QuaIific- Athlete(s) Gender Age Event Competi-
ation coached category category tion 
level 
ClI1.1 Female Senior PH Male Junior Sprints County 
club 
P12 Female Senior Sprints County 
C2 Male Senior P21 Female Senior Long County 
club sprints 
C3/3.1 Male Club P31 Male Senior Middle Club 
distance 
runner 
P32 Male Senior Middle Club 
distance 
runner 
C4/4.1 Male Senior P41 Female Senior Middle Internat-
club distance ional 
runner 
P42 Female Senior Middle Internat-
distance ional 
runner 
CS Male Club PSI Female Junior Multi- Club 
event 
Athletics was chosen because of the researcher's familiarity with the sport. 
Additionally, by studying an individual sport, it can be argued that no account 
need be taken of team membership, found to affect the pattern of attributions 
following wins and losses (Scanlon & Passser, 1980), or team cohesion, found to 
affect attributions made in team settings (Bird et aI., 1980). 
Procedures 
These coaches were contacted and asked to participate, with their respective 
athletes, in a longitudinal study lasting one season (approximately 9 months), 
commencing at the beginning of the preparation phase (October). 
Coaches and athletes were met individually and told that the study was aiming to 
examine coaches' and perfonners' attitudes to training and competition. They 
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were assured that all infonnation would be treated in the strictest confidence. The 
techniques to be used were explained and the participants had the opportunity to 
ask questions2• Coaches and perfonners were given a supply of log sheets (see 
Appendix 2) to be completed for 2-3 training sessions or competition events per 
week (usually two training sessions per week and all competitions). 
Instrument 
The log sheet is divided into two parts: Part 1 asked for a description of the 
forthcoming training or competition event, the major goal for this event and its 
relative importance (measured on a five-point Likert-scale); this was completed 
before, and as close to, the event as possible. Part 2, evaluating the outcome of 
the event in relation to the identified goae, asked the respondent to rate the level 
of success on a 5-point Likert-scale ('1 '= 'total success', '5'= 'failure') and, in 
answer to the following: 'Please give your explanation for this degree of success, 
i.e. the cause of this success/failure', to use an open response fonnat to ascertain 
the main causes of this degree of relative success. 
It was stressed that coaches and perfonners should complete their log sheets 
independently and return them to the researcher in separate pre-paid envelopes on 
a four-weekly basis4. 
Analyses 
Open responses to the question of cause were coded by the researchers using the 
following attributional dimensions. The definitions of these dimensions have 
been adapted from Stratton et al. (1988) to allow contextually meaningful 
analyses. 
• Locus of causality (coded internal or external) 
2 The data presented here are part of a larger stndy with these subjects, incorporating post-event 
interviews in addition to questionnaire data collection. 
3 Goal-achievement was used (rather than win/loss) in order to take account of perceptions of 
success as suggested by previous researchers (e.g., McAuley 1985). 
4 This time-scale was to facilitate the interview component of the project. 
S It is recognised that such coding by the researcher may lead to a fundamental attribution research 
error (Russell, 1982) and was undertaken in the light of McAuleyet al.'s (1983) finding oflow 
researcher-subject correlations for assignment of causal elements to dimensions. This is discussed 
further below. 
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i.e. Is the stated cause located within or without the athlete6? 
• Stability (coded stable or unstable) 
i.e. Is the stated cause going to be influential to outcomes in one month's 
time? 
• Controllability (coded controllable or uncontrollable) 
i.e. Could the stated outcome have been changed by the attributor without 
concerted effort? 
• Universality (coded universal or personal) 
i.e. Does the causal statement tell the researcher something that is distinctive 
or idiosyncratic about the athlete7? 
• GlobaIity (coded global or specific) 
i.e. Does the stated cause affect just the stated outcome or many outcomes? 
Attributional statements were coded based on methods described by Stratton et al. 
(1988), with the following exception: 
Stability - a causal factor was coded stable if it was considered to have at least a 
50% probability of remaining active in influencing outcomes in 1 month's time 
(as opposed to 6 months suggested by Stratton et aI., 1988, in relation to clinical 
and therapeutic settings). 
These dimensions are identified by Stratton and colleagues as pertinent to the 
analysis of naturally occurring attributions in interview situations8• 
Consistent with Tenenbaum and Furst's view that attributors may offer multiple 
causes in order "to capture the variable events which had transpired" (1986, 
p.316), most responses offered more than one cause per outcome. In such 
situations each causal element within the statement was coded separately and an 
aggregate dimension score calculated for each response; therefore, each response 
6 Locus of causality and universality here consider whether the cause is internal or external to the 
athlete and says something distinctive about the athlete. 
7 It was felt more meaningful to code attributions for universality in relation to the athlete since 
the outcomes were athletes' performances. 
8 The second part of this study involved interviewing coaches and performers in order to reflect on 
their sporting outcomes and therefore used the dimensions identified by Stratton et at. (1988). 
Questionnaire data analysis needed to be compatible with the analysis of interview data in order to 
contrast results. 
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elicited an aggregate score on each of the five dimensions9• This was achieved by 
attaching numerical values to each statement by dimension lO, as in Table 8. 
Table 8: Numerical coding of attribution dimensions. 
Dimension Direction Numerical coding 
Locus of causality Internal (to the athlete) +1 
External (to the athlete) -1 
Stability Stable +1 
Unstable -1 
Controllability Controllable (by the attributor) +1 
Uncontrollable (by the 
-1 
attributor) 
Universality Universal (re: the athlete) +1 
Personal (to the athlete) -1 
Globality Global +1 
Specific -1 
This numerical coding was used, rather than that of Stratton et aI. (1988) and 
Munton et aI. (1999), so that aggregate dimension scores would be grouped 
around zero and, therefore, aggregate scores representing either ends of the 
dimension would be positive or negative and, thus, easily recognisable; a score of 
zero therefore represents an aggregate score of no dimensional tendency. An 
example ofthe coding is given in the following illustration. 
9 See Tenenbawn and Furst (1986) for a consideration of fIrst and subsequent attributions. Where 
more than one statement was made, no weighting based on causal element order was given. 
10 This nwnerical coding differs from Stralton et al. 's coding which uses 1 and 0 for each 
dimension scale. 
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A poor success score attributed by the perfonner as follows: 
'u.because it was a bad week and I wasn't really in the mood to race; 
anyway, I hate this type of course '. 
would be coded: It was a bad week 
External, Unstable, Uncontrollable, Universal, Global 
(-I, -1, -1, I, I) 
I wasn't really in the mood 
Internal, Unstable, Uncontrollable, Universal, Specific 
(1, -1, -1,1, -1) 
I hate this type of course 
Internal, Stable, Uncontrollable, Personal, Specific 
(1,1, -1, -1, -I) 
Taking an aggregate of these element scores, this response would be coded: 
Locus of causality: 1 
Stability: -1 
Controllability: -3 
Universality: 1 
Globality: -1 
This process results in each statement made by either the coach or perfonner 
having five dimension scores which can then be compared with those of their 
dyadic partner. 
Compatibility within the coach-perfonner dyad is considered in tenns of both 
dimension compatibility (e.g., difference in each of the aggregate dimension 
scores) and in tenns of overall summative compatibility (achieved by summing 
the dimension compatibility scores). 
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Analyses are conducted both at the group (across C-P dyads) and individual dyad 
level as follows. 
Individual dimension compatibility was considered in relation to the following 
independent variables: 
• Perceived success of the outcome (as perceived by the coach-performer 
dyads). 
• Perceived importance of the event (as perceived by the coach-performer 
dyads). 
• Other dimension compatibilities (i.e., co-variation). 
Summative compatibility was considered in relation to: 
• perceived success of the outcome (as evaluated by the coach-performer 
dyads) 
• perceived importance of the event (as perceived by the coach-performer 
dyads). 
The results for each C-P dyad were contrasted to examine any patterns in 
compatibility scores. 
Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 9 shows the mean success, mean importance and mean dimension scores 
for each coach and performer, where: 
Coach C1.0 coaches performer Pll 
Coach Cl.l coaches performer P12 
Coach C2.0 coaches performer P21 
Coach C3.0 coaches performer P31 
Coach C3.1 coaches performer P32 
Coach C4.0 coaches performer P41 
Coach C4.1 coaches performer P42 
Coach CS.O coaches performer PSI 
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Positive value Negative value 
Locus: Internal External 
Stability: Stable Unstable 
Controllability: Controllable Uncontrollable 
Universality: Universal Personal 
Globality: Global Specific 
Table 9: Mean success, mean importance and mean dimension scores. 
C=Coach Success Importan 
P,.,P'former l=v.succ. -ce Locus Stability Control Universal Globality 
n=nwnber 7=Unsucc l=V.imp. -ity 
of 
outcomes 
7=Unimp 
C 1.0 2.38 1.72 0.84 0.44 -0.20 0.36 -0.20 
n=27 
PH 2.63 1.63 0.35 0.00 -0.35 0.35 -0.52 
n=27 
Cl.l 1.83 1.72 0.94 0.94 0.56 0.39 -0.06 
n=26 
P 12 1.88 1.88 1.00 0.62 0.38 0.08 -0.23 
n=26 
C 2.0 2.60 2.47 1.10 0.43 -0.77 0.10 0.03 
n=30 
P21 2.50 2.04 1.00 -0.31 -0.62 0.70 -0.62 
n=30 
C 3.0 1.59 1.30 0.29 -0.19 0.12 0.84 -1.14 
n=58 
P31 1.83 2.40 0.21 0.14 0.05 1.00 -1.45 
n=58 
C 3.1 1.23 1.03 -1.00 0.48 -0.93 1.53 -1.55 
n=40 
P32 1.40 1.23 1.03 0.93 -0.43 1.28 -1.43 
n=40 
C4.0 1.86 1.90 -0.47 -0.48 -0.57 0.92 -0.75 
n=31 
P41 2.30 1.70 0.38 -1.24 -0.76 0.67 -1.14 
n=31 
C4.1 1.27 1.81 0.48 -0.19 -0.04 -0.04 0.04 
n=35 
P42 1.93 2.00 0.14 -0.69 -0.14 0.18 -0.14 
n=35 
C 5.0 2.22 2.35 0.53 -0.75 0.20 0.12 1.18 
n=52 
PSI 2.41 1.88 1.48 -1.19 -0.85 0.79 0.96 
n=52 
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The above data can be summarised as follows: 
• Generally, coaches and perfonners score the events as relatively successful, 
with coaches generally rating events as slightly more successful than do 
perfonners. 
• Both coaches and perfonners consider events to be important; this is to be 
expected as only significant training events and competitions were selected for 
inclusion. 
• Mean locus of causality scores are generally positive (i.e., internal to the 
athlete), especially those of perfonners. 
• Mean universality scores are generally positive (i.e., universal in relation to 
athlete). 
• Mean globality scores are generally negative (i.e., specific). 
• There is no clear pattern for either the stability or controllability data, although 
in all cases except one, the coach and perfonner dyad's mean controllability 
scores have the same sign (i.e., both tend to rate as controllable or 
uncontrollable). 
Group analyses 
Paired samples t-tests were conducted to test for differences in group scores for 
coaches and perfonners; the results of these are shown in Table 10. 
Table 10: Coach and perfonner group differences. 
Degrees of Mean 
Variable freedom C P t Il 
Success 252 1.92 1.94 -0.37 0.71 
Importance 250 1.74 1.86 -1.96 0.51 
Locus of 252 0.28 0.70 -4.01 <0.001 
causality 
Stability 252 0.00 -0.20 1.98 0.05 
Controllability 252 -0.16 -0.32 -1.46 0.15 
Universality 252 0.56 0.77 -1.91 0.06 
Globality 248 -0.81 -1.14 3.18 <0.01 
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Significant differences (p<0.05) were found between coaches' and performers' 
scores (across all outcomes) for locus of causality and globality, such that 
coaches tend to offer causes which are less internal (to the athlete) and less 
specific than those oftheir athletes. 
Table 11 shows results of Spearman's Rank Order Correlations for all coach and 
performer scores for success, importance and all five dimensions. 
Table 11: Spearman's Rank Order Correlations for success, importance and 
attribution dimensions across all coach and performer scores. 
Dimension Correlation coefficient 'r' 
Success 0.69 
Importance 0.30 
Locus of causality 0.17 
Stability 0.44 
Controllability 0.23 
Globality 0.23 
Universality 0.19 
It can be seen that for success (r=0.69) and stability (r=0.44), considerable 
variation in the scores of one dyadic partner is accounted for by those of the other 
partner. For importance and other dimension scores much weaker relationships 
between scores are evident. 
Considering dimension scores for coaches and performers, Tables 12 (coaches) 
and 13 (performers) show the results of independent samples t-tests to examine 
potential differences in coaches' and performers' dimension scores when these 
scores are split on 'success' ratings. 
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Table 12: Differences in coaches' dimension scores when grouped by 'success' 
scores (group 1: success scores = 1; group 2: success scores> 1). 
Mean 
dimension Degrees of 
Dimensions score freedom t p 
difference 
Locus 0.23 258 1.25 0.21 
Stability 0.82 264 -5.45 <0.001 
Control 0.23 260 -1.20 0.23 
Universality 0.63 258 -3.68 <0.001 
Globality 0.01 253 0,07 0.95 
For coaches, results reveal significant differences on the 'stability', t(264)=-5.45, 
p<O.OOI, and 'universality', t(258)=-3.68, p<O.OOI, dimensions, such that 
successful outcomes are perceived as more stable and more universal than less 
successful outcomes. 
Table 13: Differences in performers' dimension scores when grouped by 
'success' scores (group I: success scores = I; 
group 2: success scores> 1). 
Mean 
dimension Degrees of 
Dimensions score freedom t 
difference 
Locus 0.40 270 2.59 
Stability 1.33 270 -7.36 
Control 0.60 270 -4.04 
Universality 0.19 270 -1.1 1 
Globality 0.32 270 2.07 
p 
0.01 
<0.001 
<0.001 
0.27 
0.04 
In relation to performers, significant differences were found on the 'locus of 
causality' t(270)=2.59, p=O.OI, 'stability', t(270)=-7.36, p<O.OOI, 'control', 
t(270)=-4.04, p<O.OOI, and 'globality', t(270)=2.07, p<0.05, dimensions. 
Performers perceived the outcome more personally controllable, more stable, 
more specific and less internal (although still weakly internal) when successful 
than when unsuccessful. 
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Table 14: Differences in coaches' dimension scores when grouped by 
'importance' scores (group 1: importance scores = 1; group 2: 
importance scores> 1). 
Mean 
dimension Degrees of 
Dimensions score freedom t 
difference 
Locus 0.78 265 4.67 
Stability 0.40 265 -2.13 
Control 0.31 265 1.72 
Universality 0.86 254 -5.51 
Globality 0.38 254 2.17 
Table 15: Differences in performers' dimension scores when grouped by 
'importance' scores (group 1: importance scores = 1; 
group 2: importance scores> 1). 
Mean 
dimension Degrees of 
Dimensions score freedom t 
difference 
Locus 0.11 268 -0.69 
Stability 0.34 268 -1.71 
Control 0.32 268 -1.87 
Universality 0.03 268 -0.19 
Globality 0.13 268 -0.83 
p 
<0.001 
0.03 
0.09 
<0.001 
0.03 
p 
0.49 
0.09 
0.06 
0.85 
0.41 
It appears from Tables 14 (coaches) and 15 (performers) that perceived task 
importance may mediate the coaches' dimension scores to a greater extent than it 
does the performers' scores. Coaches' dimension scores split on importance show 
significant differences for 'locus of causality', such that outcomes of less 
important events are deemed more internal to the athlete than important events, 
t(265)=4.67, p<O.OOI; 'stability', where outcomes of important events were 
perceived as more stable, t(265)=-2.13, p<0.05; 'globality', where outcomes of 
important events were perceived as more specific, t(254)=2.17, p<0.05; and 
'universality', where important outcomes were seen as more universal, t(254)= 
-5.51, p<O.OOl. No such significant differences were found for performers. 
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Dyadic compatibility 
To test the degree to which individual coaches' and perfonners' dimension and 
success scores are related, a series of Spearrnan's Rank Order Correlation 
coefficients were calculated; these are presented in Table 16. 
Table 16: Spearrnan's Rank Order Correlations between individual coaches' and 
perfonners' dimension, success and importance scores. 
uyaaw,nt. LOCUS ~taD'"ty LontcOl. uDlver. "'OD". ~uccess Import. 
"'.U/rH U.,.· O,',U' U.'" V.W V.V' U.'" 0.,.-
U.IIPll V.40 V.I. v.,; vm V.;I V •• ,"" 0.'0' 
U.V/r:" -vm -I).V. V.>I· -V.V. V.DJ V.07· V.'" 
\-J.U/r.H U.'''· U.OU· V.J'· V."- v.,,· v .•• • -v." 
'-'_Hr, .. V.VO 0.,,. -V.VO V. -V.VO U.Ol· v.'v 
U.O/r'l V.VO -I).V" V.,. -0 .... V.,. V.4. V.Vb 
"'_lIrn V.J' -I).uJ V.1O -U.VO -U ... V.'" v ... 
,-,.vlr,. V."O v.'" -V.l' -I).V' -I).V. V.l. v ••• • 
+ small 'n' * p<O.05 **p<O.Ol 
Certainly, from Table 16, most coach and perfonner dyads (the exceptions being 
C4.01P41 & C51P51) have success scores which are positively and significantly 
related. It appears that C3.01P31 have dimension scores that are highly correlated, 
having significant correlations on all five dimension scores, whereas C4's 
dimension scores seem least related to those of his two athletes. All five of 
C5.01P51's dimension scores and the success scores seem quite unrelated. 
The highest number of significant correlations for dyad dimension scores is for 
the stability and control dimensions, with three from eight dyads' scores for each 
positively related. 
In relation to Rejeski's model of at tributiona I conflict, of interest is the degree to 
which there may be differences in dimension scores between individual C-P dyad 
members. 
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Appendix 3 (Tables 48 to 55) shows results of t-tests to examine the potential 
differences in dimension scores for individual C-P pairs. These t-tests revealed 
the significant differences shown in Table 17. 
Table 17: A summary of significant differences between individual dyad 
members' dimension scores. 
Dyad Dimension 't' and 'p' values Difference 
C1.01P1l No sig. differences 
C1.lIPI2 No sig. differences 
C2.0/P21 Stability t(54)- 2.02 Coach: weak stable 
p<0.05 Performer: weak 
unstable 
C3.0/P31 No sig. differences 
C3.lIP32 Locus t(78)- -6.69 Coach: external 
p<O.OOl Performer: internal 
C4.0/P41 Locus t(40)= -2.13 Coach: weak external 
p<0.05 Performer: weak 
internal 
C4.lIP42 Globality t(5l)- 3.19 Coach: weak global 
p<O.OOl Performer: specific 
Locus t(10l)= -4.86 Coach: internal 
p<O.OOl Performer: stronger 
internal 
C5.0/P51 Control t(101)= 4.12 Coach: weak 
p<O.OOl controllable 
Performer: 
uncontrollable 
Universality t(lOI)= -2.60 Coach: weak universal 
p<0.05 Performer: stronger 
universal 
Locus of causality appears to be the dimension where scores are most likely to 
vary between coach and athlete (three out of eight dyads here). Where there are 
differences in the locus of causality dimension scores, the trend is for the athlete 
to make attributions more internal to themselves than does the coach internal to 
the performer. 
CS and PSI appear to differ in a number of dimensions; this is in addition to their 
Iow correlations for success and dimension scores. In relation to Rejeski's model, 
this suggests a strong potential for attributional conflict within this dyad. 
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Appendix 4 (Tables 56 to 63) shows the results of a series of Speannan's Rank 
Order Correlations for dyads' dimension compatibility scores. Results reveal the 
following. 
For four of the C-P dyads there are significant (p<O.05) positive correlations 
between locus of causality compatibility and control compatibility (i.e., as 
compatibility on locus of causality increases, so does that of controllability). This 
indicates that the more the coach and perfonner agree as to the location of the 
cause, the more they agree as to whether it is controllable. 
For two of the C-P dyads there are significant (p<O.05) positive correlations 
between locus of causality compatibility and globality compatibility (Le., as locus 
of causality compatibility improves so does that of globality). 
For three of the C-P dyads locus of causality compatibility and universality 
compatibility are significantly related; two dyads with significant (p<O.05) 
positive correlations (Le., as compatibility on locus of causality improves so does 
that of universality) and one significant (p<O.Ol) negative correlation (i.e., greater 
compatibility on locus of causality relates to less compatibility on universality). 
Also, there is one significant correlation for stability-universality (p<O.05), 
stability-controllability (p<O.05), stability-globality (p<O.05), universality-
globality (p<O.05) and controllability-universality (p<O.05) compatibility scores. 
Taking these results collectively, it appears that the relationship between 
compatibility on the locus of causality dimension and other dimensions may be 
especially important and worthy of further study. 
In relation to aggregate compatibility, i.e., the composite of the five dimension 
compatibility scores, this does not appear to be affected by level of agreed 
success. Those dyads with agreed relative success (aggregate success score of <2) 
scored no differently on aggregate compatibility than those judging the outcome 
less successful (aggregate success score >=2). 
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Furthennore, of the individual dimension compatibility scores, only locus of 
causality compatibility approaches a significant difference when median split on 
aggregate success (p<0.05; actual difference in mean locus of causality scores 
0.37, such that those scoring less successful were more compatible). 
When splitting compatibility data based on agreed importance scores, once again, 
the only significant difference between the higher and lower importance groups is 
on the locus of causality dimension (p<0.05, actual difference in mean scores 
0.29 such that those scoring less important were more compatible). See Appendix 
5 (Tables 64 & 65) for results of t-tests between C-P compatibility scores 
differing on success and importance. 
Discussion 
It appears that, for the events sampled in this study, coaches and perfonners (as 
groups) deemed the outcomes generally successful and important. There were no 
significant differences between groups of coaches and perfonners in these scores. 
Since the majority of chosen events were training sessions, which were freely 
chosen from the week's training regime, it seems reasonable to assume that these 
were chosen because of their relative significance. Future researchers might find 
it beneficial to consider more closely how events are sampled within a 
longitudinal study. 
Locus of causality scores are generally positive, i.e., internal to the athlete; this is 
especially the case for perfonners, who score this dimension more internally to 
themselves than do coaches (p<0.001). This appears not to support the notion of 
the actor-observer difference which would predict coaches would attribute to 
factors internal to the athlete, which appears the case, and perfonners to 
environmental factors, not found here. Indeed, Biddle and Hill (1992a) make the 
point, in relation to winners' and losers' attributions, that the internal-external 
difference may be one of degrees of internality rather than a more distinct 
dichotomy. The data in Table 9 are, of course, mean scores across successful/less 
successful and important/less important events. Hewstone (1989) notes that there 
is evidence that the actor-observer effect is weakened by positive or negative 
outcomes (as opposed to neutral outcomes). Tillman and Carver (1980), for 
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example, found that positive outcomes tend to be attributed more to persons. 
Although no difference was found for coaches' scores on locus of causality 
between high and lower success groups there was a significant difference 
(p=0.01) for perfonners, with the causes of less successful events judged by 
perfonners to be relatively more internal to them (although the difference in mean 
scores was small, 0.4, see Table 13). If this result was to be supported in future 
studies, one would need to re-consider the extent to which a self-serving bias 
(Zuckennan, 1979) may operate in natural settings. Event importance may 
mediate locus of causality scores: as Table 14 shows, coaches scoring events as 
important tend to attribute the outcome more to external factors than when less 
important (p<0.001), where the emphasis is more internal to the athlete. This may 
be because, for important events, the coach takes greater account of the sporting 
environment (e.g., the opposition, task difficulty, conditions) than for less 
important events, where the focus remains narrowly on the athlete. Importance 
does not appear to affect athletes' locus of causality. 
Analyses of stability scores suggest no significant (p<O.OS) differences between 
coaches' and perfonners' scores. Both coaches (p<0.001) and perfonners 
(p<0.001) attribute more to stable factors when successful than when relatively 
unsuccessful, consistent with the findings of Grove, Hanrahan, and McInman 
(1991). This appears functional, as the resultant affect is likely to include 
confidence in the athlete's future successes. For coaches, task importance appears 
to affect the use of stable explanations, which are drawn upon more for important 
events than for less important ones (p<O.OS); no such difference was found for 
athletes. This may indicate that self- and other-serving biases are influenced by 
task importance; these results suggest that the coach is more likely to offer an 
other-serving preference for stable causes when the outcome is successful and 
important, but that the athletes' (self-serving) preference may not be similarly 
influenced by event importance. One would expect the self-serving benefits of a 
bias towards stable causes for successful outcomes to be greater for important 
events. 
In tenns of controllability the raw data do not provide an equivocal pattern, 
although dyad members' ascriptions appear largely compatible in tenns of mean 
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scores. Since coach and perfonner work together within a dyad, perceived 
personal control by each is seen as compatible; perceived control by the coach is 
not seen as incompatible with perceived control by the athlete for the same event. 
There is no significant difference (p<O.05) between coaches' and perfonners' 
scores on this dimension. Follow-up analysis shows that, whilst perfonners tend 
to consider successful outcomes more controllable (although not strongly so) than 
less successful outcomes (p<O.OOI), which is consistent with Grove et al.'s 
(1991) findings, no such difference was found for coaches. Event importance 
appears not to influence coaches' or perfonners' selection of controllable causes. 
In a sport such as athletics, and especially through the winter months, weather 
conditions and the contribution by training partners/opposition (all 
uncontrollable) are likely to play an important part in training and competition 
outcomes. It appears that relative successes are seen by perfonners to be at least 
partially as a result of effort, personal control and attitude. Resultant affect is, 
then, more likely to include higher levels of personal satisfaction and confidence 
in being able to produce positive outcomes in the future. 
Coaches and perfonners tend to see causes as more universal than personal; that 
is, most perfonners would produce similar outcomes in such situations. There is 
no significant difference between coaches' and perfonners' scores on this 
dimension (p<O.05). Perhaps this again reflects the nature of track and field 
(especially middle-distance running) training and competition. During the 
preparation phase in particular, training is fairly standardised and regardless of 
the specific regime, is affected by similar factors (e.g., weather conditions, 
amount of effort, training fatigue). Whilst perfonners' selection of universal 
causes appears not to be affected by the outcome or event importance, coaches 
tend to select more universal explanations when the event is important (p<O.OOI) 
and the outcome is relatively successful (p<O.OOI). These findings are difficult to 
explain. 
There is a tendency for coaches and perfonners to offer specific (i.e., not global) 
causes; that is, the causes offered are domain-specific (i.e., rooted in the nature of 
the training or competition activity). This tendency is greater for perfonners than 
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for coaches (p<0.05). For coaches, globaIity ratings appear unaffected by 
perceived success although, for performers, there is a tendency for the 
explanation to be more specific for successful outcomes (p<O.05). With regard to 
event importance, coaches tend to make more specific attributions for important 
events than for less important events (p<O.05) whilst, for performers, scores on 
this scale seem unaffected by event importance. 
This may have interesting implications for mental training and life-style 
management techniques employed by athletes. It would seem as though the 
causes of sporting outcomes are perceived as lying mainly within the sport itself, 
rather than factors outside, such as work, family or life-style, factors that 
presumably do impact on sporting outcomes but are deemed less significant by 
the coaches and performers. 
In order to consider compatibility one has to examine both correlations (the 
strength of relationships between sets of dimension scores) and differences 
between sets of scores. Dyads appear generally to produce similar patterns of 
attributional dimensions (see Figures 20 to 59 in Appendix 6). This may be a 
reflection of the closeness of these coach-performer relationships or the nature of 
such relationships in track and field; possibly participants from team sports, 
where there is less opportunity for one-to-one discussion and where one would 
expect the emphasis to be on team performance rather than that of individuals, 
would produce different findings. Future researchers should sample participants 
from a range of team and individual sports to investigate this phenomenon. 
It is possible that successful events, especially important ones, have greater 
potential for attributional conflict. Considering the composite compatibility 
scores, level of perceived success seemed not to affect compatibility, contrary to 
expectation based on Rejeski's model. However, when each dimension 
compatibility was considered separately, locus of causality compatibility did 
differ between high success and Iow success sub-groups (p<O.05), although the 
actual difference was only 0.37 on a five-point scale; there were no other 
dimension differences. Specifically, when perceived more successful, 
compatibility on locus of causality was lower. That is, coaches and performers 
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had a greater difference of opinion on the intemal-extemal nature of the outcome 
cause when the outcome was deemed successful, contrary to hypothesis two. This 
may provide support for Weiner's (1985) contention that negative outcomes elicit 
attributional search. It may be that people engage in greater attributional search 
following an unsuccessful outcome and, therefore, are more likely to reach some 
common (or compatible) conclusions. It may be that successful outcomes result 
in less search and therefore greater variety of causal explanation. Coaches may, 
therefore, need to spend more time with athletes when successful in order to 
ensure they broadly agree on the reasons for this success. 
Similarly, when considering the impact of perceived event importance, there was 
no difference between relatively important and unimportant event on composite 
compatibility. However, when the event was deemed relatively important, less 
compatibility on locus of causality ensued when compared to less important 
events (p<0.05); actual difference of 0.29. There were no other compatibility 
differences. There is, therefore, limited support for the third hypothesis, although 
it should be remembered that, in these analyses, data were split on relative 
importance within the data set: events included in the study were all deemed to be 
significant. 
It appears, therefore, that the locus of causality dimension may be the critical 
dimension when considering compatibility. It would seem that successful and 
important events result in less compatibility on locus of causality, but not other 
compatibility indices. The fonner may support Weiner's (1985) contention that 
negative outcomes elicit attributional search that, in turn, may give rise to more 
congruent causal inferences on the part of coach and perfonner. However, one 
might also expect that important events would also elicit more attributional search 
and, hence, agreement; this was not supported by the data. 
The implications for coach educators are that significant successes need to be 
discussed and the factors which cause them clearly identified so that they can be 
maintained in the future, rather than a focus on weaknesses and unsuccessful 
outcome which coaches and perfonners may tend towards post-event. 
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Considering individual dyads, one dyad had all five correlation coefficients 
greater than 0.3 (the probability of each being p<0.05; Table 16). Conversely, one 
dyad (C51P51) had three sets of dimension scores which were significantly 
different (p<0.05, Table 17) and 4 of the remaining 7 dyads had one set of 
dimension scores which were significantly different. It is a weakness of this study 
that no measure of sUbjective compatibility between dyadic members was 
undertaken. It would be interesting to assess the extent to which compatibility in 
anyone dimension contributed to a sense of subjective compatibility. 
Whilst no obvious pattern of significant correlations and/or differences between 
dimension scores exists, it seems that a greater number of significant correlations 
exists for stability and controllability dimensions. Coaches and perfonners 
appear, therefore, to have greater similarity in their perceptions of the likelihood 
of outcomes re-occurring and the extent to which they feel they have control over 
them, than for the locus of causality and the extent to which the individual 
perfonner or specific circumstances affects the cause-outcome relationship. 
Future studies should consider the contribution of both the degree of co-variation 
in coach-performer dimension scores and the extent of differences between them 
to attributional compatibility in dyadic relationships. Furthermore, it would be 
useful in future studies to assess the extent to which participants within a dyad 
felt congruence of causal attributions; a number of perfonners and coaches 
expressed a feeling that their dyadic partner was unlikely to agree with them. The 
critical question being: does dimension compatibility have a significant impact on 
the effectiveness of the dyad or the sense of compatibility? 
One possible reason for obtaining findings which are contrary to the expected 
actor-observer differences is provided by Hewstone (1989) who draws on the 
earlier works of Stephan (1977) and Regan (1978). The fonner suggests that an 
observer of someone from an ingroup (Stephan refers to the same cultural group, 
but this could be extended to a sport group) would have more infonnation of the 
antecedents of the observed behaviour and is, therefore, more likely to analyse 
the situation in terms similar to those of the actor. Regan (1978) provides a 
qualification to this, suggesting that the degree to which the observer likes the 
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observed person will affect the evaluation of hislher behaviour (i.e., people 
evaluate others in a way consistent with their view of them). Unfortunately, it is 
not possible to evaluate the validity of this suggestion with the current data but, 
again it provides an important consideration for future research. 
Taylor and Jaggi (1974) propose another view which may be pertinent in the 
coach-performer setting (although these authors were referring to ethno-cultural 
groups rather than sports groups). These authors suggest that the egotistic bias, 
that of making more flattering self-attributions following positive outcomes, may 
operate at the group level, termed in this case the ethnocentric bias. In this way 
group members may attribute positive outcomes more to the qualities of their 
fellow group members than to external factors. It is possible that coaches, as part 
of the close knit sport group, make what are effectively ethnocentric attributions 
for their performers' outcomes. Furthermore, Taylor et aI., (1983) suggest that 
group-serving patterns of attributing can facilitate cohesion maintenance. Their 
study, examining ice-hockey players, found that group-serving attributions helped 
maintain team-spirit and off-ice cohesion despite continual poor performances. 
This may prove an interesting avenue for future research. 
Methodology 
There are some issues concerning the measurement of attributions that are 
pertinent to discuss here. This researcher was particularly interested in the 
attributions made by coaches and performers concerning their everyday sporting 
outcomes. Of concern was the degree to which potentially conflicting attributions 
in the coach-performer dyad would affect its working relationship. However, for 
this issue to be suitably addressed, one needs to collect and assess the naturally 
occurring statements coaches and performers make during their interactions. 
However, as Biddle and Hanrahan (1998) point out when discussing this topic, 
the methods, such as those used here, prompt the respondent to make attributions 
when, in natural circumstances, they may not (or make different types of 
attributional statement). Future research needs to utilise methods that capture the 
natural discourse within natural sporting situations and coach-performer 
encounters. This has, to date, not been attempted within sport and exercise 
psychology. 
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In everyday settings, where events result in attributional search, attributors may 
call upon a number of elements to explain an outcome. However, in forced 
response designs, Weiner (1979) suggests that, not wishing to repeat themselves, 
subjects may offer attributions which are farther and farther from the basic causal 
beliefs they hold. It is for this reason that many previous studies have only 
considered the first attribution offered. 
This study attempted to consider, although not give differential weights to, the 
varied attributional elements offered by respondents rather than adopt a one 
outcome-one cause approach. The methods used allowed any number of causes 
to be considered although, generally, 2 or 3 were offered. This approach may 
offer certain advantages. For example, Tenenbaum and Furst (1986) found that 
the pattern of causal dimension differences between winners and losers changed 
when one considered the second and third causal explanations, especially on 
locus of causality and control dimensions. Losers started out giving external 
reasons but by the third cause had begun to give internal reasons (i.e., the 
egocentric bias was not found beyond the first attribution). Interestingly, when 
coaches' perceptions ofperfonnance level were used rather than win-loss, similar 
results were obtained. These authors conclude that researchers need to consider 
more than the first attribution; the methods used here present one way this can be 
achieved. Future researchers may, however, wish to consider giving greater 
weighting to the first causal attribution, which may be the most salient 
(Tenenbaum & Furst, 1986). 
However, it is recognised that by collapsing scores for causal elements (where 
there is more than one cause offered) into one composite dimension score per 
causal statement, some data are lost. The effect of this is that, whilst all causal 
elements are incorporated and not just the first cause to be offered, no relative 
weighting is attached to any element. Future research may need to consider how 
multiple causes offered for outcomes vary in tenns of their dimensional qualities 
and whether these need treating discretely. 
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Harvey (1987) notes that there is great difficulty in coding complex attributionsll 
because the multiple causes and dimensions require sophisticated measurement 
and coding devices. Newman (1981) also comments that the situational-
dispositional distinction so central to actor-observer differences research was 
derived from situations where the observer did not have an ongoing relationship 
with the actor. Clearly, in the coach-performer situation, this is not the case. 
These authors and others (e.g., Fincham, 1985) go on to distinguish between 
individual, interpersonal and interactive attributions which relate to the degree of 
interaction between dyadic members. Future researchers may need to consider the 
validity of using such distinctions in close dyadic relationships. Indeed, Bradbury 
and Fincham (1989) suggest a more complete taxonomy of attributions, including 
interpersonal and relationship attributions. 
The current method did allow perceived success to be rated on a five-point scale 
rather than an objective win-loss dichotomy. Due to a median split being used to 
distinguish successful and less successful groups, even the less successful group 
was not unsuccessful; inclusion merely indicated a success score other than '1' 
(total success). Therefore, the current findings may offer some support for those 
of Milech and Nesdale (1984) who found in their study that attributions are 
discriminatory at the 70-90% success level, although little can be concluded at 
lower success levels. 
Summary 
In Study 2, eight paIrS of coaches and their performers used attributional 
logbooks to record their personal (multiple) attributions soon after a significant 
sporting outcome involving the performer. 
Unlike most previous studies (the exception being Brawley, 1984) the attributions 
of both coaches and performers were collated; subsequent analyses incorporated 
all attributions made, not merely the first to be stated. 
11 The context ofHarvey's connnents was explicitly attributions in close interpersonal 
relationships. 
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Whilst there do appear to be some significant differences in dimension scores at 
the group level, notably locus of causality and globality, a range of significant 
dimension differences and correlations are apparent at the level of the individual 
dyad. Locus of causality appears to be the dimension most likely to vary across a 
range of circumstances and is the most common coach-perfonner difference. 
These findings suggest the importance of studying compatibility at the level of 
the individual dyad. 
In conclusion, this approach has the advantage of allowing any number of causal 
attributions to be coded and their dimension ratings combined. This, in tum, 
allows coaches' and perfonners' responses to be given a numerical value and so 
be statistically compared. Little research has attempted to explore the coach-
perfonner relationship from an attribution theory standpoint. 
Coach-perfonner attributional compatibility appears an area of sport psychology 
research still relatively unexplored. The actor-observer paradigm may prove a 
useful starting point. However, these preliminary findings suggest success may 
mediate the actor-observer difference which may need to be re-considered for 
close, interacting relationships and where the observer is active in the event 
process. 
Despite the advantages of the preceding approach over many questionnnaire-
based designs, ecological validity remains compromised by the reliance on a 
forced written response procedure. Adopting a natural discourse analysis 
approach would allow the naturally occurring conversation between coach and 
perfonner to be analysed for its attributional content. A variety of discourse 
analysis procedures (e.g., Antaki & Naji, 1987) have allowed natural 
conversation to be content analysed and specific software (such as The Leeds 
Attributional Coding System) enables causal attributions within such 
conversations to be assessed. Chapter 5 will utilise the Leeds Attributional 
Coding System to collate and code interview material concerning the events 
contained in Chapter 4. This has the advantage of allowing participants to use 
their own spoken language to offer causal statements as and when they feel 
appropriate. 
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Chapter 5. Study Ill: Coach-performer Compatibility: 
Interview Data 
Introduction 
The results of Chapter 4 are infonnative in that they are based upon multiple 
attributions made soon after a shared significant sporting outcome involving 
perfonners. The attributions of both coaches and perfonners were collated and 
analyses incorporated all made attributions, not merely the first to be stated. Since 
the outcomes were real events spread over a competitive season it is possible to 
contrast coaches' and perfonners' patterns of attributions over time. 
However, because data were in written fonnat, collected using a questionnaire, 
the criticisms made by Stratton et al. (1986) concerning the need to utilise natural 
discourse are still relevant. To explore the degree to which coaches and 
perfonners make similar attributions when completing a written questionnaire 
immediately after an event to during interviews some time later was considered 
important. It is argued that the processes by which attributional divergence may 
lead to conflict are mediated by coach-perfonner discourse. That is, how 
attributions are articulated through discussion has greater ecological validity (see 
Blass & Kaplowitz, 1990) than through responses to questionnaires. 
It is, therefore, necessary to employ a method of data collection that draws upon 
discourse. Ideally, this would be undertaken in the natural settings of the training 
and competition environments. However, such an approach has associated with it 
a number of significant considerations. For example: 
• the process of data collection may distort the natural articulation of 
attributions, and may, indeed, affect the coaching process 
• technologically, it is difficult to record naturally occurring attributions in the 
competition and training environment 
• attributions made to a dyadic partner in situ will represent limited reflection 
and, therefore, may offer data different from when reflection has occurred (an 
interesting avenue for future research). 
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Purpose a/the study 
It was, therefore, decided to utilise an interview approach that would elicit 
attributions made verbally by respondents following a period of potential 
reflection. Using such an approach, it was hoped that the intensity of causal 
beliefs, assessed by the number of times a cause was offered, as well as the 
dimensional attributes of causal explanations, could be considered. The Leeds 
Attributional Coding System (LACS) allows qualitative interview data to be 
quantified, thereby allowing the previously reported questionnaire and current 
interview data to be contrasted. 
Based on the results from the analysis of questionnaire data and findings from 
previous studies (e.g., Fletcher et aI., 1986), it was hypothesised that: 
• actor-observer differences will exist, although these may be diminished by the 
long-standing nature of coach-performer relationships and the time delay 
between events and interviews 
• there will be attributional divergence between coaches and performers, the 
nature of which may differ from log data 
• self-serving and potentially other-serving biases will exist in the attributions 
made by coaches and performers 
• coaches will offer more complex (i.e., a greater range of) attributions because 
of their ability both to empathise with performers and perceive the events 
from an external perspective. 
Methods 
Participants 
Those coaches and performers detailed in Chapter 4 (see Table 7 for details) also 
completed the post-event interviews. Participants had been asked previously if 
they would agree to interviews being recorded and transcribed; all had given their 
consent. Confidentiality of interview material was assured. 
Procedures 
In addition to the procedures identified in Chapter 4, coaches and performers 
were individually interviewed once every 3-4 weeks (depending on availability 
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and prior arrangement)l. Interviews were conducted at the participants' nonnal 
training venue. During these interviews participants' log sheets were used by the 
researcher to initiate discussion concerning the significant outcomes jointly 
selected by each dyad for the proceeding 3-4 week period. The log sheets were 
not, however, shown to the participant prior to or during the interview. Interviews 
typically lasted 20-25 minutes depending on the length of responses given by the 
participant. Taped interviews were then transcribed and coded using the LACS. 
The interviews 
The interviews began with the researcher reminding the participant of the selected 
sessions and competitions. In chronological order each session/competition was 
then discussed in the following manner. 
• The researcher asked the participant to describe the event (this provided 
contextual infonnation and ensured that the event being recalled was the same 
as the one recorded on the log sheet). 
• The participant was then asked to describe how the event progressed in 
relation to goal attainment and to discuss what the participant perceived to be 
the causes of the level of attainment achieved. 
• The participant was allowed to respond freely with the researcher only asking 
for clarification where required. 
Interviews were taped using a small desktop tape-recorder placed unobtrusively 
on a nearby table or chair. 
Coding and analyses: the LACS 
Sympathetic to a constructivist paradigm, this research attempted to provide 
"meaningful descriptions" (Stratton, 1997, p.117) of what coaches and 
perfonners say during interviews, believing that this process provides a window 
onto the meaning structures held by these participants. Consistent with the 
requirements of Grounded Theory, it is necessary to provide detail of the methods 
used to elicit the material from which meanings are concluded (Stratton, 1997). 
The following provides such detail. 
I However, due to athlete injurylillness and coach commitments, a number of interviews were 
missed during the course of the season. 
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The LACS is utilised by undertaking the following steps: 
• Attributions are extracted from the transcripts. 
• For each attributional statement, the cause and outcome elements of the 
attribution are identified. 
• For each statement, the speaker, agent and target are identified. 
• Attributions are coded on each of the causal dimensions. 
• Each statement is content coded, including in this study coding for emotional 
content. 
• Numerical data are input for analysis. 
(Munton et aI., 1999). 
The raw interview transcripts were coded using the LACS. The LACS has been 
comprehensively validated and tested in a range of clinical and social 
psychological settings (see Munton et aI., 1999), drawing on the latest advances 
in discourse and content analyses. It allows researchers to move beyond 
description of the content of interviews to the core values and beliefs 
underpinning it (Stratton, 1997). 
Within the family therapy setting in which Stratton and colleagues worked these 
researchers had discovered that many of the dysfunctional reactions exhibited by 
family members were a result of beliefs they held about each other and the causes 
of their behaviour. Critiquing the methods previously used by Peterson et aI. 
(1982) for being focussed solely on negative events, having no measure of 
controllability and a limited definition of the internal-external dimension, Stratton 
et aI. (1986) report the development of the LACS for analysing attributions, 
making a number of important distinctions hitherto unmade. 
These authors note that, when considering causal dimensions, most can be 
applied to any of the following within the causal statement: the cause of the 
event, the outcome in the event or the link between them. This distinction was 
considered by Stratton et aI. (1986) to be essential if coding was to be reliable. 
Within the family therapy setting of interest to Stratton and co-workers, these 
authors considered each of the dimensions listed below and decided to which 
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aspects of the causal chain (cause, link, outcome) they most appropriately applied 
(for a detailed discussion, see Munton et aI., 1999). 
Locus of control - code in relation to the cause, with separate coding for 
speaker, agent and target. 
Stability - code in relation to the cause. 
Controllability - need to consider all three elements (C-L-O), with separate 
coding for speaker, agent and target. 
Globality - code in relation to the cause. 
Universality - need to consider all three elements (C-L-O), with separate coding 
for speaker, agent and target. 
For definitions of these dimensions see Chapter 4, pp.83-84. 
A LACS coding template for recording the interview data IS provided in 
Appendix 7. 
In relation to the log data, it should be remembered that for the locus of causality 
and universality dimensions, coding is in relation to the athlete, and that for 
controllability, coding is in relation to the attributor. 
It should be noted that stability, globality and locus of causality were drawn from 
Peterson's (1982) Attribution Styles Questionnaire and controllability and 
universality were added because of perceived weaknesses inherent in the three 
dimension approach (Stratton, 1997). 
Stratton and colleagues report the use of the LACS in a range of clinical, market 
research and business settings (see Munton et aI., 1999, for details). For example, 
Stratton (1991) reports the use of the LACS in discovering the consumer needs of 
passengers on long-haul flights and the beliefs that lay behind the poor evaluation 
of a television commercial. 
Stratton et al. suggest three important criteria for assessing the value of this 
approach: reliability, generating sufficient data and validity. Measures of 
reliability of coding each dimension are provided by Stratton et al. (1986, see 
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p.305). In these initial studies Stratton and colleagues found that attributions for 
negative outcomes tended to be more global (p<0.01), personal (p<0.05) and 
uncontrollable (p<0.001) than for positive outcomes. For speakers, correlations 
between dimensions are also provided. Global causes tend to be stable; stable and 
global causes tend to be less controllable; personal causes tend to internal, 
although this relationship was much weaker for targets. Stratton et a!. (1986) also 
report a degree of construct and face validity. 
Whilst the propensity to produce attributional statements clearly depends on the 
setting, in the family therapy setting Stratton et a!. (1986) report analyses yielding 
an average of 44 statements per 45-minute session, whilst Munton et a!. (1999) 
report 40-100 attributional statements in 30-minute selection interviews. This, 
Stratton et a!. suggest, means that one such session may be sufficient to uncover 
individuals' causal beliefs. 
Each causal statement within the transcript was identified and extracted along 
with any contextual infonnation that may have assisted coding. Based on 
preliminary analyses of the first round of interviews, a speaker, agent, target 
(SAT) numerical index was developed. The speaker, agent and target within all 
extracted statements were then coded according to this index. Table 18 shows the 
SAT index. 
Table 18: SAT index. 
Numerical code Speaker,agent,target 
1 Coach 
2 Athlete 
3 Other athletes 
4 Conditions (inc!. weather, event circumstances) 
5 Athlete's (training or com~etition) perfonnance 
6 Other people (not athletes, e.g., family) 
7 Training progranune 
8 Outcome (i.e. finishing position) 
9 Default 
The LACS allows causal statements to be coded even when the outcome, link and 
cause are spatially separated within natural discourse. 
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Each statement was coded for content using a content code also developed from 
the first set of interviews. The content codes are defined here and summarised in 
Table 19. 
Outcome (saliency): if the attributional statement contains an overt reference to a 
positive or negative outcome it is coded either 'positive' ('1') or 'negative' ('2'); 
otherwise, it is coded 'neutral' ('9'). 
Nature of event: a statement is coded 'specific' ('1') if the outcome refers to a 
particular, single event; if the statement refers to events generally, or to a general 
set of conditions, it is coded 'general' ('2'). 
Inclusion of dyadic partner: if the dyadic partner (coach or perfonner) is referred 
to anywhere in the statement it is coded 'yes' (1); otherwise, it is coded 'no' (2). 
Emotional content: if the statement contains a positive or negative emotion 
anywhere in the attribution it is coded 'positive' ('1') or 'negative' ('2'); if the 
statement contains no emotional element it is coded 'no emotion' ('9'). 
Time of season: this refers to the time at which the statement was made: between 
October and end April coded 'pre-competitive' (' 1 '); between start May and end 
June coded 'early competitive' ('2'); between start July and September coded 
'competitive' ('9'). 
Table 19: Content index. 
Label Coded '1' Coded '2' Coded '9' 
Outcome Positive Negative Neutral 
Nature of event Specific event Non-event related Default 
related (general) 
Inclusion of Yes No Default 
dyadic partner 
Emotional content Positive Negative No emotion 
Time of season Pre-competitive Early competitive Competitive 
All causal statements were then coded on each of the five dimensions previously 
detailed. The first set of transcripts was coded jointly by both the primary 
researcher and a research colleague previously trained in the use of the LACS. 
The purpose of this was to improve coder reliabilitY. Where differences in 
dimension coding existed, statements were discussed and agreement reached. 
2 However, it should be noted that no statistical measure of inter-coder reliability was used. 
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This assisted the author in becoming more consistent in the coding of subsequent 
transcripts. All numerical data were then entered into a statistics package (SPSS 
version 10.0 for windows) for analyses. 
Results 
In the following section analyses of both questionnaire and interview data will be 
used to determine whether the attributions made by coaches and performers do, 
indeed, offer the potential for conflict. 
Specifically, and in accordance with Rejeski's (1979) model, it is hypothesised 
that: 
I. there will be coach-performer differences in the selection of causal agents and 
targets due to the divergent perspectives theory 
2. there will exist actor (athlete)-observer (coach) differences in the dimensional 
qualities of attributions made; this phenomenon will be evident at both the 
group and individual dyad level 
3. actor-observer differences will be more pronounced for negative outcomes. 
In addition: 
4. self-serving (performers) and other-serving (coaches) biases will exist in the 
attributions made by coaches and performers 
5. the time-from- event effect (e.g., Burger, 1986) on attributions will result in a 
difference in the pattern of attributions made by coaches and performers 
between the log and interview data such that attributions become more 
dispositional over time, especially for the athletes. 
Results will be presented for the interview data and, where appropriate, will be 
contrasted with corresponding log data results. Data are first presented for 
coaches and performers as groups, followed by data for individual dyads. 
Descriptive data: coach and performer groups 
A total of 1562 attributions were made during the interviews. Tables 66-71 
(Appendix 8) provide descriptive statistics for these attributions. 
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Agents and targets 
Hypothesis 1: There will be coach-performer differences in the selection of 
causal agents and targets due to the divergent perspectives theory. 
Table 20 shows the agents and targets utilised by coaches and performers. 
Table 20: Agents and targets. 
SATs Coaches' Coaches' Performers' Performers' 
a2ents (%) tar2ets (%) a2ents (%) targets (%) 
Coach 10.8 22.2 1.7 2.2 
Athlete 56.7 55,6 54.7 64.6 
Other atbletes 7.7 3.2 4.9 0.6 
Conditions 9.8 1.0 14.7 1.9 
(e.g., weather, 
event) 
Athlete's 2.3 12.4 9.1 26.2 
performance 
Other people 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Training 6.6 4.0 10.2 3.0 
pr02ramme 
Outcomes 0.7 0.4 1.0 0.6 
(i.e., finishing 
position) 
Default 4.6 1.2 3.6 1.0 
From Table 20 it can be seen that, in regard to agents, both coaches and 
performers identifY the 'athlete' as the agent in approximately 55% of the 
attributions but that coaches identify themselves, 'coaches', as agents far more 
than do performers. Coaches and performers identifY 'conditions' (which may 
refer to the weather or event conditions), and performers identifY the 'training 
programme' as other significant agents. 
Regarding targets, both coaches and performers identifY the 'athlete' as the major 
target (in c60% of all attributions). Coaches identify themselves, 'coaches', as 
targets far more than do performers. Furthermore, performers are more likely than 
are coaches to identifY the performer's own performance, 'athlete's performance', 
as a target. 
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Individual dyads 
For the purpose of displaying the individual dyads' results the same codes as used 
in Chapter 4 apply, namely: 
Coach C1.0 coaches Perfonner PII 
Coach C1.1 coaches Perfonner PI2 
Coach C2.0 coaches Perfonner P21 
Coach C3.0 coaches Perfonner P31 
Coach C3.1 coaches Perfonner P32 
Coach C4.0 coaches Perfonner P41 
Coach C4.1 coaches Perfonner P42 
Coach C5.0 coaches Perfonner PSI 
Descriptive data for each of the dyads are presented in Appendix 9. 
Agents and targets. Tables 21-28 show the agents and targets employed in the 
attributions made by each dyad. 
Table 21: Coach 1.0IPerfonner 11. 
SAT codes Cl.0Agent PH Agent Cl.O Target PH Target 
(%) (%) (0/<» (%) 
Coach 16.2 2.7 28.9 3.2 
·1; Athlete 65.3 . 57.0 60.1 61.1 
Other athletes 2.3 0.9 1.2 0.9 
Conditions 6.9 13.1 1.2 0.5 
Athlete's 1.7 14.0 4.0 27.6 
perfonnance 
Other people 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Training 2.3 5.4 1.7 3.2 
progranune 
Outcome 0.6 0.9 0.0 1.8 
Default 1.2 5.9 2.9 1.8 
As for the group data, the 'athlete' is the primary agent and target for both coach 
and perfonner. Coach I appears to refer to herself as a major agent and target 
(more so than the coach group mean score). 
Coach-performer Compatibility: Interview Data 116 
Table 22: Coach 1.1lPerformer 12. 
SAT codes C1.l Agent Pl2 Agent CI.I Target P12 Target 
1%) (%) (%) (%) 
Coach 8.1 5.6 26.7 1.1 
Athlete 75.6 60.7 61.6 59.6 
Other athletes 3.5 7.9 0.0 2.2 
Conditions 1.2 7.9 0.0 2.2 
Athlete's 1.2 4.5 7.0 34.8 
performance 
Other people .! 1.2 . 0.0 0.0 . . 0.0 
Training 8.1 10.1 2.3 0.0 
programme 
Outcome 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Default 1.2 3.4 2.3 0.0 
Table 22 provides very similar scores to those of Coach1IPerformer 11 (Table 
21). 
Table 23: Coach 2IPerformer 21. 
SAT codes C2 Agent(%) P21 Agent C2 Target P21 Target 
(%) (%) (%) 
Coach 8.7 9.0 19.7 14.9 
. Athlete 48.0 .. 76.1 48.0 58.2· 
Other athletes 8.7 0.0 4.7 0.0 
Conditions 4.7 . 4.5 0.0 ... 4.5 ! 
Athlete's 1.6 1.5 16.5 17.9 
performance 
Other people 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Training 15.7 6.0 10.2 4.5 
_programme 
Outcome 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Default 12.6 3.0 0.8 0.0 
Coach 2 and Performer 21 appear to utilise a wider range of agents and targets 
than other coaches and performers. 
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Table 24: Coach 3IPerfonner 31. 
SAT codes C3.0Agent P31 Agent C3.0 Target P31 Target 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
Coach 3.1 0.0 9.2 0.9 
Athlete 57.7 36.2 61.3 68.1 
Other athletes 16.0 11.2 8.6 0.0 
Conditions 11.7 16.4 1.8 0.0 
Athlete's 1.2 4.3 17.8 25.9 
perfonnance 
Other people 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Training 5.5 25.0 0.6 5.2 
programme 
Outcome 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 
Default 4.9 5.2 0.6 0.0 
Perfonner 31 utilises himself as agent much less than other perfonners and less 
than Coach 3, placing a heavier emphasis on the training programme. Coach 3 
considers himself as agent much less than other coaches. 
Table 25: Coach 3.1lPerfonner 32. 
SAT codes C3.1 Agent P32Agent C3.1 Target P32 Target 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
Coach 2.9 0.0 2.9 3.4 
Athlete 65.7 59.3 77.1 59.3 
Other athletes 2.9 6.8 2.9 0.0 
Conditions 0.0 6.8 0.0 0.0 
Athlete's 11.4 8.5 11.4 27.1 
perfonnance 
Other people 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Training 5.7 16.9 2.9 5.1 
programme 
Outcome 8.6 0.0 0.0 .. 0.0 
Default 2.9 1.7 2.9 5.1 
Perfonner 32 makes more use of himself as agent than Perfonner 31 and, in so 
doing, has a similar pattern of agents to Coach 3. Like Perfonner 31, Perfonner 
32 identifies the training programme as a significant agent. As for Coach 
3IPerfonner 31, the coach is much less the agent and target than for other dyads. 
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Table 26: Coach 4IPerfonner 41. 
SAT codes C4.0Agent P41 Agent C4.0Target P41 Target 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
Coach 9.3 7.5 27.9 10.0 
Athlete 53.5 55.0 53.5 50.0 
Other athletes 11.6 2.5 0.0 0.0 
Conditions 9.3 10.0 2.3 2.5 
Athlete's 4.7 15.0 7.0 35.0 
perfonnance 
Other people ··0.0 0.0 : .. 0.0 0.0 
Training 4.7 7.5 4.7 2.5 
programme 
Outcome 0.0 2.5 4.7 0.0 
Default 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
The 'athlete' is seen as agent and target equally by coach and perfonner. 
However, Coach 4 makes over a quarter of attributions with himself as target. 
The 'athlete's perfonnance' is a major target for Perfonner 41. 
Table 27: Coach 4.1lPerfonner 42. 
SAT codes C4.1 Agent P42 Agent C4.1 Target P42 Target 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
Coach 25.0 0.0 31.3 0.0 
Athlete 50.0 49.3 57.8 : 65.7 
Other athletes 9.4 9.0 0.0 0.0 
.. Conditions . 4.7 25.4 :. 0.0 9.0 : .. 
Athlete's 4.7 11.9 6.3 22.4 
perfonnance 
Other people 0.0. 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Training 3.1 3.0 3.1 3.0 
programme 
Outcome 3.1 1.5 1.6 0.0 
Default 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Coach 4 makes a large number of attributions with himself as agent andlor target, 
whereas Perfonner 42 makes no attributions with the coach as agent or target. 
:. 
.: 
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Table 28: Coach 5IPerformer 51. 
SAT codes CS Agent (%) PSI Agent CS Target PSI Target 
(%) (%) (%) 
Coach 8.2 1.2 25.4 0.0 
Athlete . 41.8 49.4 » 40.9 . 
" 
76.2 
Other athletes 5.5 2.4 2.7 0.0 
Conditions 30.9 27.7 , 1.8 '··1.2 
Athlete's 1.8 10.8 21.8 22.6 
performance 
Other people 
'" 
0.0 0.0 0.0 , 0.0 
Training 6.4 6.0 7.3 0.0 
programme 
.' Outcome 0.0 2.4 0.0 0.0 
Default 5.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
The 'athlete' is employed less by Coach 5 and Performer 51 as agent than other 
participants although Performer 51 employs the athlete as target more than does 
Coach 5. 'Conditions' feature largely as agent in attributions made by Coach 5 
and Performer 51. 
Therefore, whilst the athlete is still the primary agent and target for all individual 
dyads, dyads do differ in the degree to which they employ other agents and 
targets. This will, in turn, affect the scores on subsequent attributional 
dimensions. 
Coach-performer differences in dimension scores 
The following section is divided by dimension. Graphs (Figures: 4, 6, 8, 10, 11, 
12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19) show the percentages on each dimension score for coaches 
and performers for positive, neutral and negative outcomes in interviews. Beneath 
these are further graphs from the log data for the same dimension (Figures: 5, 7, 
9, 13, 17), showing the percentage of coaches' or performers' dimension scores 
for each of the composite scores shown for successful (scored '1' on the success 
scale) and less successful (scored 2-5 on the success scale) outcomes. It will be 
recalled that, for the log data presented in Chapter 4, dimension scores represent 
composite scores for a causal statement (which may have several elements, each 
of which may be scored positively or negatively on each dimension) and, 
therefore, log scores range in practice from minus 4 to plus 4, including zero 
which represents a composite score of neither polarity. 
. 
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In addition, Tables 29, 31, 33, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 43, & 44 report the 
percentages of attributions made by each dyadic member on each dimension 
across each outcome category, as reported in the interviews. Highlighted are 
those pairs of scores for positive or negative outcomes where there is >20%3 
difference in frequency scores. Neutral outcome scores are not highlighted since 
these outcomes are less likely to be of significance to compatibility within the 
coach-performer relationship. 
These are accompanied by Tables 30, 32, 34, 38, & 42 which show, for contrast, 
the percentage scores on each dimension made by dyadic members in the log 
sheets. These are not presented by outcome category because of the relatively 
small number of attributions made in log sheets by individuals for negative 
outcomes. 
Where interview data are coded in relation to agents and targets, only dimension 
scores in relation to speakers are contrasted with log data, since attributions made 
in the log are generally coded only in relation to the attribution maker (i.e., the 
speaker), the exceptions being the locus of causality and universality dimensions 
(coded in relation to the performer). 
These analyses allow the following hypotheses to be tested. 
Hypothesis 2: There will exist actor (athlete)-observer (coach) differences in the 
dimensional qualities of attributions made. This phenomenon may be apparent at 
both the group and individual dyad level. 
Hypothesis 3: Actor observer differences will be more pronounced for negative 
outcomes. 
Hypothesis 4: Self-serving (performers) and other-serving (coaches) biases will 
exist in the attributions made by coaches and performers. 
Hypothesis 5: The time-from-event effect on attributions will result in a 
difference in the pattern of attributions made by coaches and performers between 
the log and interview data, such that attributions become more dispositional over 
time (from log to interview data) for the athletes but not the coaches. 
3 Since it is inevitable that some differences in dimension scores will exist, a difference of 20% or 
more was selected as a notable difference worthy of further comment. 
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For consistency and ease of viewing, coaches ' scores are represented by blue 
graphs and performers' scores by red. 
Stability (group) 
Figure 4: Coach and perfonner groups' stability scores by outcome (interviews). 
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It can be seen from Figure 4 that both coach and performer groups have similar 
patterns of attributions made in interviews across outcome categori es. Coaches 
and performers tend to offer more stable causes for both pos iti ve and neutral 
outcomes but more unstable causes for negati ve outcomes. 
Patterns for the stability dimension from the log data o f coaches and performers, 
shown in Figure 5, are similar to those of the interview data in that there is a 
relati ve skewing toward stab le causes fo r positive outcomes and toward unstab le 
causes for negati ve outcomes for both gro ups. 
Stability (individual dyads) 
Table 29: Indiv idual dyads' stability sco res (percentages) by outcome 
(interviews). 
Oyad Stability Stability Stability 
Positive Neutral Negative 
Stable Uustab. Stable Uustab. Stable Unstab. 
Cl /PI I 75.0/57.3 25.0/42.7 56.7/68.9 43.3/31. \ 35.8/48.7 64.2/51.3 
Cl.1IP12 77.5175.7 22.5/24.3 79.3/43.2 20.7/56.8 70.6/46.7 29.4/53.3 
C2/P21 56.5/66.7 43.5/33 .3 80.9/8\ .3 \9. \/18.8 56. \ /6 1.5 43 .9/38.5 
C3/P31 54.4/80.3 45.6/ 19.7 5 \ .4/50.0 48.6/50.0 38.9/22.6 61. 1/77.4 
C3.I / P32 45 .5/80.0 54.5120.0 100/70.0 0.0/30.0 0.0/3 \ .6 \ 00/68.4 
C4/P41 38.5/75.0 6\.5/25.0 43 .8/72.7 56.3/27.3 7. \/48.0 92.9/52.0 
C4.lIP42 35.7/53.3 64.3/46.7 33.3/37.5 66.7/62.5 0.0/42.9 100/57.\ 
CS/PSI 78.4/58. \ 21.6/41.9 66.7/36.8 33.3/63.2 28. \/54.5 71.9/45 .5 
For positive and negati ve outcomes sim ilarities in group means (see Figure 4) for 
stabili ty scores mask large individual dyadic differences. Four dyads have 
stability dimension score differences for positive outcomes o f more than 20%. 
Five dyads have stability dimension score di fferences for negati ve outcomes of 
greater than 20%. With regard to dyadic members' scores there does not appear 
to be any pattic ul ar pattern , with neither coaches nor perfo nners being 
consistentl y more or less stable. 
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Tab le 30: Individual dyads ' stabi lity scores (percentages) (logs), 
Oyad Stable Unstab le 
CI /PII 56,0157 ,8 32,0/39 , I 
Cl. I/PI 2 72.3173 , I 27,8/26,9 
C2/P2 1 50,5/26,9 33,3/50,0 
C3/P3 1 44,8/45,8 41.4134,5 
C3.lIP32 55.0/72.5 25 ,011 7.5 
C4/P4 1 23,8/9,5 66,7176,2 
C4. 1/P42 40.711 0,3 55.6175 ,9 
CS/PSI 19.6/ 17.3 64.7173, I 
Contrasting with the log data a number of interesting points emerge. Whilst 
C2/P21 differ markedly on their log data results there appears little difference in 
stabi lity scores for attributions offered in interviews, For other dyads, notably 
C l.I /P 12, C3/P3 I , C3, I/P32, C4/P41 and C5/P5 1, differences ev ident in 
interview data are less pronounced in the log data. However, for C4, 11P42 the 
differences in scores between dyadic members appear consistent between data 
sets, 
Globality (group) 
Figure 6: Coach and performer groups' globa lity scores by outcome (interviews), 
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Figure 7: Coach (b lue) and perfo rmer (red) groups' globality scores by outcome 
(logs). Positive numbers = global; negative numbers = spec ific. 
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With regard to the globality of interview attri butions (Figure 6), a broadl y similar 
pattern appears for coach and perfom1er groups for all outcomes; more causes are 
speci fi c than are global. 
Likewise, for the log data (Figure 7), the majority of coaches' and performers' 
composi te scores are specific, wi th a similar pattern emerging for both groups 
across pos itive and negative ou tcomes. 
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Globality (individual dyads) 
Table 3 1: Individual dyads' globality scores (percentages) by outcome 
(interviews). 
Dyad Globality Globality Globality 
Positive Neutral Negative 
G lobal Specific G lobal Specific Global Specific 
C I/Pll 31.7/34.1 68.3/65.9 30.0/32.8 70.0/67.2 39.4/29.5 60.4170.5 
C I.I /PI2 70.0/21 .6 30.0178.4 62.9118 .9 37.9/8 1. 1 29.4/20.0 70.6/80.0 
C2IP21 43.5/25.0 56.5/75.0 48.9/50.0 51.1/50.0 47.4/48.7 52.6/51.3 
C3/P31 40.0/73 .8 60.0/26.2 32.4/37.5 67.6/62.5 16.7/35.5 83.3/64.5 
C3. I/P32 27.3/66.7 72.7/33 .3 50.0/80.0 50.0120.0 100/31.6 0.0/68.4 
C4/ P41 53.8/68.8 46.2/31.3 56.3172.7 43.8/27.3 50.0/20.0 50.0/80.0 
C4. I/P42 42 .9123.3 57 .1176.7 38.1/0.0 6 1.9/ 100 33 .3/33.3 66.7/66.7 
CS/PSI 52.9/30.2 47.1/69.8 44.4/31 .6 55 .6/68.4 9.4118.2 90.6/81.8 
As fo r stabi lity, group mean scores for globali ty hide real dyadic di fferences. 
Four dyads di ffe r by more than 20% for positive outcomes and two dyads differ 
by more than 20% for negative ou tcomes. Again , no discernib le pattern emerges 
between indi vidual coach and perfo rmer scores. 
T able 32: Individual dyads' globality scores (percentages) (logs). 
Dyad G lobal Specific 
CIIPII 24 .0/30.4 44.0/56.5 
C 1.I / P!2 38 .9/34.6 44.4/6 1.5 
C2IP21 43 .311 8.5 40.0/59.3 
C3/ P31 10.3/6.9 75.9/86.2 
C3.IIP32 5.017 .5 72.5/77.5 
C4/P41 8.3/4.8 75.0/66.7 
C4.1 / P42 52 .0/ 14.3 48 .0/85 .7 
CS/PSI 11.8/ 1.9 84.3/86.5 
Once again, di fferences in scores for C2!P2 1 evident in the log data (Table 32) 
appear less ev ident in the interview data (Table 3 1, a lthough there is a di fference 
approaching 20% for pos it ive outcomes). Di fferences in log scores fo r C4. 1!P42 
are less pronounced in the interv iew data. By contrast, dyadic di fferences in the 
interview scores for C 1.1 /P 12, C3/P31, C3 .1 /P32 and C5!P5 1 are less pronounced 
in the log scores. 
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Locus of causality (group) 
Figure 8: Coach and performer groups' locus of causality (speaker) scores by 
outcome (interviews). 
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Figure 9: Coach (b lue) and perfornler (red) groups ' locus of causality scores by 
outcome (logs). Positive scores = internal to the ath lete; negative 
scores = ex ternal to the athlete. 
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(N.B. : the attributions made by both coaches and performers in the logs are coded 
according to whether the cause is internal or external to the athlete, therefore, for 
athletes, one can compare directl y log and interview data, since, in the 
perfolll1ers' transcripts, the speaker is the athlete. However, for coaches ' 
transcripts, one must remember that the speaker here is the coach. ) 
In relation to interview data (Figure 8), coaches offer attributions that are largely 
external to themselves, espec iall y when the outcome is positively or negati ve ly 
sa li ent. This contrasts wi th performers who tend to make more attributions 
internal to themselves in situations where the outcome is not neutral. When 
neutral , internal and ex ternal attribut ions are more evenly di stributed. 
The log data (Figure 9) show that both coach and perfornler groups have 
composite locus of causa lity scores more internal to the athlete than ex ternal for 
both positive and negative outcomes. 
Figu re 10: Coach and performer groups' locus of causa lity (agent) scores by 
outcome (in terviews). 
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Perhaps expectedly, both coach and performer groups make attributions in which 
the cause(s) is internal to the agent, regardless of the outcome. 
Figure 11: Coach and performer groups' locus of causa lity (target) scores by 
outcome (interviews). 
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For posi tive outcomes coaches tend to offer causes distributed evenly between 
internal and external to the target, whereas performers offer more causes ex ternal 
to the target than internal. Thi s difference between coach and performer groups is 
less ev ident for neutral outcomes where both groups offer more causes external to 
the target. For negative outcomes the distribution between ex ternal and internal 
causes is more even for both groups. 
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Locus 0/ causality (individual dyads) 
Table 33: lnd ividual dyads' locus of causality (speaker) scores (percentages) by 
outcome (interviews). 
Dyad Locus speaker Locus speaker Locus speaker 
Pos itive Neutral Neeative 
Int Ext lilt Ext Int Ext 
C I/PlI 6.7170.7 93.3 /29 .3 28 .3/49.2 71.7150.8 11 .3/67.9 88 .7/30.8 
C I.1 /PI 2 2.5170.3 97.5/29.7 17.2/35 .1 82.8/64.9 5.9186.7 94.1113 .3 
C2/P21 0.0175.0 10011 6.7 25.5/87.5 74.5112 .5 3.5179.5 96.5/20 .5 
C3/P31 2.2/42 .6 97.8/57 ,4 16.211 6.7 83.8/83.3 0.0145 .2 100/54 .8 
C3. I/P32 9.1146.7 90.9/53 .3 0.0170.0 100/30.0 0.0/84.2 10011 5.8 
C4/P41 15,4/37.5 84.6/62 .5 6.3 /81. 8 93.8118.2 7. 1/68.0 92 .9/32.0 
C4.I /P42 21.4140.0 78.6160.0 33 .3/81.3 66.7/ 18.8 20.0/38. 1 80.0/61.9 
CS/PSI 5.9158. 1 94 .1/41.9 25.9/21.1 74.9178.9 0.0163.6 100/36,4 
The pattern of causes being largely ex ternal to the speaker fo r coaches and 
internal to the speaker fo r performers appears little affected by whether the 
outcome is positive or negati ve. However, most coaches appear to offer a higher 
number of causes that are internal to the speaker for neutral outcomes than for 
other outcomes. 
Table 34: lndividual dyads' locus of causality scores (percentages) (logs). 
Dyad In tern al Extern al 
C l / PI I 64 .0/47.7 8.0/21.7 
C I.1 /PI 2 66.7/92.3 11. 117.7 
C2/ P21 70.0/65.4 6.711 5.4 
C3/ P31 48.3/39.7 32 .8/29.3 
C3.I /P32 22 .5/80.0 60.017.5 
C4/P41 23.8/42.9 66.7/33 .3 
C4.I /P42 70.4/5 1.7 25 .9/34.5 
CS/PSI 60.8/80.8 2 1.6/3.8 
In the interv iew data (Table 33) coaches tend to offer causes large ly ex ternal to 
themselves, whereas a more variable pattern is ev ident for per fo rmers. In the log 
data (Table 34) coaches ' attributions tend to be more internal to the athlete, a 
pattern mirrored by the perfonners, also more likely to offer causes internal to 
themselves than externaL 
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Table 3S: Individual dyads ' locus of causa lity (agent) scores (percentages) by 
outcome (i nterviews). 
Dyad Locus agent Locus agent Locus agent 
Positive Neutral Negative 
Int Ext Int Ext Int Ext 
Cl/PI I 98.3/93 .9 1.7/6.1 95.0/82.0 5.0/ 18.0 100/92.3 0.017.7 
C I.I /PI2 100/94.6 0.0/5.4 93 .1/81. 1 6.9/ 16.2 82.411 00 11 .8/0.0 
C2/ P21 100/91.7 0.0/8.3 87.2/1 00 8.5/0.0 98.2/92.3 1.817.7 
C3/P31 96.7/98.4 3.3/ 1.6 97.3/1 00 2.7/0.0 91.7/1 00 8.3/0.0 
C3.1/P32 90.9/96.7 9.1/0.0 100/100 0.0/0.0 90.0/94.7 10.0/5.3 
C4/P41 100/100 0.0/0.0 87.5/1 00 12.5/0.0 92.9/100 7. 110.0 
C4. I /P42 lOO/ lOO 0.0/0.0 100/93.8 0.0/6.3 93.3/100 6.7/0.0 
CS/PSI 92.2/1 00 7.8/0.0 100/89.5 0.011 0.5 lOO/ lOO 0.0/0.0 
Since it is common for the perceived cause to emanate from the agent, it is not 
surpri sing that , under all outcome conditions, the causes selected by coaches and 
performers (although they may differ) are large ly internal to the agent. 
Correspondingly, there are no notable dirrerences within any of the dyads' pairs 
of scores. 
Table 36: Indi vidual dyads' locus of causa lity (target) scores (percentages) by 
outcome (interviews) . 
Dyad Locus taq(et Locus taq(et Locus tareet 
Pos itive Neutral Neeative 
Int Ext Int Ext Int Ext 
C l / PI I 55 .0/36.6 45 .0/63.4 43.3/49.2 56.7/50.8 66.0/35 .9 34.0/62.8 
C I.I IP12 55 .0/21 .6 45 .0178.4 44.8/40.5 55 .2/59.5 17.6/46.7 82.4/53.3 
C2/P21 34.8/66.7 65 .2125.0 34.0/56.3 66.0/43.8 29.8/53 .8 70.8/46.2 
C3/P31 55 .6129.5 44.4170.5 48.6/20.8 51.4179.2 58.3/32.3 41.7/67.7 
C3.IIP32 27.3/3.3 72.7/96.7 75.0/60.0 25.0/40.0 70.0/84.2 30.0/15.8 
C4/P41 53 .8/31.3 46.2/68.8 18.8/63.6 81.3/36.4 42.9/44.0 57. 1/56.0 
C4.IIP42 46.4/26.7 53.6173 .3 47.6/56.3 47.6/43.8 46.711 9.0 53.3/81.0 
CS/ PSI 45.1/39.5 54.9/60.5 7.4/21.1 92.6178.9 21.9/45 .5 78.1/54.5 
Four of the dyads ' pairs o f locus of causality scores in re lation to the target for 
positive outcomes differ by more than 20% and six of the pairs of scores for 
negative outcomes differ by more than 20%. For positive events coaches 
generally offer more causes intemal to the target than do perfornlers. No 
discernible pattern appears for neutral or negative events. 
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Controllability (group) 
Figure 12: Coach and performer groups' contro llabi lity (speaker) scores by 
outcome (interviews). 
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Figures 13: Coach (blue) and performer (red) groups' controllabi lity scores by 
outcome (logs). Positive scores = controllable; negative scores = 
uncontrollable. 
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Parti cipants tend to make attributions in which the outcome is uncontrollable by 
the speaker, especiall y for posit ive and negati ve outcomes for coaches, and 
negati ve outcomes for performers (Figure 12). For neutral events uncontrollable 
and controllable outcomes are more evenly di stributed for both groups. 
From the log data (Figure 13) it seems that, whil st the data are more equivocal, 
coaches' controllabil ity scores are slightly skewed toward contro llab le factors for 
positive ou tcomes and uncontro ll ab le factors fo r negative ou tcomes. For 
perfo nners there appears an even di stribution of contro llability scores for positive 
outcomes but a skew toward uncontrollable factors for negati ve ones. However, 
these pattems are more equ ivocal than fo r the interview data. 
Figure 14: Coach and performer groups ' contro llabil ity (agent) scores by 
outcome (interv iews). 
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With regard to the agent, coaches and performers demonstrate broadl y similar 
patterns for the control dimension across outcomes. There is a tendency to offer 
more attributions in which the outcomes are controllable by the agents for 
positive outcomes, wi th thi s pattern being more di stinctive for coaches. For 
negative events more outcomes are perceived by performers as uncontTOll able by 
the agent, whereas there is a more even distribution for coaches. For neutral 
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events coaches offer more uncontrollab le than controllable outcomes; fo r 
perfo rmers the d istri but ion is more even. 
Figure 15: Coach and perfo mler groups' controllability (target) scores by 
outcome (interviews). 
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Whilst both coaches and per fo nners give more attributions in which the outcome 
is uncontro ll able by the target, across a ll outcomes, thi s tendency is more ex treme 
fo r performers. 
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Controllability (individual dyads) 
Table 37: Indi vidua l dyads' controllability (speaker) scores (percentages) by 
outcome (interviews). 
Oyad Control. speaker Control. speaker Control. speaker 
Positive Neutral Negative 
Control. Uncont. Control. Uncont. Control. Uncont. 
C I /P]1 20.0/54 .9 80.0/45 .1 46.7/45 .9 53.3/54.1 15 .1/30.8 84.9/67.9 
C1.l /PI2 17.5 /51 .4 82.5 /48.6 37.9/62 .2 62. 1/37.8 11.8/20 .0 88.2/80.0 
C2/P21 26.1/33.3 73.9/58.3 44 .7/50.0 55.3/50.0 15.8/ 15.4 82.5/84.6 
C3/P31 5.6/32.8 94.4/67 .2 29 .7/8.3 70.3/91.7 8.3132.3 91.7/67 .7 
C3.1 /P32 27.3/36.7 72 .7163.3 25.0/30.0 75 .0170.0 0.0126.3 100173.7 
C4/P4] 23. 1112.5 76.9/87.5 68.8/63.6 31.3/36.4 21.4124.0 78.6176.0 
C4.I /P42 25 .0133.3 75.0/66.7 66 .7/68.8 33.3/31 .3 60.0/28 .6 40 .0171.4 
C S/PS] 23 .5/30.2 76.5/69. 8 44.4121.1 55.6178.9 6.3/40 .9 93 .8/59. 1 
For posi ti ve outcomes both sets of coaches and perfomlers make attributions 
largely uncontrollable by themselves . For negative outcomes and, with the 
exception of C4.I /P42, thi s preference for uncontrollable attri but ions is 
exaggerated. Some dyads (e.g., C31P3 1) appear to attribu te little control over 
outcomes. 
Three of the dyads' pairs of controllability scores in relat ion to the speaker for 
positive outcomes differ by more than 20% and fou r of the pairs of scores for 
negative outcomes di ffer by more than 20%. 
Table 38: Individual dyads ' contro ll ab ility scores (percentages) (logs). 
Oyad Controllable Uncontrollable 
ClIPl1 32.0/30.3 32.0/39. 1 
Cl.I / PI2 50.0/61.5 22.2/34.6 
C2IP21 20.0/ 19.2 63.3/6 1.5 
C3/ P31 43.1 /34.5 41.5/34.5 
C3.] /P32 22.5/ 17.5 60.0/47.5 
C4/P41 23.8/ 19.0 71 .4/57.1 
C4.l / P42 48.1 /34.5 48. 1/48.3 
CS/PS] 47.1115.4 35 .3/65.4 
In contrast with the interview data (Table 37) the preference for uncontrollable 
attributions appears less pronounced in the log data scores (Table 38), although 
still ev ident in a number of dyads. On ly CS/PSI log scores diffe r by more than 
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20%, a pattern that is on ly evident in their negative outcome interview data . Other 
dyadic differences in the interview scores are not so evident in the log scores. 
Table 39: Individual dyads ' controll abi li ty (agent) scores (percentages) by 
outcome (interviews). 
Dyad Control. agent Control. agent Control. agent 
Positive Neutral Negative 
Control. Uncont. Control. Uncon!. Control. Uncont. 
C l /PI I 71.7/63.4 28.3/36.6 55.0/60.7 45.0/39.3 52.8/38.5 47.2/61.5 
C 1.lIPI2 60.0/54.1 40.0/45 .9 44.8/43 .2 55.2/56.8 47.1120.0 52.9/80.0 
C2/P21 56.5/41.7 43.5/50.0 48.9/43.8 51. 1156.3 43 .9/28.2 54.4171.8 
C3/P31 55 .6/60.7 44.4/39.3 29.7/58.3 70.3/41.7 52.8/5 1.6 47.2/48.4 
C3.lIP32 63 .6/56.7 36.4/43 .3 0.0/50.0 100/50.0 65.0/42.1 35.0/57.9 
C4/ P41 76.9/56.3 23 .1/43 .8 18.8/54.5 81.3/45.5 50.0/44.0 50.0/56.0 
C4.lIP42 75.0/43.3 25 .0/56.7 42 .9/62.5 57.1137.5 33.3/38.1 66.7/61.9 
CS/PSI 49.0/30.2 5 1.0/69.8 37.0/5.3 63.0/94.7 3 1.3/45.5 68.8/54.5 
Large differences on controllabili ty by agents appear more rare, with only one 
dyad with such a difference evident for each of the sets of pos iti ve and negative 
outcomes. For positive outcomes coaches, and to a lesser extent performers, 
attribute more control to the agents than a lack of it. C5/P51 appear unusual in 
their apparent lack of contro l by agents. For negative o utcomes results for 
coaches are more equivocal, whi le there is a tendency for performers to perceive 
less control by the agent. 
Tab le 40: lndividual dyads' controllabi lity (target) scores (percentages) by 
outcome (interviews). 
Dyad Control. tareet Control. tareet Control. Tareet 
Positive Neutral Neeative 
Control. Uncont. Control. Uncont. Control. Uncont. 
ClIPII 38.3/32.9 61.7/67. I 45.0/37.7 55.0/62.3 45 .3/24.4 54.7174.4 
C 1.I /PI2 52.5116.2 47.5/83.8 41.4/64.9 58.6/35. 1 23.5/20.0 76.5/80.0 
C2/P2l 26.1125 .0 73.9/66.7 31.9/25.0 68.1175.0 28 .1 11 0.3 70.2/89.7 
C3/P3l 37.8/26.2 62.2/73.8 51.4/8.3 48.6/91.7 33.3/29.0 66.7171.0 
C3.I /P32 36.4116.7 63.6/83.3 25.0/40.0 75.0/60.0 50.0/26.3 50.0/73 .7 
C4/P41 38.5/6.3 61.5/93 .8 68.8/45.5 25.0/54.5 7.1120.0 85.7/80.0 
C4.lIP42 42.9116.7 57.1183 .3 61.9/43 .8 28.6/56.3 33.3/28.6 66.7171.4 
CS/PSI 45 .1125.6 54.9174.4 3.7/21.1 96.3178.9 18.8/31.8 81.3/68.2 
For pos itive and negati ve outcomes both the attributions made by coaches and 
performers offer less control by targets than control by them. Scores for 
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contro ll ability in relation to the target di ffer between coach and perfonner for 
posi tive outcomes in three of the dyads and for negati ve outcomes in two of the 
dyads. 
Ull iversalily (group) 
Figure 16: Coach and perfonner groups' universa lity (speaker) scores by 
outcome (interviews). 
U=Universal; P=Personal 
Coaches 
8% 
.- u p ._ u p .- u p 
POS/lInf 
u p U I' .- U p 
Perfonners 
Figure 17: Coach (b lue) and perfo rmer (red) groups' universality scores by 
outcome (logs). Positive scores = universal; negati ve scores = 
personal. 
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(N .B. As for the locus of causality scores, uni versality data from the logs are 
coded in re lation to the athlete, i.e., Does the attribution tell us something unique 
about the athlete? Therefore, one cannot simply compare the coaches ' interv iew 
(re: speaker) and log scores.) 
Attri butions made by coaches in interviews (Figure 16) tend to more uni versa l to 
themselves than are those made by performers across a ll outcomes. Attributions 
are more evenly di stributed between uni versa l and personal for perfonners across 
all outcome categori es. 
With regard to log data (Figure 17), both coaches and perfonners tend to make 
attri butions that are more un iversa l than personal (to the athlete); for coaches thi s 
tendency is more apparent fo r pos itive outcomes. 
Figure 18: Coach and perfonn er groups' uni versality (agent) scores by outcome 
(interviews). 
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For both coach and perfo nner groups and across outcome categori es, more 
attri butions are personal to the agent, that is, they say someth ing unique or 
id iosyncrati c about the agent, than are universal. 
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Figure 19: Coach and perfonner groups' uni versality (target) scores by outcome 
(interviews). 
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For pos itive outcomes coaches tend to give more attributions which are personal 
to the target than do perfomlers. For negati ve and neutral outcomes coaches' 
statements are more evenl y di stributed between universal and personal 
attributions. Perfonners tend to give more attributions that are universa l to the 
target for positive and negative outcomes but, for neutral outcomes, like those o f 
coaches, the statements are evenl y di stributed between universa l and personal 
attributions. 
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Ulliversality (illdividual dyads) 
Table 41: Individual dyads' un iversality (speaker) scores (percentages) by 
outcome (interviews). 
Dyad Universa l. speaker Universa l. speaker Universal. 
Speaker 
Positive Neutral Negative 
Personal U nivers. Personal Univers. Personal Univers. 
C I / PlI 16.7/57.3 83.3 /42.7 11.7/39.3 88.3/60.7 0.0134.6 100/65.4 
C l.l /PI 2 0.0/62.2 100/37.8 6.9/40.5 93.1/59.5 0.0/53 .3 100/46.7 
C2/ P21 8.7/50.0 91 .3/50.0 17.0/75.0 83.0/25.0 1.8/51.3 98.2/48.7 
C3/P31 1. 1/34.4 98.9/65.6 18.9/54.2 81.1 /45 .8 5.6/41.9 94.4/58.1 
C3.lIP32 0.0/36.7 100/63.3 0.0/40.0 100/60.0 0.0/42.1 100/57.9 
C4/P41 15.4/ 18.8 84.6/81.3 37.5/54.5 62.5/45 .5 7. 1/64.0 92.9/36.0 
C4.lIP42 14.3/56.7 85.7/43.3 47.6/93 .8 52.4/6.3 20.0/85.7 80.0/ 14.3 
CS/PSI 13.7/37.2 86.3/62.8 22.2/36.8 77.8163.2 0.0127 .3 100172.7 
With the focus of the attributions being perfomlers and their perfonnances it is 
likely that such attributions will offer little about the uniqueness of the coach and 
much more about the uniqueness of the performer. Therefore, it is unsurprising 
that most dyad ic scores on thi s dimension di ffer by large percentages, coaches' 
attributions being largely universal and performers' attributions being more 
personal. 
Table 42: lndi vidual dyads' universality scores (percentages) (logs). 
Dyad Persona l Universal 
Cl /PI I 24.0/34.8 40.0/42.4 
C J.1 /P12 16.7/46.2 44.4/50.0 
C2/P21 40.0122 .2 40.0170.4 
C3/P31 15.5115.5 65.5/67.2 
C3. IIP32 5.0/ 15.0 80.0172.5 
C4/ P41 15.4/ 14.3 84.6/61 .9 
C4.1/P42 48.0/46.4 48.0/53 .6 
CS/PSI 35 .5117.3 43. 1/57.7 
In contTast to the interview data (Table 41 ), there are far fewer differences 
between individual coaches ' and performers ' log scores on this dimension. From 
the log data both coaches ' and performers' attributions are more universa l than 
personal. 
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T able 43 : Individual dyads' universali ty (agent) scores (percentages) by outcome 
(interviews). 
Dyad Unive rsal. agent Un iversal. agent Universal. Agent 
Positive Neutral Negative 
Personal Univers. Personal Univers. Personal Univers. 
C l /PI) 88.3178.0 11.7/22.0 55.0160.7 45.0/39.3 67.9/60.3 32.1/39.7 
C1.lIP12 87.5175.7 12.5/24.3 62. 1/51.4 37.9/48.6 76.5153 .3 17.6/46.7 
C2/P21 78 .3/58 .3 21.7/4 1.7 61.7187.5 34.0112.5 71.9/51.3 28.1 /48 .7 
C3/P31 72.2/70.5 27 .8/29.5 75 .7/87.5 24.3/ 12.5 66.7/51.6 33.3/48.4 
C3.I /P32 72.7/53.3 27.3/46.7 100/40.0 0.0/60.0 65.0/42.1 35.0/57.9 
C4/P41 76.9/8 1.3 23. 1/ 18.8 87.5172.7 12.5/27.3 92.9/76.0 7.1124.0 
C4. l!P42 53 .6/86.7 46.4113 .3 7 1.4193.8 28.6/6.3 73.3/8 5.7 26.7/ 14.3 
CS/PSI 82.4/55.8 17.6/44.8 70.4173.7 29.6/26.3 75 .0/50.0 25 .0/50.0 
In relation to agents, attributions offered by coaches and performers tended to be 
more personal than un iversa l across outcome categori es. There are also much 
fewer large differences between coaches' and perfo mlers' scores compared to 
those in relation to speakers. Genera ll y, coaches' scores fo r both positi ve and 
negative outcomes tend to be relatively more personal than performers' scores. 
Table 44: Individual dyads' universali ty (target) scores (percentages) by outcome 
(interviews). 
Dyad Universal. target Universal. target Unive rsal. Target 
Pos itive Neutral Negative 
Personal Univers. Personal Univers. Personal Univers. 
CIIPII 75.0/56.1 25.0/43 .9 35.0/4 1.0 65.0/59.0 66.0/30.8 34.0/69.2 
CI.I /P12 57.5/32.4 42 .5/67 .9 34.5/40.5 65.5/59.5 58.8/40.0 41.2/60.0 
C2/P2J 69.6/66.7 30.4/33.3 46.8/62.5 53.2/37.5 29.8/4 1.0 70.2/59.0 
C3/P3J 53.3129.5 46 .7170.5 70.3/66.7 29.7/33.3 50.0/35 .5 50.0/64.5 
C3.) /P32 72.7/33.3 27.3/66.7 75.0/40.0 25 .0/60.0 65 .0/42 .1 35.0157 .9 
C4/P41 61.5/ 18.8 38.5/81.3 68.8/63.6 3 1.3/36.4 42.9/56.0 57.1/44.0 
C4.I /P42 46.4150.0 53 .6/50.0 57 .1/93.8 38. 1/6.3 53 .3176.2 46.7123.8 
CS/PSI 62.7/30.2 37.3169 .8 37.0/38.8 63 .0163 .2 31.3/3 1.8 68.8/68.2 
Coaches' scores for positive outcomes tend to be more personal to targets than 
universal, whereas perfonners' scores for positive outcomes are more equivocal 
but tend to be more personal to the target. For negati ve outcomes coaches ' and 
performers' scores appear more evenly di stributed between personal and 
universal. There are more differences on universality from the perspect ive of the 
target than from that of the agent. 
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In order to summarise individual dyad dimension scores, differences of greater 
than 20% are shown in Table 45 . 
Table 45: Dyads with differences on interview dimension frequency scores of 
greater than 20% (positive and/or negative differences as labelled) . 
Stab. Glob. Locus- Locus- Locus- Cont.- Conl.- Cont.- Univ.- Univ.- Univ.-
spea k. a~(,lIt la rge l speak. 3J,:cnl tar!,!cl spea k. aJ.:c nl target 
C l! • • • • * • 
P I I (Pos! (Neg) (Pos) (Neg) (Pos! (Neg) 
Neg) Neg) 
C I.I ! • • • • • • • • • • 
P I2 (Neg) (Pos) (POS! (POS! (Pos) (Neg) (POS) (Pos! (Neg) (Pos) 
Neg) Neg) Neg) 
C2! • • • • 
P21 (POS! (POS! (Pos! (Neg) 
Neg) Neg) Neg) 
C3! • • • • • • • 
P31 (POS) (POS) (Pos! (Pos! (POS! (POS! (Pos) 
Negl Neg) Neg) Neg) 
C3.1! • • • • • • • • • 
P32 (Pos! (Pos! (Pos! (Pos) (Neg) (Neg) (Pos! (Neg) (Pos! 
Neg) Neg) Neg) Neg) Neg) 
C4! • • • • • 
P41 (Neg! (Neg) (POS! (Pos) (Pos) 
Pos) Neg) 
C4.1! • • * • • • • • 
P42 (Neg) (Neg) (Neg) (Pos) (Pos) (Pos! (Pos) (Neg) 
Neg) 
CS! • • • • • • • • 
PS I (Pos! (Pos) (Pos! (Neg) (Neg) (Pos! (Pos! (Pos) 
Neg) Neg) Neg) Neg) 
In relation to Table 45, it can be seen that all of the dyads differ by a substantial 
amount on at least two dimensions and one, C I .11P 12, on all dimensions. 
Discussion 
One of the issues in comparing the two sets of data (log and interview) is that the 
log data do not include the vari ed SAT perspectives. Therefore, in order to 
consider compatibility, log data must be coded in relation to a fi xed reference 
point (i.e., the athlete, for locus causality and universality) . However, the LACS 
used to code the interview data considers three di mensions (including locus of 
causality and universality) from the va ri ed perspectives of SAT, so, for the 
coaches, it is particularly difficult to compare like with li ke . Whereas, for 
performers, one can compare the log data on these dimensions with interview 
data in relation to the speaker (which is therefore in relation to the performer), 
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thi s cannot be done for the coaches. This highlights one of the problems with 
considering the results of previous actor-observer studies. It also rei nfo rces the 
need to consider varied methodologies in future research and to take account of 
the potential differences in speakers, agents and targets adopted by various 
groups and individuals. 
The results outlined in th is chapter allow the attributions made in interviews by 
coaches and performers in operating dyads to be contrasted. Furthermore, and the 
previous comments not withstanding, where appropriate, analyses of data 
presented in Chapter 4 for attributions made in questionnaire responses may be 
contrasted with those from interviews. This Discussion section will focus on the 
interv iew data, for coach and performer groups and then individual dyads, 
contrasting these results with those of the log data analyses where appropriate. 
Group data 
It appears that, III the interviews conducted between one and four weeks after 
naturally occurring sports events, the coaches in this study made more 
attributions than did performers (Table 66, Appendix 8). These attributions were 
more likely to be positive in nature than negati ve or neutral for both coach and 
performer groups 4 but contained little emotional content (Tables 67 and 68, 
Appendix 8), especially in the case of coaches. For performers the attributions 
were more often relating to specific events; for coaches the distribution between 
specific and general events was more balanced (Table 69, Appendix 8). This may 
reflect the coaches' ability to take a wider view of the training and competition 
environments, whereas the performer appears more episodic. Whereas coaches 
often made reference in their attributions to the performers, perfonners rarely 
made reference to coaches in theirs (Table 70, Appendix 8). The former is not 
surpri sing given the focus of the interviews; the latter is, perhaps, more surpri sing 
as, within such close working relationships, one might expect greater inclusion of 
the coach in performers' attributions for perfomlance. The number of attributions 
per phase of the season probably reflects the duration of each phase and the 
number of interviews in each (Table 71, Append ix 8). 
" Although the researcher rather than the speaker assessed saliency, contextual infomlation was 
used 10 increase the cOllfidence of such labelling. 
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These results are, perhaps, not surprising. Observers who can empathise with 
actors, due to having considerable experience in and knowledge of the activity, 
and who may be able to consider the outcomes from more diverse perspectives, 
are more likely to offer a greater range of attributions than the actors themselves. 
The high percentage of training outcomes may have resulted in a more positive 
slant, in that the goals for these events are perhaps more likely to be controllable 
and, hence, achievable than those for competition. Given the time lag between 
event outcome and interviews, emotions may well have dissipated over time. One 
would expect coaches to make reference to their perfonners given the nature of 
the target events, although it is surprising how little overt reference perfonners 
made to their coaches. This may reflect the individual nature of the sport of 
athletics; future studies in team sports, where team selection and tactics may be 
more influential, may yield different results. 
Research hypothesis 1: There will be coach-perfonner differences in the 
selection of causal agents and targets. 
Whilst there do appear to be some actor-observer differences in the agents 
selected by each group, it is not consistent with the divergent perspectives model. 
The agents employed by coaches and perfonners are important in that it is often 
within the agent that the cause of the outcome is located. Both coach and 
perfonner groups identified the 'athlete' as the most common agent. This is 
predicted for the coach group since, for them, the athlete is the primary focal 
point. However, one might expect athletes to have selected a greater number of 
causal factors from their environment. Coaches identified themselves, 'coach', 
and then 'conditions' as other significant agents. For perfonners, the 'training 
programme' and then 'conditions' were the next most commonly cited agents. 
The 'coach' was rarely cited by perfonners as the agent, although it could be 
argued that the training programme is primarily designed by the coach, and hence 
implicit within this agent. Therefore, whilst the athlete was the most common 
agent, there may be some discrepancy between the two groups on other persons 
or environmental factors that bring about outcomes. Future research will need not 
only to take account of the agents and targets offered by different speaker groups 
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but also attempt to assess the dimensional qualities associated with attributor's 
meanings for each of them. 
With regard to targets, again, and not surprisingly, both groups agreed on the 
'athlete' as the primary person or circumstance affected by the cause. However, 
whilst the coach group identified themselves, the 'coach', as the target in nearly a 
quarter of attributions, the performer group identified the 'athlete's performance' 
in over a quarter of their attributions. It may be, therefore, that, whilst both 
coaches and performers in their dyads were explaining the same sporting 
outcomes, their attributional focus within this framework was different; each 
group is explaining the outcome in terms which are most significant to them. It 
may be, therefore, that each group is selecting its own causal background 
(McGill, 1989) against which to explain the event. Future studies need to ensure 
that research designs take account of this by eliciting agents and targets that are 
clearly defined and differentiated. 
Research hypothesis 2: There will exist actor (athlete)-observer (coach) 
differences in the dimensional qualities of attributions made at both group and 
individual dyad level. 
Research hypothesis 3: Actor-observer differences will be more pronounced for 
negative outcomes. 
Research hypothesis 4: Self-serving (performers) and other-serving (coaches) 
biases will exist in the attributions made by coaches and performers (especially 
apparent for locus of causality, controllability, and stability dimensions). 
Research hypothesis 5: The time-from-event effect (e.g., Burger, 1986) on 
attributions will result in a difference in the pattern of attributions made by 
coaches and performers between the log and interview data, such that attributions 
become more dispositional over time, especially for the athletes. 
The contrasts possible between log and interview data with regard to group 
dimension scores can be summarised as follows in Table 46. 
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Table 46: Summary of findings (in relation to attributional dimensions). 
Interview data 
Stability 
• Coaches' and perfonners' scores are more 
stable for positive and neutral outcomes 
and more unstable for negative outcomes 
Globality 
• Coaches' and perfonners' globality scores 
are generally specific across outcomes 
Locus of causality 
• Performers' speaker locus of causality 
scores are internal except for neutral 
outcomes, coaches' speaker locus of 
causality scores are largely external across 
outcomes 
• Causes are deemed by both coaches and 
performers to be largely internal to the 
agent across outcomes 
• For coaches, there is a relatively even split 
between causes internal and external to 
the target; this is mirrored by performers 
except for positive outcomes which tend 
to be more external to the target 
Controllability 
• Coaches' speaker controllability scores 
are more uncontrollable than controllable, 
especially for positive and negative 
outcomes; perfonners' scores are also 
more uncontrollable 
• Both coaches and performers tend to offer 
outcomes split between uncontrollable 
and controllable by the agent across 
outcome saliency 
• Coaches and especially perfonners offer 
outcomes generally uncontrollable by the 
target 
Universality 
• Coaches' speaker universality scores are 
largely universal; performers' scores are 
more evenly distributed for all outcome 
categories 
• Both coaches and perfonners offer 
attributions more personal to the agent 
than universal across outcomes 
Log data 
Stability 
• Coaches' and perfonners' composite 
scores are similar, and portray a similar 
pattern to those of the interview data: 
positive outcomes are more stable, 
negative outcomes more unstable 
Globality 
• Coaches' and perfonners' globality 
composite scores are generally specific 
across outcomes 
Locus of causality 
• Composite locus of causality scores are 
generally internal to the athlete for both 
groups across outcomes 
Controllability 
• Results are more equivocal but generally 
coaches' and perfonners' scores show no 
apparent bias for positive outcomes and 
are more uncontrollable for negative 
outcomes 
Universality 
• Coaches' and perfonners' composite 
scores are more universal than personal 
across outcomes, for coaches, especially 
for positive outcomes 
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• For neutral and negative outcomes both 
coaches and performers offer attributions 
evenly split on universality; for positive 
outcomes, coaches offer attributions more 
personal and for performers more 
universal to the target 
Stability. From both the analyses of interview data and log data (Figures 4&5) 
coach and perfonner groups have similar patterns for the stability of causes cited 
in their respective attributions. Specifically, causes identified were more often 
stable for positive and neutral outcomes but more unstable for negative outcomes 
in the interview data and more stable for positive and more unstable for negative 
outcomes in the log data of both groups. This appears functional as more stable 
causes suggest a likely reoccurrence in future, certainly desirable for positive 
outcomes, and unstable causes, being changeable, lessen the negative impact of 
unsuccessful outcomes (Weiner, 1992). It appears that this tendency is consistent 
over time (between the immediate log data and the time-lagged interview data) 
and modes of data collection. Given Tenenbaum and Furst's (1986) finding that, 
taking into account that more than the first attribution leads to an increase in the 
stablity scores, one might have expected both sets of scores to be high on 
stability, since both sets of data included all attributional statements given. 
Furthennore, from these data, it appears that coach and perfonner groups are 
compatible on the dimension of stability. It can, therefore, be assumed that both 
coach and perfonner would, more often than not, have similar expectations for 
future perfonnance. 
Globality. In relation to globality (Figures 6&7), it appears that, regardless of 
when and how attributions are collected, by immediate log or time-lagged 
interview, the results are similar: both coaches and perfonners tend to offer more 
specific than global attributions across outcomes. This may be explained by the 
nature of the outcomes for which attributions are made, which themselves are 
more often relating to a specific event, competition or training perfonnance, than 
to events in general. Furthennore, given that coaches and perfonners agreed on 
the events to be explained, these events may have been selected because of some 
Coach-perfonner Compatibility: Interview Data 147 
specific reason, such as their relative importance or uniqueness. Within Weiner's 
(1986) model, causes that have specific outcomes result in a limited number of 
relevant areas of the attributor's life being affected. In this study it may be that 
most of the cited outcomes and their causes are domain, or even sub-domain, 
specific. 
Again, it appears that coaches and perfonners are compatible on the globality 
dimension. 
Locus of causality. Locus of causality is an attribution dimension that requires 
attaching the cause to a specific person or circumstance. That is, the cause in the 
attributional statement is assessed as being either internal or external to someone 
or something (and therefore cannot be assessed in the general sense, as is the case 
of 'stability'). For the attributions collected via the log causes were coded as 
either internal or external to the athlete to allow simple comparison between 
coaches and perfonners. However, for the interview attributions, the LACS 
allowed causes to be coded from the perspective ofthe speaker (athlete or coach), 
agent and target. 
What follows is an attempt to compare log data with the interview locus of 
causality results in relation to the speaker, agent and target. Assessing locus of 
causality and the remaining dimensions from the perspective of the speaker is 
regarded as the most appropriate perspective since, for each attribution, agents 
and targets may vary, making simple comparison impossible. However, it should 
be borne in mind that, for locus of causality and universality dimensions, 
coaches' log scores are coded in relation to the athlete (for the reasons offered in 
Chapter 4). Any conclusions regarding compatibility must take this into account. 
From analysis of the log data it appears that both coaches and perfonners cite 
causes that are more internal to the athlete than external across outcome 
categories. This appears consistent with the interview data where perfonners' 
attributions are generally internal to themselves (as speakers) where the outcome 
is not neutral, whilst coaches' attributions are more external to themselves. Such 
findings, when account is taken of the agents and targets employed by coaches, 
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indicate causes located within the athlete are most commonly cited by both 
groups, both immediately after the event and some time (1-4 weeks) later. This 
appears contrary to the hypothesised actor-observer difference. Furthennore, it 
does not appear to offer support for Ross and Sicoly's (1979) contention that 
active observers (i.e., coaches) focus more on their own contribution than on that 
of their co-workers (i.e., perfonners). It may be that the heavy personal 
involvement of coaches in their athletes' perfonnance and progress draws their 
explanations closer together; it has been noted elsewhere that personal 
involvement by an observer can alter the actor-observer effect (Chen et aI., 1988). 
It is also unsupportive of a self-serving bias in the athletes and other-serving bias 
in the coaches. Causes tend to be located within the athlete whether the outcome 
is positive or negative. 
For positive outcomes this pattern of attributing should lead the athlete to 
enhanced feelings of pride and esteem but, for negative outcomes (for log data 
this is relative, since the 'less successful' sub-group include scores of 2 on the 
success scale), such internal causes may lead to lower athlete esteem and pride in 
perfonnance (Weiner, 1986). 
An issue of importance here is whether it is more important for the athlete and 
coach to agree on the nature of causes for outcomes (as they appear to here) or 
whether coaches should help perfonners attribute outcomes to causes the 
attributional qualities of which result in positive affect and cognition even when 
the coach may believe otherwise. Future research may wish to assess this. 
The apparent consistency of the locus of causality data over time, i.e., causal 
factors being primarily external to the coach and internal to the athlete, would 
indicate that the equivocal previous findings of researchers who have found 
changes in locus of causality over time (e.g., Moore et aI., 1979; Miller & Porter, 
1980) require further exploration. The methods used in the present study make 
direct comparison with Moore et aI.' s findings that attributions made by actors 
became more dispositional over time, and those of Miller and Porter, that 
observers' attributions became more situational, difficult. The present findings do 
not suggest the likelihood of attributional conflict between coaches and 
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performers but suggest compatibility in the log data and little evidence of 
incompatibility in the interview data. This may provide some support for the 
comments ofBlass and Kaplowitz (1990), that actor-observer differences (usually 
considered in relation to locus of causality) are not likely in long-standing 
relationships and, where reported, may be an artefact of the methods used to 
collect data. 
Perhaps expectedly, both coach and performer groups make attributions in 
interviews in which the cause(s) is internal to the agent, regardless of the 
outcome. It should be recalled that the agents selected by each group do vary, 
although the athlete remains the primary agent for each group. 
For positive outcomes coaches tend to offer causes distributed evenly between 
internal and external to the target, whereas performers offer more causes external 
to the target than internal. This difference between coach and performer groups is 
less evident for neutral outcomes where both groups offer more causes external to 
the target. For negative outcomes the distribution between external and internal 
causes is evenly split for both groups. This apparent difference for positive 
outcomes may reflect the different targets selected by each group; for example, 
coaches select themselves as targets far more than do performers, therefore, 
tending to increase their score for causes internal to the target. 
Controllability. In relation to controllability scores, there is an interesting contrast 
between interview and log data. Soon after the outcome coaches reported in the 
logs attributions higher in controllability for positive outcomes and lower in 
controllability for negative outcomes. Performers' attributions are evenly 
distributed on controllability for positive outcomes and more uncontrollable for 
negative outcomes. This might indicate the operation of a self-serving bias for the 
performers and other-serving bias in the coaches' responses, in that lacking 
control for a negative outcome helps prevent guilt and other negative self-directed 
emotions. 
However, in the interviews conducted between I and 4 weeks later, coaches' 
speaker controllability scores were more uncontrollable than controllable for 
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positive and negative outcomes; performers' scores were also more 
uncontrollable but especially for negative outcomes. These findings are difficult 
to explain. It might be that, given time to reflect and discuss the outcomes, factors 
additional to those controllable by coach or performer are considered more salient 
or influential. Alternatively, memory may influence the recall of different causal 
factors. For example, respondents may recall easily that the weather was poor or 
the opposition was strong but remember less about their own input. 
The results for controllability, in relation to the agent, need to be seen in relation 
to those from the perspective of the speaker. Furthermore, one should be 
cognisant of the relative levels of employment of various agents by coaches and 
performers. With regard to the agent, coaches and performers demonstrate 
broadly similar patterns for the control dimension across outcomes, both groups, 
but especially coaches, offering more attributions in which the outcomes are 
controllable by the agents for positive outcomes. Therefore, for positive 
outcomes, coach and performer groups seem compatible. 
For negative events more outcomes are perceived by performers as uncontrollable 
by the agent, whereas there is a more even distribution for coaches. What is 
difficult to tell from these data is whether when respondents believe the outcome 
is uncontrollable by the agent, they view it as controllable by anyone else. The 
relatively more controllable outcomes stated by the coaches may reflect their 
level of experience andlor a need to perceive themselves as managing the 
coaching/training process. 
Given that the majority of agents are the 'athlete', it could be argued that this 
broad pattern of controllability scores for attributions suggests a self-/other-
protective bias. Both groups perceive that the agents have less control over the 
outcomes for negative events than positive ones, therefore, there may be less 
placing of responsibility on the agent for a negative outcome. 
Both coaches and performers give more attributions in which the outcome is 
uncontrollable by the target, across all outcomes; however, this tendency is more 
pronounced for performers. Given the relatively high incidence of 'athlete' as 
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target, this finding is difficult to explain. However, the pattern of results for 
coaches and perfonners is similar, although perfonners' outcomes appear less 
controllable by the targets for all outcome categories. 
Universality. Coaches' universality scores are more universal across outcome 
categories, both for log data (where attributions are universal to the athlete) and 
interview data, from the perspective of the speaker (i.e., universal to the speaker). 
Perfonners' log scores are also more universal than personal but, in interviews, 
attributions are more evenly distributed between universal and personal. It 
therefore appears that coaches in this study, and perfonners in the time 
immediately after the events, tend to offer attributions that say more about 
general cause and effect relationships than to ones specific to the perfonner (log) 
or speaker (interview). Coaches may tend to step back from specific outcomes 
and consider the broader training and competition setting, and be able to contrast 
specific perfonners' behaviour with those of others. After a time delay 
perfonners appear less prone to offer universal attributions in the interviews 
suggesting, perhaps, that perfonners become more focussed on, or have greater 
recall of, the peculiarities of the circumstances leading up to an outcome after a 
time lapse. 
It is unlikely that this difference between coaches and perfonners will result in 
incompatibility (or more extreme conflict). However, coaches should be aware of 
this trend and assist perfonners to consider broader training and competition 
factors that may affect outcomes, especially after a time delay. 
For both coach and perfonner groups, and across outcome categories, more 
attributions are personal to the agent than are universal. Again, account should be 
taken of the pattern of employment of the various agents utilised. Furthennore, 
these events were specific, significant training sessions or competitions and the 
outcomes were the relative success in relation to achieving their personal goals 
within these sessions. These personally selected outcomes may have encouraged 
more personal attributions. 
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Furthennore, since the whole attribution is considered for coding the universality 
dimension, within the Cause - Link - Outcome chain, it may be that the 
uniqueness lies in the nature of the outcome rather than the uniqueness of the 
cause. 
Whilst taking into account the pattern of employment of targets for both groups, 
these results may suggest a potential area of incompatibility. particularly for 
positive outcomes, coaches may be identifying something unusual about, or 
personal to, the target in the lead up to an outcome, whereas, for perfonners, the 
attributions seem to represent perceptions more of a typical case. This may have 
implications for how each group views such outcomes and the circumstances 
leading up to them, and how they are dealt with in the future. 
Summary of group data. From the preceding discussion of results it seems that 
there is some evidence of actor-observer differences but that the degree to which 
it is present is less than in most previous studies. This is, perhaps, due to the long-
standing nature of these dyads, the nature of track and field athletics, and the 
requirement for individual coaching attention in this sport. Where limited actor-
observer differences do occur, this may be accounted for by the selection of 
different agents and targets. It appears that, where saliency of outcome is 
associated with actor-observer differences, positive outcomes produce more 
actor-observer differences than negative ones. 
With regard to the self-serving bias (athletes) and other-serving bias (coaches), 
there is little evidence of this in relation to the locus of causality (indeed the 
perfonners appear to internalise negative outcomes) or controllability dimensions. 
It does appear that coaches' and perfonners' patterns of attributing may change 
over the time between the immediate log data collection and the subsequent 
interviews, specifically in relation to universality. Future research may need to 
consider the impact of attributions made at different times after the event. For 
example, coaches' and perfonners' causal beliefs at the points in time when 
decisions about future competition and training (and perhaps selection in some 
sports) are being made would seem to be the most significant in relation to 
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potential conflict. Future research should consider compatibility of causal beliefs 
at these times. 
Individual dyads 
With the exception of C3.11P32, all dyads appear to appraise the majority of 
outcomes similarly in relation to saliency. However, Coach 3.1 makes more 
attributions containing a negative element and fewer attributions containing 
positive elements than does Perfonner 32. Therefore, in a free response interview, 
this coach and perfonner appear to have different perceptions about the saliency 
of the outcomes or, indeed, are focussing on different elements of the outcomes 
when appraising their jointly selected events. It may be that, for some dyads, the 
potential for incompatibility is due not to differences in the dimensional qualities 
of the attributions, per se, but to the selection of different outcomes or 
components of them within the target behaviour for which attributions are made. 
In the majority of dyads the occurrence of emotional content in attributional 
statements is low. This, perhaps, reflects the time delay between the event and the 
interviews. During this time period any emotions regarding the outcomes may 
have dissipated. Where it does occur it is more often positive than negative and is 
more apparent in perfonners' statements than in those of coaches. This is not 
surprising as one would expect that perfonners would have greater emotional 
investment in the events and their outcomes than do coaches. 
In a number of dyads the perfonner offers a larger percentage of attributions 
which relate to a specific occurrence or event, whereas the coach offers 
attributions which are more general (within the sport domain) in nature. This may 
reflect the coaches' observer perspective, the ability or motivation to consider a 
wider perspective and/or perfonners' emphasis on the specific nature of the task 
at hand. It may be necessary for coaches to recognise this emphasis by their 
athletes, especially in tenns of helping perfonners cope with specific, short-tenn 
outcomes in their training or competitions. 
In relation to the agents and targets selected by members of individual dyads in 
interviews, the following results can be discerned from Tables 21-28. 
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For ail dyads the 'athlete' is the primary agent and target, and this appears to be 
generally the case for both dyadic members. This is to be expected since the 
events being explained were outcomes associated with performers' goals in 
training and competition. However, there is a degree of variation between dyads. 
Coach 1 and 4, in particular, appear to identify themselves as major agents and 
targets in their attributions and this correspondingly reduces the incidence of the 
athlete as agent and target. This focus does not appear to be mirrored by their 
respective athletes. Indeed, Coach 4 appears to differ notably from Performer 42 
in identifying himself as a major agent and target. It seems that these coaches in 
particular see themselves as contributing greatly to their athletes' performances 
but also being affected by the outcomes. The degree to which this may contribute 
to potential attributional conflict within these dyads cannot be judged from these 
data alone but will contribute to differences in these participants' dimension 
scores. However, it seems reasonable to assume that, if coaches tend to focus 
more on themselves in explaining performer outcomes than do performers, who 
tend to focus more on themselves, there is the potential for weakened 
communication. Of course, it may be that the process of completing the logs and 
interviews refocused respondents' attention. An approach that codes more 
naturally occurring discourse would, therefore, be advantageous in addressing 
this issue. Future research wiI1 also need to explore the extent to which this 
relative self-focus by some coaches is due to motivational or perceptual biases. 
Performers 31 and 32 place a heavy focus on the 'training progranune' as an 
agent. It appears that these performers believe the progranune is responsible for 
or is the key contributory factor in a large number of the outcomes. Following 
positive outcomes this may be comforting to an athlete since the programme is 
relatively stable and controllable. In the case of poorer performances it offers a 
potential scapegoat or, at least a causal factor, that can be amended in future. 
Both Coach 5 and Performer 51 include a high percentage of 'conditions' as 
agent. This, and their correspondingly Iow percentage of 'athlete' as agent, 
suggests that they are at least compatible in looking in the same place 
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('conditions') for the cause of outcomes. However, it could be argued that such 
an emphasis on an uncontrollable factor is potentially dysfunctional. 
In most cases the athlete cites 'athlete's perforrnance' as a target more often than 
does their coach. Indeed, combined with the 'athlete', these make up the vast 
majority of the perforrners' targets. It may be that the perforrners have a much 
narrower attributional focus than do the coaches who, with additional experience, 
a wider perspective on training and competition and, arguably, differing 
motivational needs, consider a greater range of outcomes and their impact. 
It appears that coaches identify themselves as targets more than as agents. It 
would seem that these coaches see themselves more as affected by outcomes than 
people bringing about outcomes. Again, in the context of these interviews, this is 
surprising as the focus was on athlete perforrnance. It may suggest that coaches 
see themselves much more as an active part of a dynamic dyadic partnership than 
do the athletes, gaining from it, in the sense of learning and experiencing, as well 
as putting into it. The exception to this is Coach 3.1, who cites himself much less 
as agent and target than other coaches, appearing to perceive himself as rarely 
bringing about outcomes or being affected by them. 
Results extracted from the group data may camouflage differences in dimension 
scores within individual dyads. From Table 45 it can be seen that all dyads differ 
on a number of the dimensions, although there appears no obvious pattern to 
these differences. Differences appear for both positive and negative outcomes. 
This suggests the need for coaches and perforrners to be aware that it is not only 
in negative outcome situations where potential conflict may occur. However, it is 
noted that the individuals in each of these dyads have been working together for 
some time and, therefore, these differences appear not to underrnine seriously the 
working relationship. 
For dimension scores from the perspective of the speaker, where differences 
occur, it is often for both positive and negative outcomes. In the case of locus of 
causality scores, this is due to the often mutual exclusivity of locus of causality 
scores in relation to each dyadic member, i.e., even if they both agree on the 
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cause of an outcome it may be that this cause is internal to the coach as speaker 
but, at the same time external to the athlete. Therefore, on this dimension, a high 
degree of opposite scores and, therefore, large percentage differences, may 
actually be reflecting compatibility (in the sense of agreement). 
Within dyads the fewest differences in dimension scores occur from the 
perspective of the agent. That is, whilst each dyad member may select distinct 
agents, the dimensional qualities of the attributions in relation to these agents 
appear largely similar. Future research considering attributional compatibility will 
have to consider whether it is of greater importance for dyad members to offer 
attributions in which the dimensional qualities are similar or whether the 
compatibility of coach and perfonner dyads is more dependent upon the selection 
of similar agents. 
Of all the dimension scores (excluding locus of causality for the reasons given), 
controllability in relation to the agent seems to offer few est differences. 
Therefore, most of the coach-perfonner dyads agree on the ability of the agent to 
have control over the outcome. This is significant in that this dimension is most 
likely to influence the participant's feelings about change in the future and, where 
the attribution is also internal, will influence feelings of pride (for positive 
outcomes) or guilt (for negative outcomes) (Weiner, 1986). 
Stability. Considering the dimension scores of individual dyads, it appears that 
positive outcomes tend to result in more stable attributions for both coaches and 
perfonners than for negative outcomes. However, within the dyads, there is no 
clear pattern of coaches or perfonners displaying the greater propensity for this. 
It also appears that three dyads differ by more than 20% on stability for both 
positive and negative outcomes. This may potentially result in these dyad 
members' differing in their expectations for future outcomes. This, in turn, may 
affect their perceptions of what is required within training and competition in 
order to achieve future positive outcomes. For these three dyads there is, 
therefore, potential incompatibility on this dimension. In is further interesting that 
none of these dyads show this difference in their log scores on this dimension, 
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although positive and negative outcomes are not distinguished in the individual 
log data. It could be that this potential incompatibility develops after the initial 
appraisal of the outcome. However, the reverse of this pattern in true for two 
other dyads, C21P21 and C4.11P42. They have substantial differences in their log 
scores, which are less evident in their interview data. Therefore, whilst change in 
perceptions within dyads between immediate log and delayed interview data 
seems possible, the degree to which this brings dyad members' perceptions closer 
together or further apart seems equivocal. 
Globality. For globality only one dyad, C3.11P32, shows a greater than 20% 
discrepancy for both positive and negative outcomes, whilst four other dyads 
differ for either positive (3) or negative (1) outcomes. In this dyad the performer 
offers more global causes for positive outcomes than does the coach and more 
specific causes for negative outcomes than does the coach. For the athlete this 
may be functional since a specific cause (for a negative outcome) may be more 
amenable to change and will be less damaging to other aspects of the athlete's 
life. Once again, for this dyad, this difference is not apparent in the log data. 
Locus of causality. For there to be compatibility on the locus of causality 
dimension (speaker) one would expect causes selected often to be internal to the 
performer (as speaker) but external to the coach (as speaker). Indeed, even when 
the same cause is selected by both dyad members, this may be internal to the 
performer but external to the coach (e.g., athlete fatigue). Therefore, whilst 
percentages are different for coaches and performers, they may still be 
compatible on this dimension (from the perspective of the speaker). 
Seven of the dyads differ in their scores by greater than 20% (possibly for the 
reasons given previously). However, it is interesting that in one dyad, C4.11P42, 
locus of causality (speaker) scores do not differ a great deal for either positive or 
negative outcomes. It appears that this coach and performer are attributing cause 
to factors external to both of them (e.g., the conditions, opposition). Whilst this 
may reduce the likelihood of incompatibility, it may not optirnise the opportunity 
for positive affect following a successful outcome. 
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As might be expected, no dyads differ on locus of causality in relation to the 
agent. Since agents are the people or circumstances responsible for the outcome, 
one would expect most causes to be located within them. 
However, in relation to targets, three dyads' scores differ by more than 20% for 
both positive and negative outcomes, although the direction of these differences 
is inconsistent. Whilst some of this variance may be explained by the selection of 
different targets, all three dyads tend to select the 'athlete' as the primary target. 
Differences in the locus of causality where the target is common to both may be 
problematic in that the sense of responsibility and personal affect (in the case of 
the athlete as target) may differ correspondingly. To avoid potential 
incompatibility, these three dyads may need to consider which targets are being 
selected and the extent to which attributed causes are located within them. 
Controllability. In relation to controllability (speaker), three dyads differ for 
positive and four for negative outcomes. Only one dyad, C31P31, appears to differ 
by more than 20% for both positive and negative outcomes. Coaches in particular 
seem to perceive little control over positive or negative outcomes, with the 
possible exception of Coach 4. It is interesting that this coach appears to feel 
greater control over Perfonner 42's negative outcomes than either other coaches 
in relation to their athletes or himself in relation to Perfonner 41. It may be that 
this coach feels some responsibility for these perfonnances and perceives the 
ability to change these in the future. Future research may need to consider the 
extent to which a global attributional style may be mediated by interpersonal 
relations with specific others, especially in relation to ajoint task. 
Few differences exist in relation to controllability (agents). For positive outcomes 
coaches and perfonners appear to perceive more control by the agent than a lack 
of it. This will tend to produce positive affect and expectation where the agent is 
the speaker and confidence in other agents where it is not the speaker. Coaches 
and perfonners appear to perceive less control by agents for negative outcomes. 
Coach 5IPerfonner 51 perceive a lack of control by the agent. Coupled with a 
similar perceived lack of control for negative outcomes (especially in the coach), 
this may, if heightened, lead to feelings of relative helplessness. 
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There also appears a relative lack of perceived control by targets for both 
individual coaches and, especiaIly, perfonners in both positive and negative 
outcome situations. This degree of inevitability may reflect the nature of the sport 
in that there are arguably fewer variables affecting relative outcomes than for 
sports more dependent on varied skills and tactics. It may also reflect the goals set 
by these participants. Where there are some differences between coach and 
perfonner, in five of the dyads, it appears that more control by the target is 
perceived by the coach. This probably reflects the selection of the 'athlete' as 
target, whom coaches may perceive as having more control than do the athletes 
themselves. 
Universality. With regard to universality (speaker), all of the dyads differ by 
more than 20% for negative outcomes and seven of them for positive events. Not 
surprisingly, coaches' attributions are largely universal, saying little about their 
own peculiarities or uniqueness, and perfonners' attributions relatively more 
personal across all outcomes. This is largely a function of the focus of the 
outcomes: the athletes' perfonnances in training and competition. 
When considered in relation to agents, fewer differences occur with only one 
dyad's scores differing for both positive and negative outcomes. Both perfonners 
and, especially, coaches offer more attributions that indicate something personal 
rather than universal about the agent. The propensity for citing athletes as the 
agent may contribute to explaining this result; individual coaches and perfonners 
may tend to focus on the unusual or peculiar qualities of the perfonner rather than 
more generic contributory factors. The individual nature of the sport may 
contribute to this emphasis. 
Similarly, only in one dyad do universality (target) scores differ by more than 
20% for both positive and negative outcomes. For positive outcomes the tendency 
for coaches' scores to be more personal to the target than those of the perfonners 
may reflect the coaches' greater ability to contrast their perfonner's behaviours 
and responses to situations with those of other athletes and, hence, identify 
peculiarities, than that of perfonners. This may reflect a fonn of other-serving 
bias in that the coach may be attributing positive outcomes to unique or unusual 
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qualities of their athletes. This pattern and difference between coaches' and 
performers' scores is not apparent for negative outcomes. This, again, may help to 
protect the athlete (the most frequent target) in that negative performance is 
attributed to factors common across others athletes or circumstances. 
Summary of individual dyad data. Collectively, what does the above information 
say about the potential compatibility, or otherwise, of individual dyads? From 
Table 45 it is apparent that all dyads differ on a number of dimension scores, 
despite apparently effective, long-standing working relationships. It seems that 
these dyads are able to withstand differences in their respective attribution 
patterns. However, it is noted that the dyads in this study were more often similar 
in their attribution patterns. Future research will need to determine the relative 
significance of differences in specific attribution dimensions and their effects on 
the working relationships. 
It does appear that the saliency of the outcome may not be a critical factor in 
dimension score differences. Dyad members differ across a range of dimensions 
and outcomes. This reinforces the need for coaches to be aware that potential for 
incompatibility and, in extreme cases, conflict may be present following 
successes as well as relative failures. 
Key considerations 
With the consideration of the SAT perspectives it is no longer a case of simply 
comparing whether actors and observers offer attributions of similar dimensional 
qualities. One needs to take account of the agents and targets being selected by 
each speaker and consider certain dimensions (here, locus of causality, 
controllability and universality) from each of these perspectives. 
Another important question is the extent to which difference equals 
incompatibility, and whether, even when incompatible, conflict is likely to ensue. 
Whilst there are some dimensional differences in the current study, there is little 
in the group data presented to suggest likely incompatibility, either in the log data 
collection stage or that of the interviews. 
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Strengths and weaknesses a/this study 
The current study has allowed the attributions made by coaches and their 
perfonners to be collected from verbally communicated dialogue in an interview 
setting. Whilst it may be argued that this is not a natural setting, in that within 
interviews the focus was explicitly on causation, it has certain advantages over 
many ofthe more frequently used questionnaire designs: 
• The events for which attributions are made are real sporting events of 
significance to both the coach and perfonner. This allows meaningful actor-
observer differences to be studied. 
• The longitudinal nature of the study has allowed attributions to be collated 
across all phases ofthe training and competition programme. 
• The participants' own language (as recorded in the interviews) has been used; 
this allows for participants' emphases, in tenns of the number of times a 
cause-effect relation is cited and participants' own choice of words, to be 
reflected in the analyses. 
This approach has also stressed the importance of considering both the outcome 
saliency (although here identified from the contextual material by the researcher) 
and the attribution from the varied perspectives of speaker, agent and target and 
not, as has often been the case in the past, only from the perspective of the 
attributor. 
Interview analyses are based on placing attributions into the following categories: 
positive, neutral, or negative perceptions (coded by researcher), whereas log 
analyses are based on respondents' perceived success (on a 5-point scale), 
divided by the researcher into groups for those scoring 1 (totally satisfied) and 2-
5 (less than totally satisfied). Furthennore, whilst the log data represent 
composite scores for attributional statements that may contain a number of 
attributional elements and, hence, when averaged may give a dimension score 
which is neutral, i.e., numerically scores zero, the interview data represent scores 
for each discrete attribution (element) of either (Plus) one or zero on each 
dimension. Future research will need to develop a method of coding that both 
reflects the meanings and perceptions of the sample within the data-set and 
allows comparison with previous findings. 
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Where differences are evident between data collected through the logs and 
interviews, this may be due to the passage of time; that is, respondents' causal 
beliefs may change over the 3-4 week period preceding the interviews. 
Alternatively, the mode of data collection itself may have influenced the data and 
subsequent findings. The opportunity for free flow speech in the interviews, 
offering as it does a different and more familiar medium, may result in other 
causal factors being included in the causal statements made. Future research 
could use interview techniques, both immediately after events and during follow-
up data collection, to avoid potentially confounding the data. 
Summary 
In this chapter coach and performer attributions made in discourse (interviews) 
explaining real sporting events they experienced were contrasted with logbook 
attributions made by the same participants soon after these events. Key findings 
included the following. Where directly comparable, group data suggest that 
coaches' and performers' dimension scores are more similar than dissimilar. 
Where coach-performer differences occur, this may largely be accounted for by 
the differential recruitment of specific agents and targets. Specifically, whilst 
performers mainly focus on themselves as both agents and targets, coaches offer a 
wider range, including themselves, both as agents and targets, than do performers. 
In relation to stability, there appears a self-serving bias for both coaches and 
performers in both the log and interview data. Although coaches and performers 
offer attributions largely internal to the agent, performers' attributions are more 
internal to themselves following a poor performance. Especially in interviews, 
coaches and performers offer a surprisingly large percentage of uncontrollable 
causes, a phenomenon that may require further investigation. Although notable 
dimension differences are apparent in most individual dyads' data, these appear 
to be accommodated within the established relationships. Coach-performer, 
group-individual dyad, and logbook-interview differences suggest future 
researchers will have to be sensitive in their measurement of attributions. These 
results have been used to discuss a number of methodological issues relating to 
the LACS. The final chapter will consider the various findings of studies 1-3 and 
examine their implications for future research. In so doing, issues of method and, 
in particular, data collection and analysis, will be summarised. 
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Chapter 6. Discussion and Conclusions 
This chapter will draw together the key findings from studies 1-3 and evaluate the 
implications of these both for future research and practitioners. In order to 
achieve this, and discuss issues of method, a summary of key findings is shown in 
Table 47. 
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Key findings 
Table 47: Studies 1,2 & 3. 
What it sa s about: 
Actor-
Key findings: observer Self-/other- Rejeski's 
differences Compatibility serving biases model 
Study 1 
Participants: Coaches (n=18) 
Data collection: questionnaire 
eliciting attributions & emotions 
following events involving their 
performers 
• Coaches focussed on transient 
causes largely internal to the Little can be Possible 
athlete, unstable and often derived here implications 
uncontrollable by the athlete N/A NIA 
regarding self for when 
• Highly satisfied coaches tend to and other conflict may 
make stronger attributions than serving biases be most 
less satisfied ones damaging; 
• Less surprised coaches offer 
expected, 
stronger attributions than satisfying 
surprised ones events result 
• Large number of attribution-
in strongest 
emotion correlations >0.6, attributions, 
especially for less satisfied therefore, 
coaches and more surprised where 
coaches conflict 
exists, may 
be most 
serious 
under these 
conditions 
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Study 2 
Participants: Coaches (n=5) & Actor-
Performers (n=8) observer Self-/other- Rejeski's 
Data collection: log sheets differences Compatibility serving biases model 
eliciting cIose-to-event open 
response attributions for 'real' 
events 
• Attributions (coaches and Some Largely Mixed lnsider-
performers) largely internal to evidence of compatible in fmdings. outsider 
the athlete actor-observer this sample, Some differences 
• Significant differences found differences but some evidence of maybe 
between coach and performer (locus of evidence of opposite of especially 
groups on locus of causality and causality). potential self-serving relevant 
globality (coaches offer causes Perceived incompatib bias (re: locus even when 
relatively more external to the success and -ility on locus of causality) both dyad 
athlete and more global) importance of causality and self- members 
• Coaches' 'successful' outcomes may affect this and globality serving bias know each 
were more stable and universal difference. dimensions. (re: stability other well. 
than less successful ones The nature of and 
• Perfonners' 'successful' the sport and controllability) 
outcomes were less internal to the fact that for 
the athlete, more stable, most performers; 
controllable and specific than outcomes also evidence 
less successful ones were training of 
• Event importance affects events may sel£lperformer 
coaches' locus, stability, affect the -serving bias 
universality and globality universality for coaches 
scores ('important' events more scores. (re: stability). 
external to the athlete, stable, Again, task 
specific and universal); no such importance 
differences for performers may influence 
• Few differences on these trends 
controllability (esp. for 
• Both coaches and performers 
coaches). 
see events as largely universal; 
coaches select more universal 
attributions when important and 
successful 
• Coaches and especially 
performers tend to select 
specific causes; for performers 
especially when successful, for 
coaches especially when 
important 
• Successful, and especially 
important, events offer most 
potential for conflict (re: locus 
of causality) 
• Locus of causality appears to be 
the key dimension in terms of 
potential conflict 
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Study 3 
Participants: Coaches (n=5) & 
Performers (n=8) Actor-
Data collection: verbatim observer Self-/other- Rejeski's 
transcripts of interviews (3-4 differences Compatibility serving biases model 
weeks post event) concerning 
same events as Study 2, coded 
using the LACS 
Limited actor- Largely 
• Both groups select the athlete as It appears that Raises 
the primary agent and target observer compatible. dimension questions 
• Some difference in use of other differences in Some patterns are concerning 
agents and targets selection of dimension generally Rejeski's 
• Group stability scores agents and differences consistent model e.g., 
compatible and consistent with targets. across between log to what 
log data In relation to outcomes. At and interview extent can 
• Group globality scores 
dimension issue is data, contrary the coach-
compatible and consistent with scores, largely whether to Burger's performer 
log data similar. There differences (1986) relationship 
Locus (SAT) broadly is a need to equate to lack contention that be classed as • take into of self-serving one of actor-
compatible and consistent with 
account the compatibility. biases develop observer? log data perceived Raises the over time. Does 
• Control (speaker) generally success and question: Are attributional 
uncontrollable for both coaches importance. some conflict lead (esp. positive & negative dimension to stated 
outcomes) and performers Atthe differences of aftereffects? 
• Control (agent) evenly split for individual greater Under which 
both coaches and performers dyad level, significance to conditions 
• Control (target) generally some actor- intra-dyad does 
uncontrollable by target (esp. observer compatibility? attributional 
performers) differences conflict 
• Universality (speaker) scores across occur in the 
universal for coaches, evenly outcome coach-
distributed for performers categories. performer 
• Coaches and performers offer Compatibility relationship 
attributions personal to the differs by (mere 
agent dimension. differences 
• For negative and neutral Need to take may not 
outcomes coaches and account of result in 
performers agree on universal SAT to make 'conflict')? 
(target); coaches more personal sense oflocus 
and performers more universal of causality, 
for positive outcomes controllability 
• Differences in dyads' use of and 
agents and targets universality 
• All dyads have some dimension compatibility. 
differences, but no pattern 
• Fewest within-dyad differences 
from perspective of the agent 
• Least differences on control 
(agent) 
• Members of three dyads differ 
on stability for positive and 
negative outcomes 
• Members of dyads differ on 
locus of causality-speaker (7 
dyads) and locus of causality-
target (3 dyads) 
• Few coaches appear to perceive 
control (speaker or target) over 
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positive or negative outcomes 
• Few significant differences on 
universality (speaker and target) 
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Considering the findings sununarised in Table 47, a number of key themes will 
now be discussed and conclusions for future research and practitioners made. 
The contribution of attribution theory to understanding coach-performer 
relationships 
The coach-performer relationship has been studied from a number of diverse 
theoretical perspectives (e.g., Carron, 1978; Chelladurai, 1984). An 
understanding of the belief structures of these dyadic members (i.e., the way they 
explain significant events in their shared sporting lives) and the degree of 
compatibility within dyads seems pertinent to understanding these relationships. 
To date, research considering such an understanding has been very limited. 
Whilst attribution theory has considered the attributions made by sports 
performers (e.g., Santamaria & Furst, 1994; Biddle & Hill, 1992a), the methods 
used have been limited; such studies have not included the attributions made by 
performers' coaches. Given the significance of this relationship to performance 
(e.g., in terms of event and training planning, strategy development, team 
selection, performance goal-setting), this seems a considerable omission. A very 
limited number of attribution theories have been used to study participants in 
sport. Most research has drawn on the work of We in er and colleagues (e.g., Bird 
et aI., 1980; Biddle & Hill, 1992a, 1992b). Whilst Weiner's theories of attribution 
and affect (1979, 1985) were devised to explain the consequences of success and 
failure in achievement settings, it may prove valuable to explore attribution 
models for explaining interpersonal events. 
The current research, in line with suggestions made by previous researchers (e.g., 
Hanrahan, 1995; Stratton, 1991), has focussed on causal dimensions. That is, 
causal statements or elements within them have been coded according to their 
dimensional qualities and these have been considered in relation to affect (Study 
I) and interpersonal compatibility (Studies 2 & 3). However, the focus of 
previous research has been narrow, in part because of the tendency to consider a 
limited number of dimensions, but also because of often limiting the 
consideration of these dimensions to the perspective of the attribution maker'. It 
1 It is acknowledged that Russell (1982) and subsequently McAuley et al. (1992) considered 
'control' from the perspectives of the self and others. 
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would seem appropriate when considering interpersonal relations such as those 
between coaches and performers in sport settings to broaden this approach at least 
to encompass causal dimensions from the perspective of the dyadic partner and, 
arguably, others in the social setting. 
Attribution theory considers attributors to be naive psychologists, laypeople 
making attributions to better understand and control their worlds (Heider, 1958). 
Considering the coaching process, it could be argued that coaches are 
professional attributors, the very role requiring them to explain behaviour and 
control as many performance-related variables as possible in order to aid 
performance. It has been argued elsewhere that attributors utilise heuristics (Fiske 
& Taylor, 1984) and attempt to explain events within particular contexts (McGill, 
1989) in order to simplify the attribution-making process. Future research in 
sport, and in relation to potential coach-performer differences in particular, will 
need to explore which contextual backgrounds are selected and by what processes 
coaches and performers reach explanations for sport outcomes. 
Attribution-affect associations 
From the current studies it seems clear that coaches and performers undertake 
attributional activity following performers' sporting outcomes and that, in the 
case of coaches, these are associated with a number of emotions (see Study 1 and 
Biddle & Hill, 1992a). Whilst contemporary attribution research has moved 
beyond mere consideration of the objective outcome to embrace perceived 
success, it may be necessary to incorporate a more sensitive gradation of success. 
Evidence exists (e.g., Milech & Nesdale, 1984) that some previously found 
attribution-emotion associations may operate differentially according to level of 
individually perceived success. 
Milech and N esdale (1984) examined the associations between degrees of 
perceived success, affect and patterns of attribution by systematically varying the 
perceived success over five levels. They found that, whilst affect appeared to be 
related to degree of perceived success in a linear fashion and attributions for 
relatively unsuccessful outcomes (10, 30, 50 percent success) were similar, 
attributions made by successful subjects (70 to 90 percent) were quite distinct. 
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Whilst the current studies employed a median split to create relative perceived 
'successful' and 'less successful' groups, future studies wiII need to examine the 
perceptions of success more closely. It may also be necessary to consider the 
interaction of relative perceived success and task importance, since both may 
affect the attributions made, although this effect may not be uniform across actors 
(performers) and observers (coaches). 
The mechanisms by which attribution-emotion associations operate also needs 
further study. In doing so, researchers will need to consider whether the 
comments by Russell and McAuley (1986), that in real life situations attributions 
may be less influential in affect-making than previously proposed, are justified. 
Indeed, in terms of facilitating interventions to maintain effectively working 
coach-performer dyads, it may prove beneficial for researchers to consider where 
emphasis should be placed (e.g., on addressing attributional divergence or 
emotional divergence). 
Actor-observer differences 
In sport psychology most attribution research has operated at the intra-personal 
level (Biddle et aI., 2001). Little research has focussed at the interpersonal level 
and none, to the author's knowledge, at the inter-group or societal levels (Doise, 
1986). There is clear scope for further exploration of behaviour in sport, both in 
relation to competition (and training) outcomes and the dynamics of interpersonal 
interactions within sport enviromnents. 
For example, an issue of relevance to sport attribution style research is that it may 
operate not at the domain, but at a sub-domain, specific level. Thus, within the 
domain of sport, attributions for interpersonal relations may be of interest in 
addition to achievement attribution patterns. For example, Alloy, Abramson, 
Metalsky, and Hartlage (1988) have pointed out that for some learned helpless 
individuals the main concern may be in the interpersonal arena, not in 
achievement outcomes. Given the specific dynamics of sports teams and the 
public arena in which they operate, interpersonal relations and attributional 
(interpersonal) styles within sport may be worthy of future study. 
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Rejeski's model of attributional conflict 
Rejeski's (1979) model of attributional conflict in sport has been utilised in order 
to consider the conditions that may lead to attributional conflict and the 
subsequent consequences that may follow. Although this approach, based on 
Jones and Nisbett's (1972) divergent perspectives model, is not tested explicitly 
within the current research, a number of its propositions are considered here. 
Antecedents 
Rejeski's model of attributional divergence has a number of advantages as a 
framework within which to consider coach-performer attributions. It considers a 
number of antecedent conditions that may influence the likelihood of attributional 
divergence. These include individual differences, both perceptual and 
motivational, and situational factors, such as goal achievement and level of 
involvement. It should be noted that subsequent research has identified a number 
of individual differences variables that may need to be considered within such a 
framework, such as attributional style (Metalsky & Abramson, 1981; Hanrahan & 
Grove, 1990a), attributional complexity (Fletcher et aI., 1986) and individual 
differences in the selection of causal backgrounds (McGill, 1989). 
A useful area for future research is the exploration of conditions under which 
certain causal backgrounds are selected over alternatives. For this purpose it 
might be helpful to consider the distinction Hesslow (1983) makes between the 
types of comparisons available to the attributor: comparison of the to-be-
explained event with the statistically normal; comparison to the temporarily 
normal; comparison to the subjectively expected; comparison to the theoretical 
ideal; and comparison to the moral ideal. 
However, prior expectations held by coach and performer and their impact on the 
attribution-emotion relationship may also be of future research interest. For 
example, if an outcome is considered to be fair (by coach and/or performer), in 
the sense of being deserved, will causal analysis differ from analyses following 
similar outcomes felt unfair? Some recent research suggests that expectations and 
prior beliefs affect the influence of attributional analysis on subsequent emotions 
(Lupfer et aI., 1998). 
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The current research suggests that a number of qualifications may be necessary in 
order to utilise Rejeski's model for studying long-standing coach-performer 
relationships. The model, based as it is on the divergent perspectives theory of 
Jones and Nisbett (1972), has the performer assuming the role of actor and the 
coach that of observer. Subsequent research (e.g., Monson & Snyder, 1977; 
Luginbuhl & Bell, 1989) has suggested that the proposed conflict that may result 
from divergent attributions may be subject to a number of mediating factors. Of 
critical relevance in the current research is consideration of the extent to which 
the coach may be considered an observer; that is, the extent to which the role of 
coach affords the incumbent access to sport and performer experience not 
afforded other (passive) observers and the coach's influence on, and investment 
in, the performer's outcomes. 
Coaches in the current studies, like most coaches, had considerable pnor 
experience in the sport they coached. Furthermore, they had been coaching their 
respective athletes for some time. Given the focus on the individual that 
characterises track and field, it seems reasonable to assume that these coaches 
have considerable historical information regarding their performers and, with 
their prior experience, may well be able to empathise with some of their 
experiences in sport. Prior research has found that many actor-observer 
differences may be reversed when the observer is active, ego-involved and able to 
empathise with the actor (Brawley, 1984; Chen et aI., 1988; Luginbuhl & Bell, 
1989). Certainly, the current results indicate greater similarities in attributions 
than differences. This may, in part, be a function of the nature of the sport of 
track and field athletics and the closeness of these coach-performer relationships. 
Future studies will need to consider the specific nature of the relationship 
between coach and performer in a variety of sports and the opportunity these 
particular sports offer for direct coach involvement in performer outcomes (as 
well as the participants' perceptions of this). The coach may be considered an 
active observer (Ross & Sicoly, 1979; Brawley, 1984); therefore, some of Jones 
and Nisbett's (1972) and Bern's (1972) actor-observer differences may be less 
pertinent than suggested by Rejeski (1979). The research of Burger and Rodman 
(1983), who considered the perceptions of co-workers collaborating on a jointly 
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executed task, might be helpful in distinguishing features of the coach-perfonner 
relationship from those ofthe actor-observer. 
It would appear from the current research that attributional differences do exist 
within long-standing coach-perfonner dyads whose members appear, based on 
interview data, to work well together. Within such relationships the proposed 
mechanisms by which attributional divergence may occur need further 
consideration: it is suggested here that, whilst insider-outsider differences can be 
expected, intimate-stranger and self-other differences (Bern, 1972) may be less 
influential. Future research needs to explore these mechanisms in relation to long-
standing coach-perfonner relationships. 
One further consideration for future research is the potential influence of the 
speaker's and target's sex on attribution-making. Hansen and O'Leary's (1983) 
demonstration that attributors of both sexes rely more heavily on personal factors 
when explaining women's behaviour, and more heavily on situational factors 
when explaining the same behaviour of men across a range of behavioural action, 
highlights the need to consider sex as a possible mediator of the actor-observer 
difference. Although not considered in the present research, behavioural 
expectancy (Jones & McGillis, 1976) based on sex and its potential influence on 
attributions will need incorporating within future research designs. 
A variety of self- and other-serving biases within the attribution-making process 
has been suggested (Millar & Ross, 1975; Ross & Sicoly, 1979; Taylor & Doria, 
1981; Taylor et aI., 1983; Brawley, 1984). For example, research with sport 
participants has shown the existence of egocentric biases in.responsibility taking 
attributions in both coaches and perfonners (Brawley, 1984) and the presence of 
group-serving biases being associated with cohesion maintenance (Taylor et aI., 
1983). The present research offers mixed findings. Certainly, there appears little 
support for Burger's (1986) suggestion that the self-serving bias develops over 
time (from event). However, a large number of the outcomes in the current 
research pertain to training events. Therefore, it seems appropriate to explore this 
contention further in relation to real competitive events of some importance to the 
coach and perfonner. Furthennore, Millar and Ross's (1975) proposal that the 
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tendency to self-enhance is stronger than the tendency to self-protect may also 
need further consideration, especially in situations where outcomes may be 
related to future desired goals, such as selection or continuation of contract (in 
professional sports). If such a tendency is found to exist researchers will need to 
identify the mechanisms (motivational and/or informational) by which it operates 
and the extent to which it may be harmful to dyadic or group relations. Future 
research should also consider the extent to which coaches' attributions reflect 
self-serving versus performer-serving biases and the extent to which these may 
co-exist. 
Consequences 
Rejeski's model also attempts to explain how attributional conflict may impact on 
various affective, motivational and behavioural consequences, and their 
subsequent influence as future antecedents. What is not clear from the model is 
the relative contribution to interpersonal conflict of attributional divergence, as 
opposed to its various effects and aftereffects (e.g., differences in views on future 
training and competition behaviour, or differences in emotional reactions to 
outcomes). This may be of significance to those attempting conflict resolution or 
the development of group cohesion, i.e., the applied sport psychologist or team-
manager. The relative contribution of attributional differences per se, and the 
affective and behavioural consequences of them to potential interpersonal 
conflict, have been given little attention within the sport psychology literature. 
Potential for conflict and of attributional interventions 
Future research activity will need to explore the possible interventions that can 
serve to reduce any damaging effects of attributional divergence where it exists. 
The current findings indicate that positive outcomes may lead to more 
attributional differences than negative outcomes. Not considered directly in the 
current research, factors that may mediate or even nullify the effects of 
attributional divergence may need to be examined in future studies. For example, 
where effective and regular communication between coaches and performers 
exists, e.g., in discussing past events and jointly setting goals for future training 
and competition programmes, the effects of attributional differences may, less 
often, lead to detriments in the functioning of the relationship. There is, therefore, 
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a need to distinguish more clearly the terms and consequences of attributional 
divergence, attributional conflict, and the broader conflict brought about by, but 
not the only consequence of, differences in causal beliefs. 
However, despite Fosterling's (1985, p.509) claim that "it can be concluded ... 
that attribution retraining methods have been consistently successful in increasing 
persistence and performance", and findings of recent studies in physical activity 
settings appearing to support this claim (e.g., Sinnott & Biddle, 1998), the degree 
to which this approach might be effective in a naturally occurring environment, 
e.g., repeated failure in a sport, is less certain. There is a need to consider further 
the length of time over which outcomes (e.g., failures) occurs, the severity of this 
perceived failure, its perceived importance, the presence of public recognition of 
it and the involvement of others in the task. However, this is clearly an important 
issue highly relevant in an on-going coach-performer relationship, where both 
dyadic members may make dysfunctional attributions. 
Where considered, the emphasis of attribution training research in sport has been 
on the impact of attribution change on task performance, although Sinnott and 
Biddle (1998) did consider its effects on intrinsic motivation. Given the use of 
attribution training in interpersonal therapy settings (see Munton et aI., 1999, 
Chapter 3), it may prove a valuable framework for researching conflict III 
interpersonal relationships in sport (e.g., the coach-performer relationship). 
Whilst many studies using attribution theory suggest that negative outcomes, 
especially when unexpected and of importance to the attributor, offer the greatest 
potential for attributional activity (Weiner, 1985, 1986; Biddle and Hill, 1992a), it 
appears from the current findings that perceived positive outcomes may offer at 
least as much potential for attributional differences as perceived negative ones. 
Intuitively, one might expect the greatest application of cognitive interventions, 
such as attribution training, to occur following disappointing or negative 
outcomes. However, if the current findings are replicated in future studies, sports 
psychologists and coaches will need to be aware of the potential for attributional 
conflict following perceived success. 
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Coach-performer relationships in context 
As the dearth of research into the coach-performer relationship is addressed, 
researchers will need to be sensitive to those environmental and personal factors 
that impact upon it. For example, it has been suggested that individual agency is 
stressed in Western societies to a greater degree than in those of the East (Ybarra 
& Stephan, 1999). If this is the case, researchers considering attributions within 
the coach-performer relationship must be cognisant of the cultural context in 
which participants operate. This may be particularly important now that 
professional coaches and performers in sport move readily between countries and 
cultures. The study of attributions made by coaches and performers operating out 
of their cultural norm may prove particularly rewarding. 
Methodological considerations and limitations 
Limitations of previous approaches 
As already noted, little has been reported concerning the attributions made by 
significant others in sport (Biddle, 1993). Furthermore, there has been a tendency 
in sport psychology to adopt questionnaire approaches when exploring (mainly) 
performers' attributions (Biddle et aI., 2001). Despite the advantages of 
employing certain questionnaires in attribution research (e.g., Sport Attributional 
Style Scale; Hanrahan et aI., 1989; Causal Dimension Scale IT; McAuley et aI., 
1992), significant disadvantages include the forced nature of attribution 
elicitation and the detachment of attributions from their causal context, i.e., the 
participant responds to questions or settings which are of interest to the researcher 
and which are often hypothetical. Perhaps of most significance, the use of 
questionnaires implies that the participant reaches a causal conclusion III 
isolation, i.e., a "private cognition" (Munton et aI., 1999, p.30), and that the 
purpose of the questionnaire is to expose these conclusions to the researcher. 
Despite the use of interview techniques to explore attributions in clinical, 
therapeutic and market research settings, the use of interview methods for 
assessing attributions in sport has not been reported in the literature to this 
author's knowledge. Similarly, the use of discourse analysis appears unpublished 
in the sport and exercise attribution literature. 
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Participants 
The participants in the current studies were all coaches and performers (track and 
field only in Studies 2 & 3) working in well-established dyads. It may be that the 
nature of the sports (e.g., individual sport, objectively measured outcomes, and 
heavy emphasis on physical fitness for Studies 2 & 3) and the closeness of the 
existing relationships resulted in data quite different from that of studies 
incorporating other sports and relationships of different lengths and ways of 
working (e.g., regularity of contact, nature of training environment). Certainly, 
future coach-performer attribution studies should consider measuring the nature 
of the existing relationships of its participants using a variety of measures (e.g., 
interpersonal relations and need areas, Schutz, 1966; task and social coherence, 
Widmeyer, Brawley, & Carron, 1985). The nature of attributions elicited can then 
be set against such background information. 
Data collection: use of 'natural' discourse 
If one starts from the premise that reality is constructed by individuals within the 
social worlds they inhabit, then the purpose of research is to negotiate ways of 
understanding (Stratton, 1997). Grounded Theory requires that data processing be 
conducted in accordance with specifically defined procedures, with data selection 
and expression grounded by the data it portrays. Such an approach minimises the 
likelihood of data distortion. The value of this approach, therefore, is that it 
attempts to "build theory that is faithful to and illuminates the area under study" 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p.24), although Bryman (1988) suggests that what is 
produced is more akin to generating categories rather than theories per se. As 
such, this approach requires inductive processes in which the generation of rich 
data is crucial. Thus, this approach is usually associated with qualitative methods 
of data collection (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). 
The present research combines both questionnaire and interview data collection 
methods. The use of the log allowed coaches and performers to record 
attributions immediately after an event. This approach tended to produce multi-
causal explanations for the level of goal-achievement associated with events. 
However, this approach obviously relies on making written responses in the log. 
It may be argued that the use of this written medium potentially simplifies the 
Discussion and Conclusions 178 
explanations offered, in the sense of producing discrete causal statements as 
opposed to producing inter-linked causal elements more common in speech. The 
interviews, although utilising the medium of speech, were subject to a time delay, 
sometimes of several weeks. Future research should consider the use of video- or 
audio-diaries accompanied by appropriate generic guidance for participants to 
follow. The use of verbal speech in the collecting of immediate post-event diary 
data would have allowed the contrasts with subsequent interview data to be made 
with greater validity. 
Whilst conversational approaches to attribution research have been employed by 
some researchers in non-sports settings (e.g., Antaki & Naji, 1987; Hammer & 
Ruscher, 1997), and the conclusion drawn that conversation is an important 
source of attribution information (Burleson, 1986), there are also some notes of 
caution for the attribution researcher. Hewstone (1989), for example, notes that 
conversation is partially guided by conventions and that explanations to another 
can serve a number of functions. One should, therefore, be mindful that the 
spoken word might not necessarily reflect purely the causal thOUght behind it. 
However, Hammer and Ruscher (1997) provide an example of conversational 
analyses used in attribution research that may prove beneficial for future 
attribution researchers in sport. They considered the evocation of situationa1 and 
dispositional attributions in the context of unstructured dyadic conversations. 
Consideration was made of the recently developed stage models whereby 
dispositional explanations for actions are invoked first and correction for 
situational variables occur later, especially in the case of unexpected outcomes, 
which take up much cognitive energy. An interesting alternative model is one in 
which attributors develop causal chains or stories in order to deal with multiple 
causality (Lamb & Lalljee, 1992). Such models allow temporal sequencing of 
dispositional and situational factors that might affect subsequent outcomes. 
Hammer and Ruscher's study, unlike most before it, considers the inter-subject 
process of two attributors working together to explain an event and explores the 
processes shared by the attributors, e.g., using their partner to confirm the 
accuracy of their inferences (Ruscher & Hammer, 1994). The dependent variable 
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in this study was the discussion time allocation and a number of additional 
features between dyadic attributors were expected. For example, in dyads, time is 
spent asking questions of one's partner in order to take advantage of the other's 
cognitive processes, as well as to confirm one's own. Such questioning increases 
with the unexpectedness of the outcome (Ruscher & Hanuner, 1994). Secondly, 
freewheeling may occur, whereby one individual elaborates on the idea of 
another; this is especially likely to occur when the optimal explanation is not yet 
apparent (Hanuner & Ruscher, 1997). 
Results revealed dyads considering dispositionally unexpected outcomes 
spontaneously generated situational and narrative explanations. When receiving 
an unexpected outcome, dyads allocated more discussion time to situational 
factors, identified more original situational factors and constructed more narrative 
explanations than for expected outcomes. Through freewheeling and questioning, 
dyadic members were able to draw on each other's memories and inference 
patterns. Where an outcome was expected (based on prior information provided 
by the researcher), dispositional explanations often sufficed; where unexpected, 
situational factors were also considered. Furthermore, causal narratives emerged 
for unexpected outcomes. Multiple causal factors were incorporated into a causal 
explanation where a single cause proved inadequate, although the authors note 
the processes by which this occurs need further exploration. Furthermore, such a 
design may not mirror processes operating in purely naturalistic settings. 
This represents one of very few attempts at considering spontaneous attributions 
in a dyadic situation. Hanuner and Ruscher conclude with a call for further 
similar studies: "Clearly, it is time that we study naIve scientists as they converse 
with their colleagues" (1997, p.357). 
In the light of these recent developments in utilising alternative and 
complementary data collection methods in other psychology disciplines (e.g., 
interpersonal therapy), and the limitations of using questionnaire-only approaches 
to attribution research (Munton et aI., 1999), a number of authors (e.g., Biddle & 
Hanrahan, 1998) have called for a greater diversity of exploratory methods used 
in sport psychology. In sports environments, this has obvious advantages when 
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considering social settings, such as team meetings, coach-performer interactions, 
media interviews and post-event analysis. 
In the present research an attribution framework was adopted with both 
quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis methods used to explore 
coaches' and performers' attributions. Such an approach seems particularly 
germane when examining attributions made in interpersonal, natural settings. 
Stratton and colleagues' (Stratton et ai., 1988) development of the Leeds 
Attributional Coding System to expose causal beliefs within the context of 
qualitative raw material, whilst rendering the data open to quantitative analysis, 
has proved a valuable addition to the methods previously available. 
From undertaking the current research, the collection and analysis of interview 
data has had numerous benefits. For example: 
for the researcher: 
• contextual information can be noted and incorporated to enhance clarification 
and meaning 
• the approach allows emphasis to be dictated by the participant (interviewee) 
• it allows some contrast to be made with the attributions collected using 
questionnaires (log sheets) completed only a short time after the events 
for participants: 
• the research utilises a medium (verbal speech) with which they are familiar 
• interviews allow use oftheir own language style and a pace largely determined 
by them. 
However, such an approach is not without difficulties, for example: 
• consideration needs to be given to the surroundings in which interviews are 
conducted; whilst an enviromnent in which the participant feels comfortable is 
desirable, noise can cause interruptions and make transcribing difficult 
• data collection and analysis is time-consuming 
• care needs to be taken not to lead participants towards preconceived causes. 
This can be achieved by ensuring the use of generic prompts and open 
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questions, but primarily by allowing the interviewee to discuss the outcomes 
and their causes as they feel appropriate 
• there remains a problem of validity in relation to dimensions coding, e.g., the 
danger of making the fundamental attribution research error 
• the frequency of interviews, which in the present study was affected by 
distances involved in data collection and time available, can be a limiting 
factor. 
In addition to considering the methods for collecting attribution data, the 
selection, measurement and labelling of specific dimensions may need further 
consideration. For example, the often expressed view of the internal-external 
dimension operating in a hydraulic fashion needs clarification; some researchers 
(e.g., Elig & Frieze, 1979) have noted the potential use of two separate rating 
scales for this dimension. The potential to label incorrectly a statement as, for 
example, internal or external when it may reflect the opposite causal belief in the 
speaker remains a problem of natural discourse analysis. Whilst the development 
of the Causal Dimension Scale (Russell, 1982; McAuley et aI., 1992) has allowed 
respondents to dimension score their own responses and, hence, add to the 
validity of findings, no such checks were included in the interview design used in 
this study. It is possible that the researcher has unknowingly mis-represented the 
meanings implicit in the transcripts. Future studies will require methods that 
allow natural discourse to be coded and the meanings extrapolated from this 
coding checked by participants for accuracy. 
It may be that the timing of the attribution data collection is critical in the 
identification of attributional divergence. Some authors (e.g., Burger & Rodman, 
1983) have argued that patterns of attributions change over time-from-event. It is 
not possible to assess the effects on interview data of either the from-event time 
delay or the act of previously completing of the attribution log. In the present 
study there appears considerable similarity between log (near immediate post-
event) and interview (up to 4 weeks post-event) data. However, some differences 
are evident in dimension scores between individual coaches and performers when 
account is taken of the agents and targets employed in the interview data. Future 
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research designs will need to consider when attribution data are collected, 
perhaps using longitudinal studies to explore attribution patterns over time. 
Where differences over time appear in the present research, it is impossible to 
discern whether this is due to the passage of time per se or as a result of different 
modes of data collection (log and interviews). Future studies will need to 
consider also the effects of such differences over time on interpersonal relations. 
For example, is attributional divergence immediately following an event more or 
less significant to coach-performer compatibility than divergence some time later, 
after a period of reflection? This may have implications for the timing of 
cognitive interventions. 
Use o/technology 
It has been suggested previously that natural discourse provides an appropriate 
medium through which to assess causal beliefs. Methods of data collection in the 
present studies fail to ascertain the communication of attributional beliefs as 
conveyed in natural conversation between coach and performer. The challenge 
for future researchers is to devise methods that allow conversations occurring 
naturally in the training and competition environments to be recorded for 
subsequent analysis. Preliminary attempts by the author to record such discourse 
using portable microphones and recorders proved ineffectual. Modem technology 
may allow, after a period of participant desensitisation, natural dialogue before, 
during and after sports action to be recorded. This may ease the burden of 
recording pre-, during and post-event cognitions expressed in communication by 
allowing the more natural use of spoken language to replace written responses. 
Data analysis 
The studies contained within the current research have utilised methods both 
previously employed in sport psychology research and methods new to the field. 
The use of the LACS has allowed interview material to be quantified. This 
approach has enabled new sources of data to be explored. Important information 
has been gleaned concerning the agents and targets selected by individual coaches 
and performers when verbalising causal explanations. Furthermore, the 
dimensional qualities of causal statements have been assessed in relation not only 
to the speaker, but also in relation to the agent and target. It is this researcher's 
Discussion and Conclusions 183 
belief that such an approach is essential if the potential for attributional conflict is 
to be identified. 
With regard to contrasting log and interview data, in Study 2 log sheets require a 
response to a specific question of causation for each outcome. Hence, it is felt 
legitimate and appropriate to collapse causal elements' dimension scores, since 
each element relates to a specific and stated outcome. However, in Study 3, 
interviews are more open-ended, allowing respondents to discuss cause-effect 
relationships as they feel appropriate (although each interview relates to a 
specified set of perfonnance outcomes). Hence, each causal statement is treated 
in the analysis as a discrete set of dimension scores. 
A major argument for collecting attribution data relating to naturally occurring 
events and using methods more analogous to real life interactions is that it 
increases the validity of the findings. However, in the present research, 
attributions were coded by the researcher, albeit taking account of contextual 
infonnation contained within the text. Researchers using such approaches in the 
future will need to consider how to increase the confidence with which dimension 
coding is perfonned, vis-a-vis reflecting the speaker's causal beliefs. This may be 
possible by refining the interview methods or including post-interview dimension 
checks. 
Data at the group and individual dyad level 
Whilst the group data reported in the present studies are infonnative and allow 
group means to be contrasted, where conflict occurs it will be at the individual 
dyad level. Group data alone may mask differences in individual dyad 
compatibility. Individual dyads in the present research do appear to differ on a 
number of attribution dimensions, both for positive and negative outcomes. 
Future research may need to establish which specific dimension, if any, is most 
significant in tenns of attributional conflict. This may require the explicit study of 
dyads known to be experiencing conflict in tenns of their causal beliefs. 
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Conclusions 
The psychology of the coach-performer relationship is only partially understood. 
The present research has begun to address questions surrounding coach-performer 
attributional compatibility. It appears that attributions made by coaches are 
associated with their emotions and that these attributions, following sports 
outcomes involving their performers, may differ from those of their performers. 
However, these differences are not uniform across circumstances, e.g., such 
differences appear more likely following positive outcomes than negative ones. It 
is suggested that future studies utilise a range of qualitative and quantitative 
methods to understand better coaches' and performers' attributions for 
achievement and interpersonal outcomes. 
These findings, if supported by future studies, have implications for those 
attempting to maintain effective coach-performer relationships. Whilst stating the 
limitations of this research, the benefits of the methods used (and particularly the 
use of the LACS) have been highlighted. Furthermore, a number of suggestions 
have been made for future research in order to clarify the features of this 
relationship in sport. Corollaries to Rejeski's (1979) model of attributional 
conflict are made to assist this process. 
There remains much potential for researching the interpersonal relationships of 
coach-performer dyads, both within individual and tearn sports. 
References 185 
References 
Abramson, L.Y., Seligman, M.E.P., & Teasdale, J.D. (1978). Learned 
helplessness in humans: Critique and reformulation. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 87, 49-74. 
Alloy, L.B., Abramson, L.Y., Metalsky, G.!', & Hartlage, S. (1988). The 
hopelessness theory of depression: Attributional aspects. British Journal of 
Clinical Psychology, 27, 5-21. 
Alloy, L.B. & Tabachnik, N. (1984). Assessment of covariation by 
humans and animals: the joint influence of prior expectations and current 
situational information. Psychological Review, 91,112-149. 
Antaki, C. (1985). Attribution and evaluation in ordinary explanations of 
voting intention. British Journal of Social Psychology, 24,141-152. 
Antaki, C. & Naji, S. (1987). Events explained in conversational 
'because' statements. British Journal of Social Psychology, 26,119-126. 
Apter, MJ. (1982). The experience of motivation: The theory of 
psychological reversals. London: Academic Press. 
Bern, DJ. (1972). Self-perception theory. In Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in 
experimental social psychology Vol. 6 (pp.I-62). New York: Academic Press. 
Biddle, SJ.H. (1988). Methodological issues in researching of attribution-
emotion links in sport. International Journal of Sport Psychology, 19, 264-280. 
Biddle, SJ.H. (1993). Attribution research and sport psychology. In R.N. 
Singer, M. Murphey, & L.K. Tennant (Eds.), Handbook of research on sport 
psychology (pp.437-464). New York: Macmillan. 
Biddle, SJ.H. & Hanrahan, S. (1998). Attributions and attributional style. 
In J.L. Duda (Ed.), Advances in sport and exercise psychology measurement 
(pp.3-19). Morgantown, MV: Fitness Information Technology. 
Biddle, SJ.H., Hanrahan, SJ., & Sellars, C.N. (2001). Attributions: past, 
present and future. In R.N. Singer, H.A. Hausenblas, & C. Janelle (Eds.), The 
handbook of sport psychology (2nd ed.) (pp.444-471). New York: Wiley. 
Biddle, SJ.H. & Hill, A.B. (1988). Causal attributions and emotional 
reactions to outcome in a sporting contest. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 9, 213-223. 
References 186 
Biddle, SJ.H. & Hill, AB. (1992a). Attributions for objective outcome 
and subjective appraisal of performance: Their relationship with emotional 
reactions in sport. British Journal of Social Psychology, 31, 215-226. 
Biddle, SJ.H. & Hill, AB. (1992b). Relationships between attributions 
and emotions in a laboratory-based sporting contest. Journal of Sports Sciences, 
10,65-75. 
Bies, RI. (1987). The predicament of injustice: The management of moral 
outrage. In L.L. Cummings & B.M. Shaw (Eds.), Research in organisational 
behavior Vol. 9 (pp.289-319). London: IAl Press. 
Bird, AM. & Brame, I.M. (1978). Self versus team attributions: A test of 
the 'I'm OK, but the team's so-so' phenomenon. Research Quarterly, 49, 260-
268. 
Bird, A.M., Foster, C.D., & Maruyama, G. (1980). Convergent and 
incremental effects of cohesion on attributions for self and team. Journal of Sport 
Psychology, 2,181-194. 
Blass, T. & Kaplowitz, H. (1990). A longitudinal study of the actor-
observer attributional effect. Personality and Individual Differences, 11 (3), 259-
264. 
Bradbury, T.N. & Fincham, F.D. (1990). Assessing spontaneous 
attributions in marital interations: Methodological and conceptual considerations. 
Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, N/A. 
Brawley, L.R (1980). Children's causal attributions in a competitive 
sport: A motivational interpretation. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, The 
Pennsylvania State University, University Park. 
Brawley, L.R (1984). Unintentional egocentric biases in attributions. 
Journal of Sport Psychology, 6, 264-278. 
Bryman, A. (1988). Quality and quantity in social research. London: 
Unwin Hyman. 
Burger, I.M. (1986). Temporal effects on attributions: Actor and observer 
differences. Social Cognition, 4, 377-387. 
Burger, J.M. & Rodman, I.L. (1983). Attributions for responsibility for 
group tasks: the egocentric bias and the actor-observer difference. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 45 (6), 1232-1242. 
References 187 
Burleson, B.R. (1986). Attribution schemes and causal inferences in 
natural conversations. In D.G. Ellis & W.A. Donohue (Eds.), Contemporary 
issues in language and discourse processes. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum. 
Buss, A.R. (1978). Causes and reasons in attribution theory: a conceptual 
critique. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36,1311-1321. 
Campbell, J.D. (1986). Similarity and uniqueness: The effects of 
attribution type, relevance, and individual differences in self-esteem and 
depression. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 281-294. 
Carron, A.V. (1978). Role behavior and the coach-athlete interaction. 
International Review of Sport Sociology, 2, 92-98. 
Carron, A.V. & Bennett, B.B. (1977). Compatibility in the coach-athlete 
dyad. Research Quarterly, 48, 671-679. 
Carron, A.V. & Garvie, G.T. (1978). Compatibility and successful 
performance. Perceptual and Motor-skills, 46,1121-1122. 
Cates Zientek, C.E. & Breakwell, G.M. (1991). Attributional schema of 
players before and after knowledge of game outcome. Journal of Sport Behavior, 
14,211-222. 
Chelladurai, P. (1984). Leadership in sports. In J.M. Silva & R.S. 
Weinberg (Eds.), Psychological foundations of sport, (pp.329-339). Champaign, 
Illinois: Human Kinetics. 
Chelladurai, P. & Carron, A.V. (1983). Athletic maturity and preferred 
leadership. Journal of Sport Psychology,S, 371-380. 
Chelladurai, P. & Haggerty, T.R. (1978). A normative model of decision 
styles in coaching. Athletic Administrator, 13, 6-9. 
Challadurai, P., Haggerty, T.R., & Baxter, P.R. (1989). Decision style 
choices of university basketball coaches and players. Journal of Sport and 
Exercise Psychology, 11,201-215. 
Chelladurai, P. & Saleh, S.D. (1978). Preferred leadership in sports. 
Canadian Journal of Applied Sport Science, 3, 85-92. 
Chelladurai, P. & Saleh, S.D. (1980). Dimensions of leader behavior in 
sports: Development of a leadership scale. Journal of Sport Psychology, 2, 34-45. 
Chen, H., Yates, B.T., & McGinnies, E. (1988). Effects of involvement on 
observers' estimates on consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 14,468-478. 
References 188 
Covington, M.V. & Omelich, C.L. (1979). Are causal attributions causal? 
A path analysis of the cognitive model of achievement motivation. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 37,1487-1504. 
Crittenden, K.S. (1983). Sociological aspects of attribution. Annual 
Review of Sociology, 9, 425-246. 
Cross, N. & Lyle, J. (1999). The coaching process. Oxford: Butterworth-
Heinemann. 
Cunningham, J.D. & Kelley, H.H. (1975). Causal attributions for 
interpersonal events of varying magnitude. Journal of Personality, 43, 74-93. 
Cutrona, C.E., Russell, D., & Jones, R.D. (1985). Cross-situational 
consistency in causal attributions: Does attributional style exist? Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 47, 1043-1058. 
de Jong, P.F., Kooman, W., & Mellengergh, G.J. (1988). Structures for 
causes of success and failure: a multidimensional analysis of preference 
judgements. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 718-725. 
Diener, C.L & Dweck, C.S. (1978). An analysis of learned helplessness: 
Continuous changes in perfonnance, strategy and achievement cognitions 
following failure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36, 451-462. 
Doise, W. (1986). Levels of explanation in social psychology. 
CambridgelParis: Cambrideg University PresslMaison des Sciences de 
L'Homme. 
Dweck, C.S. & Goetz, T.E. (1978). Attributions and learned helplessness. 
In J.H. Harvey, W.J. Ickes, & R.F. Kidd (Eds.), New directions in attribution 
research (Vol. 2) (pp.157-179). Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Dweck, C.S., Davidson, W., Nelson, S., & Enna, B. (1978). Sex 
differences in learned helplessness: (II) The contingencies of evaluative feedback 
in the classroom and (Ill) An experimental analysis. Developmental Psychology, 
14,268-276. 
Elig, T.W. & Frieze, LH. (1979). Measuring causal attributions for 
success and failure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 621-634. 
Fairs, J.H. (1987). The coaching process: The essence of coaching. Sports 
Coach, July-September, 17-19. 
References 189 
Fiedler, K. (1982). Causal schemata: Review and criticism of research on 
a popular construct. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42, 1001-
1013. 
Fincham, F.D. (1985). Attributions in close relationships. In J.H. Harvey 
& G. Weary (Eds.), Attributions: Basic issues and applications. Orlando, Fla.: 
Academic Press. 
Fiske, S.T. & Taylor, S.E. (1984). Social cognition. New York: Random 
House. 
Fiske, S.T. & Taylor, S.E. (1991). Social cognition (2nd ed.). New York: 
McGraw-Hill. 
Fletcher, G.J.O. (1983). The analysis of verbal explanations for marital 
separation: Implications for attribution theory. Journal of Applied Social 
Psychology, 13,245-258. 
Fletcher, G.J.O., Danilovics, P., Femandez, G., Peterson, D., & Reeder, 
G.D. (1986). Attributional complexity: An individual differences measure. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 875-884. 
Forgas, J.P. (1998). On being happy and mistaken: Mood effects on the 
fundamental attributional error. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75 
(2), 318-331. 
Forsteriing, F. (1985). Attributional training: A review. Psychological 
Bulletin, 98, 495-512. 
Forsyth, D.R. & McMillan, J.H. (1981). Attributions, affect, and 
expectations: A test of Weiner's three-dimensional model. Journal of 
Educational Psychology, 73, 393-403. 
Funder, D.C. (1982). On the accuracy of dispositional vs. situational 
attributions. Social Cognition, 1, 205-222. 
Funder, D.C. (1987). Errors and mistakes: Evaluating the accuracy of 
social judgement. Psychological Bulletin, 101, 75-90. 
Gould, R. & Sigall, H. (1977). The effects of empathy and outcome on 
attribution: An examination of the divergent-perspectives hypothesis. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 13,480-491. 
References 190 
Grove, J.R., Hanrahan, S.J., & McInman, A. (1991). SuccesS/failure bias 
in attributions across involvement categories in sport. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 17, 93-97. 
Hamilton, D.L. & Shennan, S.J. (1996). Perceiving persons and groups. 
Psychological Review, 103,336-355. 
Hamilton, D.L. (1988). Causal attribution viewed from an infonnation 
processing perspective. In D. Bar-Tal & A.W. Kruglanski (Eds.), The social 
psychology of knowledge (pp. 359-385). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hammer, E.D. & Ruscher, J.B. (1997). Conversing dyads explain the 
unexpected: Narrative and situational explanations for unexpected outcomes. 
British Journal of Social Psychology, 36,347-359. 
Hanrahan, SJ. (1995). Attribution theory. In T. Morris & J. Summers 
(Eds.), Sport psychology (pp. 122-142). Brisbane: Wiley. 
Hanrahan, S.J. & Grove, J.R. (1990a). Further examination of the 
psychometric properties of the Sport Attributional Style Scale. Journal of Sport 
Behavior, 13, 183-193. 
Hanrahan, SJ. & Grove, J.R. (1990b?). Australian Journal of Science 
and Medicine in Sport, Dec. 1990,97-101. 
Hanrahan, S.J., Grove, J.R., & Hattie, J.A. (1989). Development of a 
questionnaire measure of sport-related attributional style. International Journal of 
Sport Psychology, 20, 114-134. 
Hansen, R.D. & O'Leary, V.E. (1983). Actresses and actors: The effects 
of sex on causal attributions. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 4, 209-230. 
Hardy, L. & Jones, G. (1992). Future directions for peiformance related 
research in sports psychology. London: The Sports Council. 
Harvey, J.H. (1987). Attributions in close relationships: Research and 
theoretical developments. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology,S, 420-434. 
Harvey, J.H., Yarkin, K.L., Lightner, J.M., & Town, J.P. (1980). 
Unsolicited interpretation and recall of interpersonal events. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 38, 551-568. 
Heider, F. (1944). Social perception and phenomenal causality. 
Psychological Review, 51, 358-374. 
References 191 
Heider, F. (1958). The psychology o/interpersonal relations. New York: 
John Wiley. 
Hesslow, G. (1983). Explaining differences and weighting causes. 
Theoria, 49, 87-111. 
Hewstone, M. (1989). Causal attribution: From cognitive processes to 
collective beliefs. Oxford: BlackweII. 
Hill, R (1975). Interpersonal compatibility and work group performance. 
Journal 0/ Applied Behavioral Sciences, 210-219. 
Hilton, DJ. (in press). Cited in Hewstone (1989, p. 117) op cif. 
Hirt, E.R, Erikson, G.A., & McDonald, H.E. (1993). Role of expectancy 
timing and outcome consistency in expectancy-guided retrieval. Journal 0/ 
Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 640-656. 
Home, T. & Carron, A.V. (1985). Compatibility in coach-athlete 
relationships. Journal o/Sport Psychology, 7,137-149. 
Johnson, L. & Biddle, SJ.H. (1988). Persistence after failure: An 
exploratory look at 'learned helplessness' in motor performance. British Journal 
o/Physical Education Research Supplement, 5, 7-10. 
Jones, E.E. & Davis, K.E. (1965). From acts to dispositions: The 
attribution process in person perception. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in 
experimental social psychology (Vol. 2). New York: Academic Press. 
Jones, E.E. & McGilIis, D. (1976). Correspondent inferences and the 
attribution cube: A comparitive reappraisal. In J.H. Harvey, W.J. Ickes & RF. 
Kidd (Eds.), New directions in attribution research (Vol. 1) (pp.389-420), 
HilIsdale, N.J.: ErIbaum. 
Jones, E.E. & Nisbett, RE. (1972). The actor and the observer: Divergent 
perceptions of the causes of behavior. In E.E. Jones, D. Kanouse, H.H. KeIIey, 
RE. Nesbitt, S. Valins, & B. Weiner (Eds.), Attribution: Perceiving the causes 0/ 
behavior (pp.79-94). New York: General Learning Press. 
Kassin, S.M. & Hochreich, D.J. (1977). Instructional set: A neglected 
variable in attribution research. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 3, 
620-623. 
References 192 
KeUey, H.H. (1967). Attribution theory in social psychology. In D. Levine 
(Ed.), Nebraska symposium on motivation (Vo!. 15) Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press. 
KeUey, H.H. (1972). Causal schemata and the attribution process. In E.E. 
Jones, D.E. Kanouse, H.H. KeUey, R.E. Nisbett, S. Valins, & B. Weiner (Eds.), 
Attribution: Perceiving the causes of behavior (pp.1-26). Morristown, NJ.: 
General Learning Press. 
KeUey, H.H. (1983). Perceived causal structures. In J.M.F. Jaspars, F.D. 
Fincham, & M. Hewstone (Eds.), Attribution theory and research: Conceptual, 
developmental and social dimensions (pp.343-369). London: Academic Press. 
KeUey, H.H. & Michela, J.L. (1980). Attribution theory and research. 
Annual Review of Psychology, 31, 457-501. 
Kerr, J.H. (1997). Motivation and emotion in sport: Reversal theory. 
Hove, U.K.: Psychology Press. 
Kimiecik, J.C. & Duda, J.1. (1985). Self-serving attributions in a 
competitive sport setting: Some theoretical and methodological considerations. 
Journal of Sport Behavior, 8 (2), 78-91. 
Kruglanski, A.W. (1975). The endogenous-exogenous partition In 
attribution theory. Psychological Review, 82, 387-406. 
LaUjee, M. (1981). Attribution theory and the analysis of explanations. In 
C. Antaki (Ed.), The psychology of ordinary explanations of social behaviour 
(pp.NI A). London: Academic Press. 
LaUjee, M., Watson, M., & White, P. (1982). Explanations, attributions, 
and the social context of unexpected behaviour. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 12, 17-29. 
LaUjee, M., Watson, M., & White, P. (1983). Some aspects of the 
explanations of young children. In J.M.F. Jaspars, F.D. Fincham, & M. Hewstone 
(Eds.), Attribution theory and research: Conceptual, developmental and social 
dimensions (pp. 165-192). London: Academic Press. 
Lamb, R. & LaUjee, M. (1992). The use of prototypical explanations in 
first- and third-person accounts. In M.L. McLaughlan, MJ. Cody & SJ. Read 
(Eds.), Explaining one's self to others: Reason giving in a social context. 
Hillsdale, NJ.: Erlbaum. 
References 193 
Landers, D.M. & Luschen, G. (1974). Team performance outcome and the 
cohesion of competitive coaching teams. International Journal of Sport 
Sociology, 9, 88-96. 
Lanning, W. (1979). Coach and athlete personality interaction: A critical 
variable in athlete success. Journal of Sport Psychology, 1,262-267. 
Lemer, MJ. (1980). The belief in a just world: A fundamental delusion. 
New York: Plenum. 
Luginbuhl, J. & Bell, A. (1989). Causal attributions by athletes: Role of 
ego-involvement. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 11, 399-407. 
Lupfer, M.B., Doan, K., & Houston, D.A. (1998). Explaining unfair and 
fair outcomes: The therapeutic value of attributional analysis. British Journal of 
Social Psychology, 37, 495-511. 
McArther, L.A. (1972). The how and what of why: Some determinants 
and consequences of causal attributions. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 22,171-193. 
McAuley, E. (1985). Success and causality in sport: The influence of 
perception. Journal of Sport Psychology, 7, 13-22. 
McAuley, E. & Duncan, T. (1989). Causal attributions and affective 
reactions to disconfirming outcomes in motor performance. Journal of Sport and 
Exercise Psychology, 11,187-200. 
McAuley, E., Duncan, T., & Russell, D. (1992). Measuring causal 
attributions: The revised Causal Dimension Scale (CDSII). Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 18, 566-573. 
McAuley, E., Russell, D., & Gross, J. (1983). Affective consequences of 
winning and losing: An attributional analysis. Journal of Sport Psychology,S, 
278-287. 
McFarland, C. & Ross, M. (1982). Impact of causal attributions on 
affective reactions to success and failure. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 43, 937-946. 
McGill, A.L. (1989). Context effects in judgements of causation. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 57 (2), 189-200. 
References 194 
McMillan, J.H. & Spratt, K.F. (1983). Achievement outcome, task 
importance, and effort as determinants of student affect. British Journal of 
Educational Psychology, 53, 24-31. 
Metalsky, G.!. & Abramson, L.Y. (1981). Attributional styles: Towards a 
framework for conceptualization and assessment. In P. KendeII & S. HoIlon 
(Eds.), Assessment strategies for cognitive-behavioral interventions (pp. NIA). 
New York: Academic Press. 
Meyer, J.P. (1980). Causal attribution for success and failure: A 
multivariate investigation of dimensionality, formation and consequences. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 38, 704-718. 
Milech, D. & Nesdale, A.R. (1984). The functional relationship between 
performance outcome and causal attribution. British Journal of Social 
Psychology, 23, 193-200. 
Millar, D.T. & Ross, M. (1975). Self-serving biases in the attribution of 
causality: Fact or fiction? Psychological Bulletin, 82, 213-225. 
Miller, D.T. & Norman, S.A. (1975). Actor-observer differences in 
perceptions of effective control. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
31,503-515. 
Miller, D.T. & Porter, C.A. (1980). Effects of temporal perspective on the 
attribution process. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4, 532-541. 
Monson, T.C. & Snyder, M. (1977). Actors, observers and the attribution 
process. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 13, 89-111. 
Moore, B.S., Sherrod, D.R., Liu, T.J., & Underwood, B. (1979). The 
dispositional shift of attribution over time. Journal of experimental Social 
Psychology, 15,553-569. 
Munton, A.G., Silvester, J., Stratton, P., & Hanks, H. (1999). Attributions 
in action: A practical approach to coding qualitative data. Chichester: WiIey. 
Newman, H.M. (1981). Communication within ongoing intimate 
relationships: An attributional perspective. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 7, 59-70. 
NichoIls, J.G. (1980). A re-examination of boys' and girls' causal 
attributions for success and failure based on New Zealand data. In L.J. Fyans 
(Ed.), Achievement motivation: Recent trends in theory and research (pp.266-
287). New York: Plenum. 
References 195 
Nisbett, RE. & Ross, L. (1980). Human inference: Strategies and 
shortcomings of social judgement. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. 
Nisbett, RE., Harvey, D., & Wilson, J. (1979). 'Epistemological' coding 
of the content of everyday social conversation. Unpublished manuscript, 
University of Mic hi gin. Cited in Antaki and Naji (1987). op cit 
Orbach, I., Singer, RN., & Murphey, M. (1997). Changing attributions 
with an attribution training technique related to basketball dribbling. The Sport 
Psychologist, 11,294-304. 
Orbach, I., Singer, RN., & Price, S. (1999). An attribution training 
program and achievement in sport. The Sport Psychologist, 13, 69-82. 
Osberg, T.M. & Shrauger, J.S. (1986). Retrospective versus prospective 
causal judgements of self and others' behavior. The Journal of Social Psychology, 
126 (2), 169-178. 
Pease, D.A., Locke, L.F., & Burlingame, M. (1971). Athletic exclusion: A 
complex phenomenon. Quest, June 1971, 42-47. 
Peterson, C. (1980). Memory and the 'dispositional shift'. Social 
Psychology Quarterly, 43, 372-380. 
Peterson, C., Semmel, A., von Baeyer, C., Abramson, L.Y., Metalsky, 
G.!', & Seligman, M.E.P. (1982). The Attributional Style Questionnaire. 
Cognitive Therapy & Research, 6, 287-300. 
Prapavessis, H. & Carron, A.V. (1988). Learned helplessness in sport. The 
Sport Psychologist, 2, 189-201. 
Regan, D.T. (1978). Attributiona1 aspects of interpersonal attraction. In 
J.H. Harvey, W.J. Ickes, & RF. Kidd (Eds.), New directions in attribution 
research (Vol. 2) (pp. 207-233). Hillsdale, NJ.:Erlbaum. 
Regan, D.T., Strauss, E., & Fazio, RH. (1974). Liking and the attribution 
process. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 10, 385-397. 
Reiss, M. & Taylor, J. (1984). Ego-involvement and attributions for 
success and failure in a field setting. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
10,536-543. 
Rejeski, W.J. & Brawley, L.R (1983). Attribution theory in sport: Current 
status and new perspectives. Journal of Sport Psychology, 5, 77-99. 
References 196 
Rejeski, W.1. (1979). A model of attributional conflict in sport. Journal of 
Sport Behavior, 2,156-166. 
Roberts, G.C. & Duda, J.1. (1984). Motivation in sport: The mediating 
role of perceived ability. Journal of Sport Psychology, 6, 312-324. 
Roberts, G.C. & Pascuzzi, D. (1979). Causal attributions in sport: Some 
theoretical implications. Journal of Sport Psychology, 1,203-211. 
Robinson, D.W. & Howe, B.1. (1987). Causal attribution and mood state 
relationships of soccer players in a sport achievement setting. Journal of Sport 
Behavior, 10, 137-146. 
Rosenbaum, 1.B. & Rosenbaum, W.B. (1971). Morale and productivity 
consequences of group leadership style, stress, and type of task. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 55, 343-388. 
Ross, 1. (1977). The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: 
Distortions in the attribution process. In 1. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in 
experimental social psychology (Vol. 10, pp.174-221). New York: Academic 
Press. 
Ross, 1. & Anderson, C. (1982). Shortcomings in the attribution process: 
On the origins and maintenance of erroneous social assessments. In D. 
Kahneman, P. Slovic, & A. Tversky (Eds.), Judgement under uncertainty: 
Heuristics and biases (pp.129-152). New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Ross, M. & Fletcher, G.1.O. (1985). Attribution and social perception. In 
G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (3rd ed., Vol. 2, 
pp.73-122). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Ross, M. & Sicoly, F. (1979). Egocentric biases in availability and 
attribution. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 322-336. 
Rothbart, M. & Park, B. (1986). On the confirmability and 
disconfirmability of trait concepts. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
50,131-142. 
Rotter, J.B. (1966). Generalized expectations for internal versus external 
control of reinforcement. Psychological Monographs, 80, (1, Whole number 
609). 
References 197 
Ruscher, J.B. & Hammer, E.D. (1994). Revising disrupted impressions 
through conversation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 530-
541. 
RusseIl, D. (1982). The Causal Dimension Scale: A measure of how 
individuals perceive causes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42, 
1137-1145. 
RusseIl, D. & McAuley, E. (1986). Causal attributions, causal dimensions, 
and affective reactions to success and failure. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 50, II 74-II85. 
Santamaria, V.L. & Furst, D.M. (1994). Distance runners' causal 
attributions for most successful and least successful races. Journal of Sport 
Behavior, 17, 43-51. 
Scanlon, T. & Passer, M. (1980). The attributional responses of young 
female athletes after winning, trying and losing. Research Quarterly for Exercise 
and Sport, 51, 675-684. 
Schutz, W.C. (1966). The interpersonal underworld (5th edition). Palo 
Alto: Science and Behavior Books. 
Seligman, M.E.P., Abramson, L.Y., Semmel, A., & vonBaeyer, C. (1979). 
Depressive attributional style. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 88, 242-247. 
Sinnott, K. & Biddle, S. (1998). Changes in attributions, perceptions of 
success and intrinsic motivation after attribution retraining in children's sport. 
International Journal of Adolescence and Youth, 7, 137-144. 
Snyder, M. (1974). The self-monitoring of expressive behavior. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 30, 526-537. 
Sousa, E. & Leyens, J-P. (1987). A priori versus spontaneous models of 
attribution: The case of gender and achievement. British Journal of Social 
Psychology, 26, 281-292. 
Spink, K.S. & Roberts, G.C. (1980). Ambiguity of outcome and causal 
attributions. Journal of Sport Psychology, 2, 237-244. 
Stephan, W.G. (1977). Stereotyping: Role of ingroup-outgroup 
differences in causal attribution of behaviour. Journal of Social Psychology, 101, 
255-266. 
References 198 
Stratton, P. (1991). Attributions, baseball and consumer behaviour. 
Journal of Market Research Society, 33 (3), 163-178. 
Stratton, P. (1992). Selling constructivism to market research. Human 
Systems: The Journal ofSytematic Consultation & Management, 3, 253-273. 
Stratton, P. (1997). Attributional coding of interview data: Meeting the 
needs of long-haul passengers. In N. Hayes (Ed.), Doing qualitative analysis in 
psychology. Hove, UK.: Psychology Press. 
Stratton, P., Munton, AG., Hanks, H., Heard, D.H., & Davidson, C. 
(1988). Leeds Attributional Coding System (LACS) Manual. Leeds: LFTRC. 
Stratton, P., Heard, H.G.I., Munton, AG., Brewin, C.R., & Davidson, C. 
(1986). Coding causal beliefs in natural discourse. British Journal of Social 
Psychology, 25, 299-313. 
Strauss, A & Corbin, J. (1990). Basics of qualitative research: Grounded 
theory procedures and techniques. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage. 
Strickland, B.R. (1988). Internal-external expectancies and health-related 
behaviors. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 46, 1192-1211. 
Susskind, J., Thakkar, V., Hamilton, D.L., Maurer, K., & Sherman, J.W. 
(1999). Perceiving individuals and groups: Expectancies, dispositional inferences, 
and causal attributions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76 (2), 
181-191. 
Taylor, D.M. & Doria, J.R. (1981). Self-serving and group-serving bias in 
attribution. Journal of Social Psychology, 113,201-211. 
Taylor, S.E. & Fiske, S.T. (1975). Point of view and perceptions of 
causality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32, 439-445. 
Taylor, D.M. & Jaggi, V. (1974). Ethnocentrism in a South Indian 
context. Journal of Cross-cultural Psychology, 5, 162-172. 
Taylor, D.M., Doria, 1., & Tyler, J.K. (1983). Group performance and 
cohesiveness: An attribution analysis. Journal of Social Psychology, 119, 187-
198. 
Tenenbaum, G. & Furst, D.M. (1986). Consistency of attributional 
responses by individuals and groups differing in gender, perceived ability and 
expectations for success. British Journal of Social Psychology, 25, 315-321. 
References 199 
Tenenbaum, G., Furst, D., & Weingarten, G. (1984). Attribution of 
causality in sports events: Validation of the Wingate Sport Achievement 
Responsibility Scale. Journal of Sport Psychology, 6, 430-439. 
Tetiock, P.E. (1983). Accountability and complexity of thought. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 45, 74-83. 
Tillman, W.S. & Carver, C.S. (1980). Actors' and observers' attributions 
for success and failure: A comparative test of the predictions from Kelley's cube, 
self-serving bias, and positivity bias formulations. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 16, 18-32. 
Unger, RK. (1979). Female and male. New York: Harper & Row. 
Vallerand, RI. (1987). Antecedents of self-related affects in sport: 
Preliminary evidence on the intuitive-reflective appraisal model. Journal of Sport 
Psychology, 9,161-182. 
Vallerand, RI. & Blanchard, C.M. (2000). The study of emotion in sport 
and exercise: Historical, definitional, and conceptual perspectives. In Y.L. Hanin 
(Ed.), Emotions in sport (pp.3-37). Champaign, 11: Human Kinetics. 
Vlachopoulos, S., Biddle, S., & Fox, K. (1996). A social-cognitive 
investigation into the mechanisms of affect generation in children's physical 
activity. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 18, 174-193. 
Vonk, R. & Van Knippenberg, A. (1994). The sovereignty of negative 
inferences: Suspicion of ulterior motives does not reduce the negativity effect. 
Social Cognition, 12, 169-186. 
Walster, E., Walster, GW., & Berscheid, E. (1978). Equity: Theory and 
research. Boston: Allyn Bacon. 
Watson, D. (1982). The actor and the observer: How are their perceptions 
of causality divergent? Psychological Bulletin, 104,23-35. 
Weiner, B. (1971). Perceiving the causes of successes and failures. 
Morristown, NI: General Learning Press. 
Weiner, B. (1974). Achievement motivation and attribution theory. 
Morristown, NI: General Learning Press. 
Weiner, B. (1979). A theory of motivation for some classroom 
experiences. Journal of Educational Psychology, 71, 3-25. 
Weiner, B. (1983). Some methodological pitfalls in attribution research. 
Journal of Educational Psychology, 75,530-543. 
References 200 
Weiner, B. (1985). An attributional model of achievement motivation and 
emotion. Psychological Review, 92 (4),548-573. 
Weiner, B. (1986). An attributional theory of motivation and emotion. 
New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Weiner, B. (1992). Human motivation: Metaphors, theories, and 
research. Newbury Park, CA.: Sage. 
Weiner, B., Frieze, I., Kukla, A., Reed, 1., Rest, S., & Rosembaum, RM. 
(1971). Perceiving the causes of success and failure. Morristown, NJ: General 
Learning Press. 
Weiner, B., Russell, D., & Lennan, D. (1978). Affective consequences of 
causal ascriptions. In J.H. Harvey, WJ. Ickes, & RF. Kidd (Eds.), New directions 
in attribution research (Vol. 2) (pp.59-90). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Widmeyer, W.N., Brawley, L.R., & Carron, AV. (1985). The 
measurement of cohesion in sport teams: The group environment questionnaire. 
London, Ontario: Sports Dynamics. 
Wong, P.T. & Weiner, B. (1981). When people ask 'why' questions and 
the heuristics of attributional search. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 40, 650-663. 
Ybarra, O. & Stephan, W.G. (1999). Attributional orientations and the 
prediction of behavior: The attribution-prediction bias. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 76, 718-727. 
Zuckennan, M. (1979). Attribution of success and failure revisted, or: The 
motivational bias is alive and well in attribution theory. Journal of Personality, 
47,245-287. 
Zuckennan, M. & Evans, S. (1984). A schematic approach to attributional 
processing of actions and occurrences. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 47, 469-494. 
Appendix 1 201 
Appendix 1 
The Sports Coach Questionnaire 
SPORTS COACH OUESTIONNAIRE 
The following questionnaire fonns part of an investigation into perceptions in sport. 
All the infonnation is collected in confidence; there is no need for you to put your 
name or that of your perfonner on the questionnaire. 
Please take the questionnaire away and complete it immediately after the next 
competition you attend in which your performer takes part. 
If your sport is a team sport, please answer the questions in relation to the team (the 
team's perfonnance etc.) rather than the individuals within it. 
Thank you for co-operating in this project. 
Please circle as appropriate: 
Age (years) 31-40 41-50 51-60 Above 60 
Male Female 
Is your sport a: Team sport Individual sport 
What is your sport? 
For this sporting event, please circle the appropriate number: 
Importance of winning: 
Very important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at all 
Important 
Importance of perfOrming well: 
Very important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not at all 
Important 
Please answer all ofthe following questions immediately after the event; do so by 
ringing the number that most accurately describes your current feelings: 
How pleased are you? 
Pleased 5 4 3 2 I Displeased 
How satisfied are you? 
Satisfied 5 4 3 2 I Dissatisfied 
How happy are you? 
Happy 5 4 3 2 I Unhappy 
How contented are you? 
Contented 5 4 3 2 I Discontented 
How competent do you feel? 
Competent 5 4 3 2 I Incompetent 
How good do you feel? 
Good 5 4 3 2 I Bad 
How confident do you feel? 
Confident 5 4 3 2 I Unconfident 
How proud do you feel? 
Proud 5 4 3 2 I Shameful 
How relaxed are you? 
Relaxed 5 4 3 2 I Tense 
How concerned do you feel? 
Unconcerned 5 4 3 2 1 Concerned 
Do you feel: 
Elated? 5 4 3 2 1 Depressed? 
Do you feel: 
A sense of 5 4 3 2 1 A sense of 
achievement? frustration? 
Do you feel: 
Calm? 5 4 3 2 1 Angry? 
For each of the following: 1= 'Not at all'; 5= 'Very much' 
How surprised are you? 1 2 3 4 5 
How disappointed are you? 1 2 3 4 5 
How guilty do you feel? 1 2 3 4 5 
Please also indicate your degree of satisfaction with: 
Your performer's standard of performance (that is, the way slhe played/performed) 
Satisfied 1 2 3 4 5 6 Dissatisfied 
2.D4 
There follows a list of possible explanations for both the outcome of this competition 
and the way the performer(s) performed. Please rate each ofthese for the competition 
you have just observed. 
Was the outcome due to: 
Luck 
Ability 
Effort 
Mood 
Fitness 
Previous 
experience 
Very much 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Motivation 5 
Personality 5 
Form 5 
Opponent's effort 5 
Opponent's ability 5 
Opponent's factors 5 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Not at all 
3 2 1 
3 2 1 
3 2 1 
3 2 1 
3 2 1 
3 2 1 
3 2 1 
3 2 1 
3 2 1 
3 2 1 
3 2 1 
3 2 1 
205 
Was the performance due to: 
Luck 
Ability 
Effort 
Mood 
Fitness 
Previous 
experience 
Very much 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Motivation 5 
Personality 5 
Form 5 
Opponent's effort 5 
Opponent's ability 5 
Opponent's factors 5 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Not at all 
3 2 1 
3 2 1 
3 2 1 
3 2 1 
3 2 1 
3 2 1 
3 2 1 
3 2 1 
3 2 1 
3 2 1 
3 2 1 
3 2 1 
That completes the questionnaire. Thank you for your assistance. 
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Appendix 2 
Log sheet 
RECORD SHEET 
PERFORMER'S NAME: 
To complete BEFORE the session/competition: 
Date: 
Activity: 
What is the main goaV 
obj ecti ve for this event? 
How important to YOU is the session or competition? 
(Please circle only one) 
Very important 1 2 3 4 
To complete AFTER the session/competition: 
5 
How successful was the activity (in relation to the goal identified)? 
(please circle only one) 
Total success 1 2 3 4 
Please give YOUR explanation for this degree of success: 
(i.e., the cause ofthis success/failure) 
Please add any other relevant comments overleaf 
5 
Not important 
Failure 
2.o~ 
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Differences in individual dyad members' dimension scores 
Differences in individual dyad members' dimension scores 
Table 48 ClIPll 
Dimension C=I, P=2 Mean t df p 
Locus of 1 0.84 1.32 46 0.19 
causality 2 0.35 
Stability 1 0.44 0.87 46 0.39 
2 0.00 
Controll. 1 -0.20 0.32 46 0.75 
2 -0.35 
Universality 1 0.36 0.03 46 0.98 
2 0.35 
Globality 1 -0.20 0.71 46 0.75 
2 -0.52 
Table 49 CIIP12 
Dimension C=I,P=2 Mean t df j> 
Locus of 1 0.94 -0.21 42 0.83 
causality 2 1.00 
Stability 1 0.94 0.88 42 0.39 
2 0.62 
Controll. 1 O.j6 0.50 42 0.62 
2 0.38 
Universality 1 0.39 0.90 42 0.38 
2 0.08 
Globality 1 -0.06 0.41 42 0.69 
2 -0.23 
Table 50 C2/P21 
Dimension C-l, P=2 Mean t df p 
Locus of 1 1.10 0.31 54 0.76 
causality 2 1.00 
Stability 1 0.43 2.02 54 <0.05 
2 -0.31 
Controll. 1 -0.77 -0.43 54 0.67 
2 -0.62 
Universality 1 0.10 -1.76 55 0.09 
2 0.70 
Globality 1 0.03 1.70 55 0.10 
2 -0.63 
QIO 
'. 
Table 51 C31P31 
Dimension C=I,P=2 Mean t df p 
Locus of 1 0.29 0.34 114 0.73 
causality 2 0.21 
Stability 1 -0.19 -1.11 114 0.27 
2 0.14 
Controll. 1 0.12 0.26 114 0.79 
2 0.05 
Universality 1 0.84 -0.63 114 0.53 
2 1.00 
Globality 1 -1.14 1.55 114 0.13 
2 -1.45 
Table 52 C31P32 
Dimension C=I, P=2 Mean t df p 
Locus of 1 -1.00 -6.69 78 <0.01 
causality_ 2 1.03 
Stability 1 0.48 -1.32 78 0.19 
2 0.93 
Controll. 1 -0.93 -1.51 78 0.14 
2 -0.43 
Universality 1 1.53 0.85 78 0.25 
2 1.28 
Globality 1 -1.55 -0.40 78 0.69 
2 -1.43 
Table 53 C41P41 
Dimension C=I, P=2 Mean t df p-
Locus of 1 -0.48 -2.13 40 <0.05 
causality 2 0.38 
Stability 1 -0.48 1.97 40 0.06 
2 -1.24 
Controll. 1 -0.57 0.48 40 0.63 
2 -0.76 
Universality 1 0.92 0.61 32 0.55 
2 0.67 
Globality 1 -0.75 1.02 31 0.31 
2 -1.14 
Table 54 C4/P42 
Dimension C=I, P=2 Mean t df P 
Locus of 1 0.48 1.33 54 0.19 
causality 2 0.14 
Stability 1 -0..19 1.96 54 0.06 
2 -0.69 
Control!. 1 -0.04 0.36 54 0.72 
2 -0.14 
Universality 1 -0.04 -0.71 51 0.48 
2 0.18 
Globality 1 0.04 3.19 51 <0.01 
2 -0.82 
Table 55 C51P51 
Dimension C-l, P=2 Mean t df p 
Locus of 1 0.53 -4.86 101 <0.01 
causality 2 1.48 
Stability 1 -0.75 1.72 101 0.09 
2 -1.19 
Control1. 1 0.20 4.12 101 <0.01 
2 -0.85 
Universality 1 0.12 -2.59 101 <0.05 
2 0.79 
Globality 1 -1.21 1.44 101 0.15 
2 -1.52 
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Spearman's Rank Order Correlation Coefficients 
for dyadic compatibility scores 
Tables 56-63: Speannan's Rank Order Correlation Coefficients for dyadic 
compatibility scores Cr' values shown in tables) 
Table 56 
Cl/PH Locus of Stability ControIl- Universality 
causality ability 
Locus of 
- 0.21 0.51* 0.05 
causalitv 
Stability 
- 0.34 0.37 
ControIl-
- 0.09 
ability 
Universality 
-
Globality 
Table 57 
C1.l/P12 Locus of Stability ControIl- Universality 
causality ability 
Locus of 
- 0.39 0.41 0.50 
causality 
Stability 
- 0.58* -0.14 
ControIl-
- -0.13 
ability . 
Universality 
-
Globality 
Table 58 
C21P21 Locus of Stability ControIl- Universality 
causality ability 
Locns of 
- 0.36 0.41 * 0.44* 
causalit:\' 
Stability 
- -0.00 0.22 
ControIl-
- 0.35 
ability 
Universality 
-
Globality 
Table 59 
C3/P31 Locus of Stability ControIl- Universality 
causality ability 
Locus of 
- 0.20 0.66** 0.04 
causalitv 
Stability 
- 0.16 -0.Q4 
ControIl-
- 0.14 
ability 
Universality 
-
Globality 
Globality 
0.51 * 
0.26 
0.34 
0.31 
-
Globality 
0.37 
0.19 
0.26 
0.21 
-
Globality 
0.50 
0.15 
0.36 
0.16 
-
Globality 
0.07 
0.31* 
0.10 
0.31* 
-
Table 60 
C3.lIP32 Locus of Stability Controll- Universality Globality 
causalit~ ability 
Locus of 
- 0.16 0.24 -0.42** 0.15 
causality 
Stability 
-
-0.03 0.05 0.00 
Controll-
- -0.06 0.28 
ability 
Universality 
-
0.17 
Globality 
-
Table 61 
C4/P4I Locus of Stability Controll- Universality Globality 
causalitv ability 
Locus of 
- 0.20 0.41 0.33 0.63 
causality 
Stability 
- 0.30 0.35 0,03 
Controll-
- 0.73* 0,03 
ability 
Universality 
-
-0.08 
Globality 
-
Table 62 
C4.lIP42 Locus of Stability Controll- Universality Globality 
causality ability 
Locus of 
- -0.13 0.65** 0.44 0.18 
causality 
Stability 
- -0.24 -0.25 0.12 
Controll-
- 0.36 0.12 
ability 
Universality 
- 0.26 
GlobaIity 
-
Table 63 
CS/PSI Locus of Stability Controll- Universality Globality 
causali~ ability 
Locus of 
- 0.06 -0.07 0.11 -0.20 
causality 
Stability 
- -0.10 0.32* 0.01 
Controll-
- 0.12 0.08 
ability 
Universality 
- -0.01 
Globality 
-
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Dimension compatibility t-tests 
Table 64 
Dimension 
compatibility 
Locus of 
causality 
Stability 
ControIl. 
Universality 
Globality 
Aggregate 
compat. 
Table 65 
Dimension 
compatibility 
Locus of 
causality 
Stability 
Controll. 
Universality 
Globality 
Aggregate 
compat. 
Dimension compatibility for high (success<2.00) and low 
(success>=2.00) success groups 
Success 
value Mean t df 
>=2.00 1.13 -2.56 244 
<2.00 1.50 
>=2.00 1.19 -0.08 244 
<2.00 1.21 
>-2.00 1.28 -0.20 244 
<2.00 1.31 
>=2.00 1.33 0.25 234 
<2.00 1.29 
>=2.00 1.27 1.32 235 
<2.00 1.06 
>=2.00 6.51 1.81 247 
<2.00 5.76 
Dimension compatibility for high (importance =1.00) and low 
(importance> 1.00) importance groups 
hnportance 
value Mean t df 
>1.00 1.17 -1.98 244 
=1.00 1.46 
>1.00 1.20 -0.15 244 
=1.00 1.22 
>1.00 1.29 -0.23 244 
=1.00 1.33 
>1.00 1.40 0.99 233 
=1.00 1.25 
>1.00 1.23 0.27 233 
=1.00 1.18 
>1.00 6.41 0.97 244 
=1.00 6.01 
p 
<0.05 
0.94 
0.84 
0.81 
0.19 
0.72 
P 
<0.05 
0.88 
0.82 
0.32 
0.79 
0.33 
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Dimension compatibility graphs 
a figures : 
b figures: 
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Appendix 7 
The LACS coding template 
LA sed' I C o 109 temp! ate 
1 Attribution number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
2 Speaker 
3 Agent 
4 Target 
5 Stable (1). Unstable (0) 
6 GlobaI(I), Specific (0) 
7 Internal (I), External (0) [speaker] 
8 Internal (1) , External (0) agent] 
9 Internal (11, External (0 ta\Retl 
10 Personal (1), Universal ( 0) speaker] 
11 Personal (1), Universal (0) agent] 
12 Personal (I), Universal (0) [target] 
13 Controllable (I , Uncontrollable speaker] 
14 Controllable (1 , Uncontrollable agent] 
15 Controllable (I , Uncontrollable target] 
1 Attribution number 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
2 Speaker 
3 Agent 
4 Target 
5 Stable (I), Unstable (0) 
6 Global (1), Specific (0) 
7 Internal (11, ExternalJO). (sj>eakerl 
8 Internal (1), External (0) [agent] 
9 Internal (1), External (0) target] 
10 Personal (1), Universal (0) speaker] 
11 Personal (I), Universal (0) agent] 
12 Personal (1), Universal (0) target] 
13 Controllable (I), Uncontrollable speaker] 
14 Controllable (I), Uncontrollable [agent] 
15 ControllableJ1), Uncontrollable target] 
1 Attribution number 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
2 Speaker 
3 Agent 
4 Target 
5 Stable (1), Unstable (0) 
6 Global (I), Specific (0) 
7 Internal (1 ,External (0) speakerl 
8 Internal (I , External 0) agent] 
9 Internal (I ,External ( 0) target] 
10 Personal (1), Universal (02 speaker]. 
11 Personal (I), Universal (0) agent] 
12 Personal (1), Universal (0) targetl 
13 Controllable (I), Uncontrollable speaker] 
14 Controllable (I), Uncontrollable agent] 
15 Controllable (I), Uncontrollable targetl 
2bo 
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Appendix 8 
Descriptive data (group) 
Descriptive data for all attributions and those made by coach and performer 
groups 
Table 66 shows the frequency of attributions made by coaches and perfonners and 
by each group per interview. 
T bl 66 F a e : f tt 'b f requencles 0 a n u Ions 
Total number of attributions madel 
Mean number of attributions made per interview . 
Coaches 8151 
23.8 
Performers 7471 
17.8 
Table 67 shows the saliency ofthe outcomes contained within attributions. 
T bl 67 S r a e : a lency 0 f 'b . attn utlOns 
Saliency Coaches' Performers' 
(outcome) All attributions attributions attributions 
% % 0/0 
Positive 40.6 39.3 42.2 
Negative 31.2 30.9 31.5 
Neutral 28.2 29.8 26.3 
Table 68 shows the percentage of attributions containing expressions of emotion. 
Table 68' Emotional content ,
All attributions Coaches' Performers' 
Emotion % attributions attributions 
% % 
Positive 8.9 4.9 13.5 
Negative 4.2 2.5 6.2 
No emotion 86.9 92.6 80.3 
Table 69 shows the percentage of attributions in which the outcome relates to 
specific or general (sporting) events. 
Table 69: Nature of the outcome 
Nature of outcome All attributions Coaches' Performers' 
% attributions attributions 
% % 
Relates to specific 57.6 52.5 63.5 
event 
Non-specific event 42.3 47.5 36.3 
Default 0.1 0.0 0.3 
Table 70 shows the percentage of attributions making reference to the speaker's 
dyadic partner. 
T bI 70 R 1< a e : e erence t d d' t o lya lC par ner 
Reference to All attributions Coaches' Performers' 
partner? % attributions attributions 
% % 
Yes 44.7 79.7 3.9 
No 55.5 20.0 96.1 
Default 0.1 0.2 0.0 
Table 71 shows where in the annual training cycle attributions were coIlected. 
Table 71' Time of season in which attributions made . . 
Time of season All attributions Coaches' Performers' 
% attributions attributions 
% % 
Training phase 66.2 62.7 70.2 
Early competitive 10.0 7.8 12.5 
Main competitive 23.9 29.5 17.3 
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Appendix 9 
Descriptive data (individual dyad datal 
Descriptive data for individual dyads' interview transcripts 
Individual dyads results 
In the following tables, descriptive data are presented for each dyad, allowing contrast 
between individual dyad members' scores. 
Profile: C1.0/Pll 
T bl 72 S r a e . a lency . 
Saliency C1.0 Attributions % Pll Attributions % 
Positive 34.7 37.1 
Negative 30.6 35.3 
Neutral 34.7 27.6 
Both Cl and P 11 appear to attribute evenly across positive, neutral and negative 
outcomes. 
Table 73: Emotion 
Emotion C1.0 Attributions % Pll Attributions % 
Positive 3.5 11.8 
Negative 1.7 8.6 
No emotion 94.8 79.6 
Performer 1 makes more attributions containing an emotional content, both positive 
and negative, than does Coach 1. 
T bl 74 a e : S 'fi' f :;pecI IClty 0 outcome 
Outcome Cl.O Attributions % Pll Attributions % 
Event S£ecific 52.0 62.4 
Non-event specific 48.0 37.6 
Performer 11 tends to make more references to specific events within attributional 
statements than does Coach 1, although the difference is relatively small. 
Table 75: Time of season 
Time of the season C1.0 Attributions % Pll Attributions % 
Out of season 43.4 32.1 
Early competitive 14.5 21.3 
Main competitive 42.5 46.6 
A greater percentage of Performer II's attributions are made during the competitive 
season, early and main, than Coach 1. 
T bl 76 a e : Rti t d d' artn e erence 0 lya IC pI er 
Reference to dyadic partner? C1.0 Attributions % Pll Attributions % 
Yes 79.2 5.9 
No 20.8 94.1 
As expected, Coach 1 makes far greater reference to the performer than does the 
performer to the coach. 
Profile: Cl.lIP12 
T bl 77 S r a e : a lency 
Saliency Cl.l Attributions % P12 Attributions % 
Positive 46.5 41.6 
Negative 19.8 16.9 
Neutral 33.7 41.6 
Generally similar scores between Coach I.! and Perfonner 12. 
Table 7S' 
· 
Emotion 
Emotion Cl.l Attributions % P12 Attributions % 
Positive 10.5 3.4 
Negative 5.8 2.2 
No emotion 83.7 94.4 
In contrast to CIIPII, here Perfonner 12 displays less emotion than Coach 1.1 in the 
attributional statement. 
T bl 79 S 'fi't a e 
· 
specl IClty 
· Outcome Cl.l Attributions % P12 Attributions % 
Event specific 29.1 78.7 
Non-event specific 70.9 21.3 
Many more ofPerfonner 12's attributions refer to a specific event than do those of 
Coach 1.1. This is contrast to the patterns of attributions made by P 11. 
Table SO, 
· 
Time of season 
Time of the season Cl.l Attributions % P12 Attributions % 
Out of season 45.3 55.1 
Early competitive 44.2 44.9 
Main competitive 10.5 0.0 
Most attributions made by Coach 1.1 and Perfonner 12 are made either in the 'out of 
season' or 'early competition' phases. 
T bl SI a e : Rfi t d d' e erence 0 lya IC partner 
Reference to dyadic partner? Cl.l Attributions % P12 Attributions % 
Yes 96.5 5.6 
No 3.5 94.4 
Cl makes even greater reference within her attributions to PI2 than she does for PII. 
PI2 makes a similarly large percentage to PII of attributions making no reference to 
the coach. 
Profile: C2/P21 
T bl 82 S r a e : a lency 
Saliency C2 Attributions % P21 Attributions % 
Positive 18.1 17.9 
Negative 44.9 58.2 
Neutral 37.0 23.9 
The attributions made by Coach 2 and Perfonner 21 refer to a similar pattern of 
perceived outcomes, with a large percentage of negative outcomes relative to other 
dyads. 
Table 83' , Emotion 
Emotion C2 Attributions % P21 Attributions % 
Positive 0.0 10.4 
Negative 0.0 11.9 
No emotion 100.0 77.6 
The attributions made by Coach 2 contain no emotional sentiment, whereas a fifth of 
those made by Perfonner 21 contain a balance of positive and negative emotion. 
Table 84: Outcome 
Outcome C2 Attributions % P21 Attributions % 
Event specific 37.8 41.8 
Non-event specific 62.2 58.2 
Both Coach 2 and Perfonner 21 make more attributions for non-event specific 
outcomes than for event specific ones. 
Table 8S: Time of season 
Time of the season C2 Attributions % P21 Attributions % 
Out of season 65.4 64.2 
Early competitive 0.0 0.0 
Main competitive 34.6 35.8 
There are similar numbers of attributions made by Coach 2 and Perfonner 21 for out 
of season and competitive season phases. 
T bl 86 Rfi t d d' artn a e , e erence 0 lya lC p: er , 
Reference to dyadic partner? C2 Attributions % P21 Attributions % 
Yes 78.0 9.0 
No 22.0 91.0 
Once again, the perfonner makes little reference to the coach, whereas approximately 
a fifth of Coach 2' s attributions make reference to Perfonner 21. 
Profile: C3.0/P31 
T bl 87 S r a e : alency 
Saliency C3.0 Attributions % P31 Attributious % 
Positive 55.2 52.6 
Negative 22.1 26.7 
Neutral 22.7 20.7 
A similar pattern exists for outcome saliency for Coach 3' s and Performer 31 ' s 
attributions. 
Table 88: Emotion 
Emotion C3.0 Attributions % P31 Attributions % 
Positive 5.5 16.4 
Negative 0.0 2.6 
No emotion 94.4 SI.O 
Despite similar outcome saliency scores, attributions made by Performer 31 contain 
more emotion than do those of Coach 3. 
Table 89: Outcome 
Outcome C3.0 Attributions % P31 Attributions % 
Event sl'ecific 70.6 50.9 
Non·event specific 29.4 49.1 
Attributions made by Coach 3 are more event specific than are those of Performer 31, 
and are more event specific than the attributions made by Coach 3 for Performer 32. 
The tendency by Coach 3 to make attributions for event specific outcomes may reflect 
the number of attributions made for competitive outcomes. 
Table 90' . Time of season 
Time of the season C3.0 Attributions % P31 Attributions % 
Out of season 65.6 100.0 
Early competitive 0.0 0.0 
Main competitive 34.4 0.0 
Coach 3 makes a greater percentage of attributions for competitions than does 
Performer 31, whose attributions are all for training events. 
T bl 91 a e : Rfi t d d' e erence 0 lya IC partner 
Reference to dyadic partner? C3.0 Attributions % P31 Attributions % 
Yes 79.1 2.6 
No 19.6 97.4 
Profile: C3.1/P32 
T bl 92 S r a e : a lency 
Saliency C3.1 Attributions % P32 Attributions % 
Positive 31.4 50.S 
Negative 57.1 32.2 
Neutral 11.4 16.9 
Coach 3's attributions contain a large percentage of perceived negative outcomes 
compared with other coaches and Performer 32. 
Table 93' 
· 
Emotion 
Emotion C3.1 Attributions % P32 Attributions % 
Positive 5.7 13.6 
Negative 0.0 5.1 
No emotion 94.3 81.4 
Despite the saliency scores, Coach 3' s attributions contain little emotion. 
Table 94: Outcome 
Outcome C3.1 Attributions % P32 Attributions % 
Event specific 45.7 66.1 
Non-event specific 54.3 33.9 
Table 95' 
· 
Time of season 
Time of the season C3.1 Attributions % P32 Attributions % 
Out of season 22.9 98.3 
Early competitive 0.0 0.0 
Main competitive 77.1 1.7 
Most of the attributions made by Coach 3 are for competition outcomes, whereas 
nearly all Performer 32's attributions are for training outcomes. 
T bl 96 a e : Rfi t d d' artn e erence 0 lya lC pl er 
Reference to dyadic partner? C3.1 Attributions % P32 Attributions % 
Yes 82.3 1.7 
No 16.7 98.3 
Profile: C4.0/P41 
T bl 97 S r a e 
· 
a lency 
· Saliency C4.0 Attributions % P41 Attributions % 
Positive 30.2 30.8 
Negative 32.6 48.1 
Neutral 37.2 21.2 
A similar pattern exists for both coach and performer for positive outcomes but 
performers offer more negative outcomes than does the coach. 
Table 98: Emotion 
Emotion C4.0 Attributions % P41 Attributions % 
Positive 2.3 7.5 
Negative 4.7 2.5 
No emotion 93.0 90.0 
The vast majority of attributions made by Coach 4 and Performer 41 contain no 
emotions. 
Table 99: Outcome 
Outcome C4.0 Attributions % P41 Attributions % 
Event specific 48.8 70.0 
Non-event specific 51.2 27.5 
Default 2.5 
The perfonner offers more event-specific attributions than does the coach. 
Table 100· Time of season 
· Time of the season C4.0 Attributions % P41 Attributions % 
Out of season 76.7 100.0 
Early competitive 0.0 0.0 
Main competitive 23.3 0.0 
Almost a quarter of Coach 4's attributions are for competitive outcomes, whereas all 
attributions made by Perfonner 41 are for training outcomes. 
T bl 101 RfI t d d· artn a e 
· 
e erence 0 lya IC p~ er 
· Reference to dyadic partner? C4.0 Attributions % P41 Attributions % 
Yes 93.0 17.5 
No 7.0 82.5 
Profile: C4.1/P42 
T bl 102 S )" a e : a lency 
Saliency C4.1 Attributions % P42 Attributions % 
Positive 43.8 44.8 
Negative 23.4 31.3 
Neutral 32.8 23.9 
Coach and perfonner offer a similar percentage of positive outcomes, but the 
perfonner offers more negative outcomes than does the coach. 
Table 103: Emotion 
Emotion C4.1 Attributions % P42 Attributions % 
Positive 15.6 lOA 
Negative 3.1 6.0 
No emotion 81.3 83.6 
A large number of attributions, relative to other participants, contain (largely) positive 
emotion. 
Table 104: Outcome 
Outcome C4.1 Attributions % P42 Attributions % 
Event specific 53.1 70.1 
Non-event specific 46.9 26.9 
A larger number ofPerfonner 42's attributions, compared with Coach 4, relate to 
specific events. 
Table 105· Time of season 
· Time of the season C4 Attributions % P42 Attributions % 
Out of season 81.3 100.0 
Early competitive 0.0 0.0 
Main competitive 18.8 0.0 
T bl 106 a e : Rfi t d d· artn e erence 0 aya IC jJl er 
Reference to dyadic partner? C4.1 Attributions % P42 Attributions % 
Yes 81.3 0.0 
No 18.8 100.0 
None of Performer 42's attributions make reference to the coach. 
Profile: C5/P51 
T bl 107 S r a e : a lency 
Salienc2' CS Attributions % PSI Attributions % 
Positive 46.5 51.2 
Negative 29.1 26.2 
Neutral 24.5 22.6 
Similar patterns exist for all outcome categories, with a large number of positive 
outcomes in comparison with other dyads. 
Table 108: Emotion 
Emotion CS Attributions % PSI Attributions % 
Positive 4.5 28.6 
Negative 5.5 4.8 
No emotion 90.0 66.7 
A large percentage of Performer 51' s attributions contain emotions, primarily 
positive. 
Table 109· Outcome 
· Outcome CS Attributions % PSI Attributions % 
Event specific 69.1 71.4 
Non-event specific 30.9 28.6 
Table 110· Time of season 
· Time of the season CS Attributions % PSI Attributions % 
Out of season 100.0 100.0 
Early competitive 0.0 0.0 
Main competitive 0.0 0.0 
T bl 111 a e : Rfi t d d· artn e erence 0 lya le p: er 
Reference to dyadic partner? CS Attributions % PSI Attributions % 
Yes 62.7 1.2 
No 37.3 98.8 
A relatively large percentage of Coach 5'5 attributions make no reference to 
Performer 51. 
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